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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF MARX'S THOUGHT

George Lichtheim

A CONSIDERATION of the phenomenon called 'Marxism' has an obvious starting-point in Marx's own reflections on the subject of intellectual systematisations. According to him, they were either 'scientific' (in which case they entered into the general inheritance of mankind), or 'ideological', and then fundamentally irrelevant, for every ideology necessarily misconceived the real world, of which science (*Wissenschaft*) was the theoretical reflection. Yet it is a truism that Marxism has itself in some respects acquired an ideological function. How has this transmutation come about, and what does it tell us about the theoretical breakthrough which Marx effected and which his followers for many years regarded as a guarantee against the revival of 'ideological' thinking within the movement he had helped to create?

Regarded from the Marxian viewpoint, which is that of the 'union of theory and practice', the transformation of a revolutionary *theory* into the *ideology* of a post-revolutionary, or pseudo-revolutionary, movement is a familiar phenomenon. In modern European history—to go back no further—it has furnished a theme for historical and sociological reflections at least since the aftermath of the French Revolution. Indeed, there is a sense in which Marx's own thought (like that of Comte and others) took this experience as its starting-point. In the subsequent socialist critique of liberalism, the latter's association with the fortunes of the newly triumphant bourgeoisie furnished a topic not only for Marxists. But it was the latter who drew the conclusion that the 'emancipation of the working class' had been placed upon the historical agenda by the very success of the liberal bourgeoisie in creating the new world of industrial capitalism. In so far as 'Marxism', during the later nineteenth century, differed from other socialist schools, it signified just this: the conviction that the 'proletarian revolution' was *an historical necessity*. If then we are obliged to note that the universal aims of the Marxist school, and the actual tendencies of the empirical workers' movement, have become discontinuous (to put it mildly), we shall have to characterise Marxism as the 'ideology' of that movement during a relatively brief historical phase which now appears to be closed. The phase itself was linked to the climax of the 'bourgeois revolution' in those European countries where the labour movement stood in the forefront of the political struggle for democracy, at the same time that it groped for a socialist theory of the coming post-bourgeois order. Historically, Marxism fulfilled itself when it brought about the upheaval of 1917–18 in Central and Eastern Europe. Its subsequent evolution into the ideology of the world communist movement, for all the latter's

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evident political significance, has added little to its theoretical content. Moreover, so far as Soviet Marxism and its various derivations are concerned, the original 'union of theory and practice' has now fallen apart.

This approach to the subject is not arbitrary, but follows from the logic of the original Marxian conception of the *practical* function of *theory*. It was no part of Marx's intention to found yet another political movement, or another 'school of thought'. His prime purpose as a socialist was to articulate the practical requirements of the labour movement in its struggle for emancipation. His theoretical work was intended as a 'guide to action'. If it has ceased to serve as such, the conclusion imposes itself that the actual course of events has diverged from the theoretical model which Marx had extrapolated from the political struggles of the nineteenth century. In fact it is today generally agreed among Western socialists that the model is inappropriate to the post-bourgeois industrial society in which we live, while its relevance to the belated revolutions in backward pre-industrial societies is purchased at the cost of growing divergence between the utopian aims and the actual practices of the communist movement. From a different viewpoint the situation may be summed up by saying that while the bourgeois revolution is over in the West, the proletarian revolution has turned out to be an impossibility: at any rate in the form in which Marx conceived it in the last century, for the notion of such a revolution giving rise to a classless society has now acquired a distinctly utopian ring. Conversely, the association of socialism with some form of technocracy—understood as the key role of a new social stratum in part drawn from the industrial working class, which latter continues to occupy a subordinate function—has turned out to be much closer than the Marxist school had expected. In short, the 'union of theory and practice' has dissolved because the working class has not in fact performed the historic role assigned to it in Marx's theory, and because the gradual socialisation of the economic sphere in advanced industrial society has gone parallel with the emergence of a new type of social stratification. On both counts, the 'revisionist' interpretation of Marxism—originally a response to the cleavage between the doctrine and the actual practice of a reformist labour movement—has resulted in the evolution of a distinctively 'post-Marxian' form of socialist theorising, while the full doctrinal content of the original systematisation is retained, in a debased and caricatured form, only in the so-called 'world view' of Marxism-Leninism: itself the ideology of a totalitarian state-party which has long cut its connections with the democratic labour movement. While the Leninist variant continues to have operational value for the communist movement—notably in societies where that movement has taken over the traditional functions of the bourgeois revolution—the classical Marxian position has been undercut by the development of Western society. In this sense, Marxism (like liberalism) has become 'historical'. Marx's current academic status as a major thinker in the familiar

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succession from Hegel (or indeed from Descartes-Hobbes-Spinoza) is simply another manifestation of this state of affairs.[1]

WHILE the inter-relation of theory and practice is crucial for the evaluation of Marx—far more so than for Comte who never specified an historical agent for the transition to the 'positive stage'—it does not by itself supply a criterion for judging the permanent value of Marx's theorising in the domains of philosophy, history, sociology, or economics. In principle there is no reason why his theoretical discoveries should not survive the termination of the attempt to construct a 'world view' which would at the same time serve as the instrument of a revolutionary movement. This consideration is reinforced by the further thought that the systematisation was after all undertaken by others—principally by Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Lenin—and that Marx cannot be held responsible for their departures from his original purpose, which was primarily critical. While this is true, the history of Marxism as an intellectual and political phenomenon is itself a topic of major importance, irrespective of Marx's personal intentions. Moreover, it is arguable that both the 'orthodox' codification undertaken by Engels, and the various subsequent 'revisions', have their source in Marx's own ambiguities as a thinker.

So far as Engels is concerned, the prime difficulty arises paradoxically from his life-long association with Marx. This, combined with his editorial and exegetical labours after Marx's death, conferred a privileged status upon his own writings, even where his private interests diverged from those of Marx, e.g. in his increasing absorption in problems peculiar to the natural sciences. While Engels was scrupulous in emphasising his secondary role in the evolution of their common viewpoint,[2] he allowed it to be understood that the 'materialist' metaphysic developed in such writings as the *Anti-Dühring* was in some sense the philosophical counterpart of Marx's own investigations into history and economics. Indeed his very modesty was a factor in causing his quasi-philosophical writings to be accepted as the joint legacy of Marx and himself. The long-run consequences were all the more serious in that Engels, unlike Marx, lacked proper training in philosophy and had no secure hold upon any part of the philosophical tradition, save for the Hegelian system, of which in a sense he remained a life-long prisoner. The 'dialectical' materialism, or monism, put forward in the *Anti-Dühring*, and in the essays on natural philosophy eventually published in 1925 under the title *Dialectics of Nature*, has only the remotest connection with Marx's own viewpoint, though it is a biographical fact of some importance that

[1] Cf. *inter alia* the treatment of the subject in *Karl Marx—Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, ed. T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel (London, 1956), and the recent spate of editions of Marx's early writings. Historically, the interpretation of Marxism as the theory of a revolutionary movement which has now come to an end, goes back to the writings of Karl Korsch; cf. in particular his *Karl Marx* (London-New York, 1938, 1963).

[2] Cf. in particular his letter to F. Mehring of 14 July 1893, and the *Preface* to the English edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*.

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Marx raised no objection to Engels's exposition of the theme in the *Anti-Dühring*. The reasons for this seeming indifference must remain a matter for conjecture. What cannot be doubted is that it was Engels who was responsible for the subsequent interpretation of 'Marxism' as a unified system of thought destined to take the place of Hegelianism, and indeed of classical German philosophy in general. That it did so only for German Social-Democracy, and only for one generation, is likewise an historical factum. The subsequent emergence of Soviet Marxism was mediated by Plekhanov and Lenin, and differs in some respects from Engels's version, e.g. in the injection of even larger doses of Hegelianism, but also in the introduction by Lenin of a species of voluntarism which had more in common with Bergson and Nietzsche than with Engels's own rather deterministic manner of treating historical topics. In this sense Leninism has to be regarded as a 'revision' of the orthodox Marxism of Engels, Plekhanov, and Kautsky. The whole development has obvious political, as well as intellectual, significance. I have dealt with it at some length elsewhere, and must here confine myself to the observation that Soviet Marxism is to be understood as a monistic system *sui generis*, rooted in Engels's interpretation of Marx, but likewise linked to the pre-Marxian traditions of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. Unlike 'orthodox' Marxism, which in Central Europe functioned for a generation as the 'integrative ideology' of a genuine workers' movement, Soviet Marxism was a pure intelligentsia creation, wholly divorced from the concerns of the working class. Its unconscious role has been to equip the Soviet intelligentsia (notably the technical intelligentsia) with a cohesive world-view adequate to its task in promoting the industrialisation and modernisation of a backward country. Of the subsequent dissemination and vulgarisation of this ideology in China and elsewhere, it is unnecessary to speak.[3]

In the light of what was said above about the transformation of Marxism from a revolutionary critique of bourgeois society into the systematic ideology of a non-revolutionary, or post-revolutionary, labour movement in Western Europe and elsewhere, this contrasting, though parallel, development in the Soviet orbit presents itself as additional confirmation of our thesis. The latter assigns to Marxism a particular historical status not dissimilar from that of liberalism: another universal creed which has evolved from the philosophical assumptions and hypotheses of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The universal content is, however,

[3] It is impossible here to document the links in the historical chain leading from Engels to Lenin and beyond, but reference should be made to Plekhanov's essay 'Zu Hegels sechzigstem Todestag', originally published in *Neue Zeit*, November 1891, and reprinted in G. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow, 1961), vol. I, p. 455 ff. Lenin's contribution to the 'philosophical' debate in his *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1909) is well-known, as is his belated discovery of Hegel; cf. his *Philosophical Notebooks* of 1914–16, now reprinted in vol. 38 of the *Collected Works*. The embarrassment caused to his editors by the evident incompatibility of the rather simple-minded epistemological realism expounded in the earlier work with the more 'dialectical' approach of the *Notebooks* is among the minor charms of Soviet philosophical theorising.

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differently distributed. Liberalism was from the start markedly reluctant to disclose its social origins and sympathies, whereas Marxism came into being as the self-proclaimed doctrine of a revolutionary class movement. The humanist approach was retained in both cases, but whereas liberal philosophy in principle denies any logical relation between the social origin of a doctrine and its ethico-political content, Marxism approached the problem by constituting the proletariat as the 'universal' class, and itself as the theoretical expression of the latter's struggle for emancipation: conceived as synonymous with mankind's effort to raise itself to a higher level. Hence whereas for contemporary liberalism the unsolved problem resides in the unacknowledged social content of its supposedly universal doctrine, the difficulty for Marxism arises from the failure of the proletariat to fulfil the role assigned to it in the original 'critical theory' of 1843–48, as formulated in Marx's early writings and in the *Communist Manifesto*. Whereas liberalism cannot shake off the death-grip of 'classical', i.e. bourgeois economics—for which the market economy remains the centre of reference—Marxism (at any rate in its communist form) is confronted with the awkward dissonance between its universal aims and the actual record of the class upon whose political maturity the promised deliverance from exploitation and alienation is held to depend. There is the further difference that the Marxian 'wager' on the proletariat represents an 'existential' option (at any rate for intellectuals stemming from another class), whereas liberalism—in principle anyhow—claims to be in tune with the commonsense outlook of educated 'public opinion'. This divergence leads back to a consideration of the philosophical issues inherent in the original codification of 'orthodox Marxism'.

MARX'S early theoretical standpoint, as set out in the *Holy Family* (1845) and the *German Ideology* (1845–46), was a development of French eighteenth-century materialism, minus its Cartesian physics and the related epistemological problem in which he took no interest. The basic orientation of this materialism was practical, and its application to social life led in the direction of socialism, once it was admitted that between man and his environment there was an interaction which left room for a conscious effort to remodel his existence. As Marx put it in the *Holy Family*, 'If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be made human. If man is social by nature he will develop his true nature only in society. . . .'[4] Materialism or naturalism (the terms are employed interchangeably by Marx) is the foundation of communism. This conclusion follows *necessarily*, once it is grasped that the material conditions of human existence can and must be altered if man is to reach his full stature. Materialism is revolutionary because when applied to society it discloses what the idealist hypostatisation of 'spirit' obscures: that man's history is a constant struggle with his material environment, a struggle in which man's 'nature' is formed

[4] *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter MEGA), I/3, pp. 307–8.

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and re-formed. The historicity of human nature, which is a necessary consequence of this anthropological naturalism, raises the question what criterion we possess for judging the activities of men in their effort to subdue the non-human environment: an effort mediated by social intercourse with other men, since it is only in and through society that men become conscious of themselves.[5] The answer Marx gives is open to criticism on the grounds of circularity, since it amounts to saying that man's 'nature' is constituted by his *Praxis*, i.e. his capacity for constituting a man-made world around him. However this may be, it is plain that for Marx the only 'nature' that enters into consideration is man's own, plus his surroundings which he transforms by his 'practical activity'. The external world, as it exists in and for itself, is irrelevant to a materialism which approaches history with a view to establishing what men have made of themselves. It is doubly irrelevant because, on the Marxian assumption, the world is never simply 'given' to consciousness, any more than man himself is the passive receptacle of sense impressions. An external environment true knowledge of which is possible in abstraction from man's active role in moulding the object of perception, is a fantasy. The only world we know is the one we have constituted—that which appears in our experience. The 'subjective' nature of this experience is checked by its social character, which in turn is rooted in the permanent constituents of man as a 'species being' (*Gattungswesen*) who 'comes to himself' in society. There is, in the strict sense, no epistemological problem for Marx. The dialectic of perception and natural environment cannot, in his view, be compressed into a formula, for 'reason' is itself historical and its interaction with nature is just what appears in history. Man has before him a 'historical nature', and his own 'natural history' culminates in his conscious attempt to reshape the world of which he forms part.

The notion that this anthropological naturalism is anchored in a general theory of the universe finds no support in Marx's own writings. There is no logical link between it and the 'dialectical materialism' of Engels and Plekhanov, any more than there is a necessary connection between Marx's pragmatic view of conscious mental activity as an aspect of *Praxis* and the epistemological realism of Lenin. Indeed, in the latter case there is positive incongruity. Perception as a mirror-image of an external reality which acts upon the mind through physical stimuli has no place in Marx's theory of consciousness. The copy theory of perception set out in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (apart from being inadequate and self-contradictory in the way Lenin presents it) is incompatible with the Marxian standpoint. Its formulation arose from the accidental problem of working out a new theoretical basis for the natural sciences—a problem in which Marx had taken no interest. It also

[5] 'Language, like consciousness, . . . arises . . . from the necessity of intercourse with other men. . . . Hence consciousness from the very start is a social product and remains one as long as men exist at all'. *The German Ideology* (MEGA, I/5, p. 19).

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involved a divergence from Engels's approach, since materialism for Engels was not the same as epistemological realism. In Engels's quasi-Hegelian treatment of this theme, 'matter' conserved some of the attributes of a primary substance which was somehow involved in the constitution of the universe. The difference between idealism and materialism was seen by Engels to lie in the former's claim to the ontological pre-eminence of mind or spirit, whereas natural science was supposed by him to have established the materiality of the world in an absolute or ultimate sense. The resulting medley of metaphysical materialism and Hegelian dialectics (first described as 'dialectical materialism' by Plekhanov) was conserved by Lenin, but his own theory of cognition—which was what mattered to him—was not strictly speaking dependent on it. Matter as an absolute substance, or constitutive element of the universe, is not required for a doctrine which merely postulates that the mind is able to arrive at universally true conclusions about the external world given to the senses. Lenin's standpoint in fact is compatible with any approach which retains the ontological priority of the external world (however constituted) over the reflecting mind. Belief in the existence of an objective reality is not peculiar to materialists. It is, moreover, only very tenuously connected with the doctrine of nature's ontological primacy over spirit, which Lenin had inherited from Engels and which was important to him as a defence against 'fideism'.

The whole confusion becomes comprehensible only when it is borne in mind that the transformation of Marx's own naturalism into a metaphysical materialism was a practical necessity for Engels and his followers, without being a logical one. It was required to turn 'Marxism' into a coherent *Weltanschauung*, first for the German labour movement and later for the Soviet intelligentsia. As such it has continued to function, notwithstanding its philosophical inadequacies, but it has also suffered the fate of other systematisations undertaken for non-scientific reasons. At the same time it has paradoxically served to weaken the appeal of Marx's own historical materialism, since the latter was supposedly derived from a metaphysical doctrine of the universe—or an indefensible theory of cognitive perception—with which in reality it had no connection whatever.

TO grasp the full extent of this intellectual disaster it is necessary to see what Marx intended when he applied his realistic mode of thought to the understanding of history. The doctrine sketched out in his early writings (notably in the first section of the *German Ideology*), and subsequently given a succinct formulation in the well-known *Preface* to the 1859 *Critique of Political Economy*, was 'materialist' in that it broke with the traditional 'idealist' procedure wherein ordinary material history was treated as the unfolding of principles laid up in the speculative heavens. The primary datum for Marx was the 'real

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life-process' in which men are engaged, the 'production and reproduction of material existence', as he put it on some occasions. In this context, the so-called higher cultural activities appeared as the 'ideological reflex' of the primary process whereby men organise their relationship to nature and to each other. Whatever may be said in criticism of this approach, it is quite independent of any metaphysical assumptions about the ontological priority of an absolute substance called 'matter', though for evident psychological reasons it was easy to slide from 'historical' to 'philosophical' materialism. Even so, the grounding of the former in the latter does not necessarily entail the further step of suggesting that human history is set in motion and kept going by a 'dialectical' process of contradiction within the 'material basis'. Such a conclusion follows neither from the materialist principle nor from the quasi-Hegelian picture Marx drew in the 1859 *Preface*, where he referred briefly to the succession of stages from 'Asiatic society', via Antiquity and the Middle Ages, to the modern (European) epoch. Marx's own historical research (notably in the *Grundrisse* of 1857–58) stressed the radical discontinuity of these 'historical formations'. It is by no means the case that the emergence of European feudalism from the wreck of ancient society was treated by him as a matter of logical necessity. Even in relation to the rise of capitalism he was careful to specify the unique historical preconditions which made possible the 'unfolding' of the new mode of production. The notion of a dialectical 'law' linking primitive communism, via slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, with the mature communism of the future, was once more the contribution of Engels, who in this as in other matters bore witness to the unshakeable hold of Hegel's philosophy upon his own cast of mind.

The reverse side of this medal is the ambiguous relationship of Marx and Engels to Comte, and of Marxism to Positivism. The point has occasionally been made [6] that in dealing with the rise of the 'historical school' in nineteenth-century Europe, one has to go back to the intermingling of Hegelian and Comtean strands in the 1830s—mediated in some cases by writers who had actually studied under both Comte and Hegel.[7] It is also arguable that Marx may have been more deeply influenced by Comte than he was himself aware, since some of Saint-Simon's later writings are now known to have been in part drafted by his then secretary. However this may be, it is undeniable that the general effect of Engels's popularisation of Marx ran parallel to the more direct influence of Positivism properly so called. With only a slight exaggeration it may be said that 'Marxism' (as interpreted by Engels) eventually came to do for Central and Eastern Europe what Positivism had done for the West: it acquainted the public with a manner of viewing the world which was 'materialist' and 'scientific', in the

[6] e.g. by F. A. Hayek, in *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Glencoe, 1955), especially p. 191 ff.

[7] Ibid. p. 193.

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precise sense which these terms possessed for writers who believed in extending to history and society the methods of the natural sciences. While Marx had taken some tentative steps in this direction, it was Engels who committed German socialism wholeheartedly to the new viewpoint.

At first sight it is not apparent why a Hegelian training in philosophy should predispose anyone in favour of the Comtean approach, which in some respects stands at the opposite pole. Moreover, Marx owed more to the French materialists than did Engels, so that there appears to be a certain paradox in the notion that the fusion of Hegelian and Comtean modes of thought was mediated by the latter. It must, however, be borne in mind that the *Philosophie Positive* had two aspects. In so far as it stressed the purely empirical character of science and dispensed with metaphysical explanations, it belonged to the tradition of the Enlightenment, in its specifically French 'materialist' form (which was the only one Marx took seriously). In so far as it aimed at a universal history of mankind, its influence ran parallel to that of Hegelianism. Now the peculiarity of Marx's 'historical materialism' is that it combines universalism and empiricism. For Marx (e.g. in the *Preface* to the 1859 work), the historical process has an internal logic, but investigation into the actual sequence of socio-economic formations is a matter for empirical research. The link between the two levels of generality is to be found in the interaction between technology ('forces of production') and society ('relations of production'). This interaction, however, is not uniform, i.e. not of such a kind that the historical outcome can be predicted in each case with reference to a general law abstracted from the principle of interaction. Unlike Hegel, Marx does not treat history as the unfolding of a metaphysical substance, and unlike Comte he does not claim to be in possession of an operational key which will unlock every door. Even the statement that 'mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve'[8] is simply an extrapolation from the empirically observable circumstance that in every sphere of life (including that of art) problems and solutions have a way of emerging jointly. A formulation of this kind is at once too general and too flexible to be termed a 'law'. It is a working hypothesis to be confirmed or refuted by historical experience. Similarly, the statement that socialism grows 'necessarily' out of capitalism is simply a way of saying that economic conflict poses an institutional problem to which socialism supplies the only rational answer. Whether one accepts or rejects this, Marx is not here laying down a 'law', let alone a universal law. On his general assumptions about history, the failure to solve this particular problem (or any other) remained an open possibility. In such a case there would doubtless be regress, perhaps even a catastrophe. The 'relentless onward march of civilisation' is a Comtean, not a Marxian, postulate. If the second generation of his followers understood Marx to have expounded

[8] Op. cit.; cf. *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1951), I p. 363.

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a kind of universal optimism, they thoroughly misunderstood the meaning and temper of his message.[9]

In relation to bourgeois society the Marxian approach may be summarised by saying that this formation contains within itself the germs of a higher form of social organisation. Whether these latent possibilities are utilised depends upon historical circumstances which have to be investigated in their concreteness. One cannot deduce from a general law of social evolution the alleged necessity for one type of society to give birth to a more developed one—otherwise it would be incomprehensible why classical Antiquity regressed and made room for a primitive type of feudalism, instead of evolving to a higher level. In fact Marx held that the collapse had been brought about by the institution of slavery, which was both the basis of that particular civilisation and the organic limit of its further development.[10] In principle the same might happen again. If Marx makes the assumption that the industrial working class is the potential bearer of a higher form of social organisation, he is saying no more than that no other class appears capable of transcending the *status quo*. What might be called the existential commitment of Marxism to the labour movement follows from this assumption. Like every commitment it carries with it the implied possibility of failure. Were it otherwise, there would be no sense in speaking of 'tasks' confronting the movement: it would be enough to lay down a 'law' of evolution in the Comtean or Spencerian manner. Belief in an evolutionary 'law' determining the procession of historical stages was the mark of 'orthodox' Marxism, as formulated by Kautsky and Plekhanov under the influence of Spencer and other evolutionists, but also of Engels, whose synthesis of Hegelian and Comtean modes of thought made possible this fateful misunderstanding.

IN justice to all concerned it has to be borne in mind that Marxism and Positivism did have in common their descent from the Saint-Simonian school. It was in the latter that the notion of history as a developmental process subject to 'invariable laws' was first adumbrated in confused fashion, later to be given a more adequate formulation by Comte and Marx. The justification for treating these two very disproportionately gifted thinkers under the same heading arises from the evident circumstance that their contemporaries were affected by them in roughly similar ways. In general it might be said that Marx did for the Germans—notably for German sociology and the 'historical school' (Schmoller, Weber, Sombart, Troeltsch, etc.)—what Comte had earlier done for Durkheim and his school in France. And this assimilation of Comtean and Marxian modes of thought into the canon of academic sociology was evidently rendered possible by their commitment to the idea of history as the special mode of societal evolution. In saying this one is simply stating the obvious, though on occasion this does no harm.

[9] On this point cf. Korsch, op. cit., p. 51 ff.
[10] *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Berlin, 1953), p. 380 ff.

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It was Saint-Simon who had first laid it down that the proper business of social science is the discovery of laws of development governing the course of human history. To say that Marx, no less than Comte, remained true to this perspective is simply to say that he remained faithful to his intellectual origins (which in this case antedated the Hegelianism of his student days, since we know that he had come across Saint-Simonism while still a schoolboy). That human history forms a whole—in Hegelian terms a 'concrete totality'—was a certainty he never surrendered. There is the same attachment to the original vision in his oft-repeated statement that knowledge of the 'laws' underlying historical development will enable society to lessen the 'birthpangs' inseparable from the growth of a new social formation. Insight into the regularities of history is, by a seeming paradox, seen as the means of controlling the future course of development.

In all these respects Comte and Marx appeared to be saying the same thing, and it was this similarity which led so many Positivists to describe themselves as Marxists: notably in France, where indeed this identification became a factor in the evolution of the socialist movement. Yet the differences are as important as the similarities. Comte's sociology dispensed with the notion of class conflict, which for Marx was the central motor of historical progress. The Comtean view of society not only posited the latter as the basic reality—over against the state on the one hand, and the individual on the other—but also elevated it to a plane where the 'science of society' was seen to consist in the elucidation of an harmonious interdependence of all the parts. From the Marxian viewpoint this is sheer fantasy, a wilful disregard of the reality of conflict whereby alone social progress takes place. In the subsequent evolution of the two systems, this difference in approach translated itself *inter alia* into the conflicting doctrines of Russian Populism (heavily impregnated by Comte) and its Marxist rival. There is a sense in which the defeat of *Narodnichestvo* represented the victory of the Marxian over the Comtean school. The Russian Marxists were aware of this situation, and down to Lenin's polemics in the 1890s, the need to differentiate themselves from the Positivist belief in the organic unity of society played an important role in the development of their thinking.[11]

The last-mentioned consideration, however, also served to define the historical context within which the Marxian doctrine could expect to play a role in the formation of a revolutionary movement. When in the 1880s some former Populists turned from *Narodnichestvo* to Marxism, they did so because they found in Marx a convincing statement of the thesis that the economic process would 'slowly but unavoidably undermine the old regime', so that the Russian proletariat, 'in an historical development proceeding just as inexorably as the development of capitalism itself', would thereby be enabled to 'deal the deathblow to Russian

11 Cf. *inter alia* Plekhanov's writings of the 1880s (now reproduced in vol. I of his *Selected Works*). See also Ryazanov's preface to the 1929 German edition of Plekhanov's *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (1908).

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absolutism'.[12] In other words, what they found was *a theory of the bourgeois revolution.* The latter being a 'necessary' process—in the sense that the political 'superstructure' was bound, sooner or later, to be transformed by the autonomous evolution of the socio-economic realm—it was possible to interpret Marx's doctrine in a determinist sense. In *Capital* Marx had indeed done so himself, to the extent that he had treated the 'unfolding' of the new mode of production—once it had come into being—as a process independent of the conscious desires and illusions of its individual 'agents'. Hence the link between the 'materialist conception of history' and the notion of 'ideology' as 'false consciousness'.

What his contemporaries, and the first generation of his followers, failed to see was that the entire construction was strictly appropriate only to the evolution of bourgeois society, which in Western Europe was coming to an end, while in Russia the 'bourgeois revolution' was about to be carried through by a movement hostile to the traditional aims of the middle class. Marxism as a theory of the bourgeois revolution was destined to celebrate its triumph on Russian soil at the very moment when it began to falter in the post-bourgeois environment of Western industrial society. This discontinuity was later to be mirrored in the cleavage between the determinist character of 'orthodox Marxism' and the voluntarist strain which came to the fore in the theory and practice of the communist movement. The latter, faced with the evident exhaustion of the revolutionary impulse which had accompanied the great economic gearshift of the nineteenth century, was increasingly obliged to seek fresh sources of popular spontaneity in areas of the world not yet subjected to industrialism (whether capitalist or socialist). At the theoretical level, the uncomprehended necessity to find a substitute for the revolutionary proletariat of early capitalism—an aspect of the bourgeois revolution, for it is only the latter that rouses the working class to political consciousness—found its expression in the doctrine of the vanguard: an elite which substitutes itself for the class it is supposed to represent. This development signifies the dissolution of the Marxian 'union of theory and practice': a union originally built upon the faith that the working class *as such* can and will emancipate itself, and the whole of mankind, from political and economic bondage.

(*This essay was originally written for a 'Marx-Symposium' held at the University of Notre Dame in April* 1966. *It will be included in* Marx and the Western World, *edited by Nicholas Lobkowicz, to be published shortly by the University of Notre Dame Press.*)

[12] Cf. Plekhanov's pamphlet, *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883).

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PHILOSOPHERS IN MOSCOW

Eugene Kamenka

IN 1925, John Maynard Keynes set down his short view of Russia.[1] ' How can I adopt a creed ', he wrote, ' which preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry all the seeds of human advancement? Even if we need a religion, how can we find it in the turbid rubbish of the Red bookshops? It is hard for an educated, decent, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here, unless he has first suffered some strange and horrid process of conversion which has changed all his values '. Keynes' words seemed crude, harsh, and smug before I arrived in the Soviet Union; now they seem to me to express an important truth that I discovered in my ten months at Moscow State University. There *is* a boorish unintelligence and a sullen incompetence about Russian *public* life that one does not feel in Warsaw or Budapest, and that one feels much less in Riga and Tallin. Some of this is the sullenness of people who rightly feel themselves deprived children in a badly-run orphanage. Russia, like an orphanage, is a shabby, third-rate copy of life in the great society around it. Its inhabitants know full well that it is not so much different as inferior. The administration of the orphanage, and the conditions of life within it, are in fact improving. But forty years of sullen resentment have left deep scars, and the improvements are not great enough to produce a sudden and unfamiliar feeling of joy. Much of the sullenness is that of a peasant population becoming urbanised and finding itself in that transitional stage where it is no longer capable of living in the village and does not enjoy living in the towns. But a great deal that the intelligent foreigner finds most disagreeable in Russia *is* linked with the utter destruction of middle-class and intellectual values accompanying the virtually complete physical destruction of the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie. The social elevation of boorishness as a Soviet virtue can still be seen everywhere: in the behaviour of the women who check passes at every entrance into Moscow State University, in rudeness at hotels and restaurants, in the behaviour of professors at philosophical conferences, in the portrayal of Lenin as a mixture of boor and cunning peasant in the Moscow Art Theatre's production of *The Sixth of July*, and in the utter inability of any Moscow theatre to persuade us that St Petersburg balls were attended by a sophisticated aristocracy or that Vronsky was not his footman dressed up for a play.

There are in the Soviet Union significant pockets of privilege. In some of these, as in the special hotel for Central Committee members, boorishness is mixed with the crude enjoyment of a peasant conception of good living. In others, as in the House of Journalists, in the science

[1] In the essay ' A Short View of Russia ', published in J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (London, 1933), p. 300.

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faculties of Moscow State University, and in the cafés attended by Moscow's version of gilded youth, the boorishness is becoming very significantly modified by comparative sophistication, by a quiet admiration for the habits of the old intelligentsia, and an attempt to copy ordinary western standards of elegance and grace. The crudity of children reared in an orphanage is slowly being replaced, in some sectors, by the sophistication of men whose horizon is beginning to stretch beyond the communist world.

The philosophy faculty at Moscow State University is not such a pocket of privilege. The building in which it is housed is drab, dirty, and inconvenient [2]; there are no seminar rooms where people can sit and discuss philosophy in a relaxed and informal manner. Though there is a buffet with chairs and tables (bad enough not to be crowded), no one in my experience uses it as a place for extended conversation. Lectures are for the most part extremely formal and uninteresting readings of the familiar material set down in the conventional textbooks; they go on for two hours with a ten-minute break in the middle and are rarely interrupted by questions or discussion.[3] It was my impression that there was very little seminar or tutorial work, though this was denied by my Soviet colleagues. By far the most irritating and ludicrous part of everyday 'philosophical' activity were the constant *obsuzhdeniya*, (formal discussions of work or projects), and *zashchity* (defences of theses), conducted in every department of the faculty. There seemed to be a notion that these *obsuzhdeniya* and *zashchity* were a philosophical activity, and that the postgraduate students who were allowed to attend them were learning philosophy by being there. In point of fact they were for the most part simply absurd. An audience of thirty or forty people, of whom maybe five had actually read the paper being discussed, sat around talking while the 'opponents' made comments on the paper that were generally reminiscent of a public servant's report on a project suggested by another public servant. There was no attempt to follow up points in discussion, to *engage* in philosophy as an activity. At the suggestion that it would be far more valuable to listen to a paper being read, or to try to get the technical assistance that would make it possible to have papers circulated to all those interested, the more official Soviet

[2] This is one of the old buildings of Moscow University, situated in Okhotny Ryad and Mokhovaya Street, now called Marx Prospect, the earliest of which were rebuilt after the great fire of 1812. The philosophy building was added later in the nineteenth century. The philosophy faculty is to move into a new building on the Lenin Hills by the end of 1967, where its physical conditions should be much better, but still not good by western standards. The refusal of Soviet planners to take seriously the need to provide amenities for informal discussion partly reflects the crudity which the Soviets have elevated for so long, but I suspect it is also politically conditioned.

[3] There is an increasing number of exceptions to this: the undergraduate lectures given by Professor T. I. Oizerman, head of the department of the History of Foreign Philosophy, e.g., were lively, wide-ranging impromptu performances that would rate as good undergraduate lectures in any western university. But precisely because these lectures were so different from the normal attitudes to teaching and study on which the undergraduates had been raised, the undergraduates seemed to me to find them overpowering.

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philosophers simply looked blank. On top of this, a normal meeting will often provide for the consideration of two or three papers, and several items of business, on one afternoon. (Again I could not help feeling that these incredible arrangements had at least originated in the political convenience of a police state, which made sure that nothing got through unfiltered, even to a professional audience. It is, of course, not insignificant that many such arrangements *originated* with the requirements of the *Tsarist* police state and were found natural and convenient by the Bolsheviks.)

Even today, there is no doubt that philosophical discussion suffers seriously from a 'Leninist style', a mixture of the practical politician's concern with brief points to which you can say 'yes' or 'no', and a dislike of anything that introduces complexity, elegance, or learning. The Soviet philosopher, like Nezhdanov in Turgenev's *Virgin Soil,* is still constantly asked to simplify himself and, unlike Nezhdanov, he does not find it impossible. This habit of doing philosophy as though it were a matter of putting forward theses came out very strongly in the conference on Communism and Personality which I attended at the Institute of Philosophy. About fifty speakers, in sessions spread over two days, read short prepared statements, generally taking no more than fifteen minutes. There were signs of approval or disapproval, but no real discussion. Soviet philosophers who asked me what my impression was seemed puzzled when I said that I had none, that I just did not know what to make of the 'theses' being put forward unless I had the opportunity of hearing in proper detail the arguments with which the movers would support their theses. It must be said, however, that the conference was not simply badly organised: it fairly represented the dominant style of Soviet public philosophising. It is not enough that ill-mannered abuse is becoming rarer in Soviet philosophy. The philosophers still have before them the task of making room, in their philosophical activity, for extended discussion and detailed analysis. They must gradually come to grips with complexity and evolve a philosophical life that makes possible the consideration of complexity not only privately, in the study at home, but in the public meeting and discussion. Soviet philosophers so far have tended to replace the previous unanimous applause with Lenin's activist, totally unphilosophical, conception of a 'splendid congress', as set out in a footnote to his *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*: 'A free and open struggle. Opinions expressed. Tendencies revealed. Groups acquiring shape. Hands raised. A decision taken. A stage passed through. Forward! That's something I understand. So different from the endless word-choppings of intellectuals, which come to an end not because they have solved the problems but because they are tired of talking.'

THE formulation of public Soviet philosophical life, the effect of thinking of philosophy as the propounding of theses, also came out in the striking lack of flexibility in all but the very ablest of Soviet

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philosophers. Points must be made in the approved fashion, else they are not understood. They must be set into a rigid context by being given a title which indicates clearly the 'department of knowledge' to which they belong; else Soviet philosophers will get lost about the rules to apply to them. In the department of the History of Philosophy of the Peoples of the USSR I read a paper on the Marxist conception of the history of philosophy, which I criticised as containing a number of conflicting but unsatisfactory strands. I was told that I had simply misunderstood Marx, and objected in reply that this was odd, since the conflicting strands I had found in Marx could in fact be shown to have been exemplified in the various stages through which Soviet philosophy itself had passed in the last forty years. 'Ah', came the triumphant answer, 'if you wanted us to discuss this question you should have called your paper "the history of Soviet philosophy".' The speaker was serious. The title I had given the paper, incidentally, was one urged upon me by my supervisor—'The history of philosophy as a science'. He assured me—and I think he believed it—that this was the way in which my concern with the *integrity* of the history of philosophy could best be expressed in the Russian language, and seemed genuinely puzzled by my suggestion that this was a very queer use of the word 'science', a use that gave a totally false impression of what my views on the nature of either history or philosophy were.

The Russian language, it must be noted, still reflects the combined effects of separation from twentieth-century culture and of being subjected to a monolithic and rather crude ideology. One does not realise how much Freudianism, the new sociology, and the intellectual periodical press have enriched our language until one lives in a society in which none of these has been permitted to make any impact. I found it impossible to explain to Russians, in Russian, that their extremely hostile attitudes to China were in part a projection of their feelings about Stalin and their own past; the big Soviet English-Russian dictionary accurately reflects a *lacuna* in the Soviet mentality when it fails to list the psychological meaning of the word 'projection', and concentrates on rockets and drawing boards. It is almost impossible to tell a Russian philosopher, in Russian, that a point is important or unimportant, interesting or uninteresting, without finding oneself interpreted to be supporting the simple Soviet doctrine of essences, of that which is essential and that which is accidental or superficial. *Eto ne sushchestvenno* sounds educated and 'philosophical' in Russian; *eto ne interesno* or *eto ne vazhno* sounds as though one has abandoned philosophy for inexactitude, as though one has become 'unscientific'. In their use of jargon, Russian philosophers are still painfully and uncritically 'scientific'.

The foreigner, then, is still struck by the rigidity, considerable crudity, and lack of deep scholarship, complexity, and detailed analysis in Soviet philosophy, rather than by the high standards that Soviet official publications constantly claim for themselves. He will also be

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struck by the dearth of a tradition of serious monographic work on special questions. So much of the energy of Soviet philosophers has gone into low-level teaching and into the compilation and constant revision of general texts. A Soviet candidate's thesis that has a reading list of thirty or forty items (mostly of marginal relevance and representing three years' work) will commonly be thought to have covered the subject quite extensively; if the Soviet student wishes to consider Descartes, he still has only the book by Asmus; if he is interested in Hume, he will have to wait for the publication of Professor I. S. Narsky's book, now in the press. I myself had come to the Soviet Union to complete my book on Feuerbach, expecting to have a fair bit of material to consult. Had not A. M. Deborin written, as far back as 1922: 'Ludwig Feuerbach is unjustly forgotten in his native country. He is known and valued most of all in Russia, where revolutionary Marxism has always waged the most bitter struggle against idealism, making use in this struggle of the armour provided by the heritage of ideas from Feuerbach'? Yet when it came to my actual work, I found that forty years of Soviet philosophy had produced in all two significant monographs on Feuerbach—Deborin's and a recent book on Feuerbach's atheism by A. I. Ardabev. Compared with the detailed scholarly analyses to be found in a book like Rawidowicz's *Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophie,* they were simple and superficial compendia, mixing a fairly crude and simple line with fairly crude and simple exposition. The Soviet philosophy student is still in the position of doing much of his work from general and simple texts, laying down 'foundations' of ethics or of philosophy or of atheism, and from the three-volume history of philosophy edited by G. F. Aleksandrov in 1941.[4] These books function very much as cribs, and philosophy students thought it perfectly feasible to mug them up two weeks before the examination and gain a good pass. My experience was that they were right and that the Soviet system of examination—which requires a student to spend roughly fifteen to twenty minutes with the examiner, giving oral answers to three to five questions selected by ballot—encourages the awarding of high marks for 'correct' answers learnt by rote. Certainly the examinations seemed to me much too perfunctory to distinguish satisfactorily between the creative and original thinker and the cynical rote learner.

The lack of monographic literature, the unsearching character of examinations, and the comparatively low level of specialisation in the humanities and social sciences, reinforced by the low critical standards of public life generally, have produced among students and even post-graduate students a very poor appreciation of the standards of competence and the depth of research required from anyone who would expect to make an academic contribution in the West. A first-year student in the Soviet Union calls himself a lawyer or a philosopher, and this is not

[4] The six-volume history of philosophy, publication of which was completed while I was in Moscow in 1965 was—I think rightly—in poor repute among students for smothering genuine (i.e. western European) philosophy amid long sections on the philosophy of the peoples of Central Asia, the Far East, Bulgaria, and so on.

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merely a manner of speaking: he really seems to think that he has *mastered* at least all that part of the law or of philosophy with which he has already been concerned in his studies. This is very largely because of the lack of complexity of his studies, because of the emphasis placed by Soviet educators on essential principles and correct answers. At the celebration of May Day in Moscow university I watched a thousand students and lecturers sit gravely through a play meant to show Lenin displaying fantastic genius and brilliance of mind on the occasion of his oral examinations as a young student at university—routing, as you would expect, the professor of theology. The standards of ' brilliance ' accepted by the play and by most of the audience almost defy belief if one thinks of the place of presentation as being a genuine university. Lenin's breath-taking brilliance consists in being able to quote dates and figures relating to the history of the Church in Russia and its landholdings—precisely the sort of figures that we would expect a dull but industrious student to mug up in place of thinking. Yet professors in what was once a fairly good university are seriously portrayed as being astounded—in precisely the same way as the illiterate peasant of Russian folk stories is astounded by the man who can read. What people thought privately it is hard to tell—but certainly I found no immediate reactions showing any awareness that the play deserved the guffaws of laughter that it would have received in any western university.

Finally, one of the most important and most difficult adjustments that the foreign visitor has to make is to the cynicism of a great deal of Soviet philosophical life. There is, perhaps, no other field in which there is so great a disparity as in philosophy between what people believe and what they write and say on public professional occasions. Repeatedly, one reads candidates' theses of five chapters in which the middle three contain relatively simple but honest exposition, while the first and fifth contain a great deal of ideological rubbish. ' But please,' says the author, ' you must not judge me by those two ideological chapters. After all I want to get my degree.' No student that I met had any doubt that the same considerations applied to the better philosophical books published in the Soviet Union—that they never went more than part of the way towards expressing the opinion that the author really held. Undergraduates and graduate students have the same sort of cynicism about public philosophical discussions in the university; only in the private seminars at the Institute of Philosophy (seminars I was never invited to attend) would they expect people to speak in a comparatively unihibited way. Certainly one still feels that a great deal of the work criticising contemporary western philosophy is written by people whose primary motive is to gain thereby an opportunity of studying and expounding it intelligently.

THE aspects of philosophical life in the Soviet Union that I have stressed so far are the ones which the foreigner, looking only for *blatant* political pressure, may find more striking because they are in a

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way more unexpected and more specifically Russian. They apply much less in countries like Poland or Hungary or Yugoslavia, where I found it far easier to talk to philosophers, where I was invited to their homes and engaged in hour-long discussions about specific questions, where I found that people did not feel themselves cut off—as Russian philosophers do—from the world of polite and of philosophical discourse. The aspects I have stressed remain very serious impediments to philosophical life in the Soviet Union precisely because they are no longer simply imposed from above, because they have also become iron in the soul of a great many Russian philosophers, who will not concede that my objection to them is anything but a matter of taste. It must be stressed, however, that once we recognise that the development of Soviet philosophy has been proceeding from a very poor foundation, and amid unsatisfactory conditions, the striking thing is that the development is firmly and unquestionably in the direction of producing better philosophical teaching and better philosophical work. There was not a single project discussed, not a single policy decision taken, in the ten months that I was at the philosophy faculty in 1965–66, that did not seem to me a move in the right direction. Originally, philosophy suffered a great deal in the Soviet Union from the fact that it was regarded as a purely postgraduate activity. When the undergraduate philosophy faculties were formed, it was still customary for people to be able to enrol only after a period of productive work, earning them the right to enter. Those who wished, after completing the five-year course, to become postgraduate *aspirants* for the *candidate* degree, had to spend another period of productive work, often teaching low-level philosophy in provincial institutions, before they could be admitted to the three-year *aspirantura.* It is one of the features of Soviet university life, reflecting both the desire to avoid making political interference obvious and the frequency with which such interference leads to changes, that rules and regulations are not published in any easily accessible form. But all the philosophers I met were extremely critical of these periods in productive work, in which people lost the habit of study, and told me proudly that from 1966 onward the philosophy faculty at Moscow would accept students straight from the schools, and that an increasing number of really good undergraduates were being kept at the university to continue postgraduate work in philosophy without having to spend a period 'simplifying' themselves. The department of History of Foreign Philosophy—by far the most respected in the philosophy faculty, and rightly so—was constantly extending its influence: an influence exercised in the wholly laudable direction of arguing that the study of philosophical problems requires close acquaintance with the leading philosophical ideas of classical and contemporary western philosophy. Professor I. S. Narsky, a former member of the department who has specialised in Hume and aspects of philosophical logic, moved over to become head of the department of logic, where he did a great deal—in the face of some rather nasty but unsuccessful opposition—to promote the study of formal

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and symbolic logic, while insisting that dialectical logic was best studied in conjunction with dialectical materialism. The latter department, like dialectical logic generally, I found to have gained very little respect from undergraduates and graduates. The department of atheism, insisting that the criticism of religion requires a thorough knowledge of religion, has built up one of the finest departmental libraries in the philosophy faculty—primarily because religious works, including the Bible and the Koran, are still banned from the second-hand bookshops and are still very difficult to obtain in the bigger libraries. The department of ethics and aesthetics, headed by M. F. Ovsiannikov, a philosopher with a serious interest in Hegel, is encouraging much more detailed studies of aesthetic categories and aesthetic problems than the Soviet Union has seen in the past, while ethics will probably be given the dignity of a separate department of its own. Certainly, as in the West, there is growing up in the philosophy faculty a feeling that problems must be studied in detail, that students must be encouraged to read literature at first hand, and that the publication of serious monographic literature is the way both to philosophical recognition and to quicker academic promotion. One has the impression that having political connections, while still important and useful, is no longer a satisfactory substitute for being philosophically competent.

In these circumstances, a certain healthy philosophical arrogance is developing among those who feel themselves to be philosophically educated, or to be the students of those who are philosophically educated. There is a deep contempt for what are widely regarded as the philosophical illiterates who succeeded in forcing A. M. Deborin out of Soviet philosophical life and dominating it in his stead in the period from 1931 to 1956. There is considerable admiration for those who know foreign languages and who have studied closely western European philosophers: V. F. Asmus enjoys tremendous respect (though he is now too old to become organisationally influential) precisely because he is for the Soviet student the paradigm of the best a local philosopher can be—non-party, committed to scholarship, and well acquainted with western European thought. (It is nevertheless a sign of the low standards from which Soviet philosophy is having to recover that not one of Asmus's books, taking account of all the difficulties he is labouring under, can be regarded as more than the kind of book we would reasonably expect from any competent academic writing on Descartes or Aristotle today. The very range of Professor Asmus's writing, his readiness to move from classical philosophy to Cartesianism to mathematics, bears witness to the poorly developed state of Soviet scholarship, which still makes it possible for a man to become an authority on a philosophical period in a relatively short space of time.)

THE general trend that I observed in the philosophy faculty, then, was a constant movement towards greater philosophical integrity and seriousness, towards higher requirements and greater specialisation,

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towards the building up, in short, of a more academic frame of mind and a more academic system of instruction and selection. One had no doubt of the sincerity of a number of leading Soviet philosophers, especially in the middle age-range, in wanting to see philosophy more seriously taught and more professionally examined. This trend is displayed in the increasing importance ascribed to academic achievement in selecting people for entrance to the faculty, for postgraduate work, and for staff appointments. It is displayed in pressure exercised by members of the faculty on State publishing houses, whom they are urging to republish more of such ' non-materialist ' philosophers as Plato, Descartes, Hume, and Kant. (The two-volume edition of Hume published under the editorship of I. S. Narsky in 1966 is the first Russian edition of Hume since the Revolution.) There is a certain discouraging of the over-simplified Marxist account in monographic publications. A young member of the department of aesthetics, E. G. Yakovlev, was refused the comparatively high Soviet degree of doctor of philosophical sciences for his book *Aesthetic Feeling and Religious Experience*, which his critics regarded as ' too crude ' in its claim that religious art was possible only in so far as it portrayed, in religious guise, a non-religious human experience. There is also a general quickening of interest in what was previously regarded as the idealist or anti-materialist strain in the history of philosophy both in Russia and abroad. I. P. Chuyeva, in her *Criticism of the Ideas of Intuitionism in Russia*, attempts a serious account of the philosophical views of N. O. Lossky, S. L. Frank, and V. F. Ern. We are beginning to see sympathetic work on the Russian constitutional-democrat and anti-Marxist M. M. Kovalevsky, especially as a sociologist, and in private I found even greater interest in Sorokin and Berdyaev. When I was preparing a paper on Hume's treatment of religion, just before the two-volume Soviet edition of Hume came out, I had the greatest difficulty in getting the works of Hume because both pre-revolutionary Russian and English copies in the libraries were constantly in demand by students. Finally, perhaps, one should mention the enormous development of interest in sociology, not only as a separate discipline emancipating itself from Marxist-Leninist philosophy, but also as providing confirmation or refutation of philosophical positions. There is something of a fashion, at the moment, for including a small sociological investigation in any philosophy thesis where it could conceivably fit. This fashion is especially noticeable in theses dealing with questions involving moral or religious attitudes. The investigations given in such theses seem to me predictably amateurish and in any case not particularly relevant. But they were intended, I think, to bridge the shocking gap that used to exist in the Soviet Union between the fantasy world of Soviet philosophical writing and the realities of Soviet life.

* * *

It will be evident from what has been said above that there are many conflicting trends and strands in Soviet philosophical life. As one selects

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particular strains for attention, one appears to be oscillating from condemnation to hope, from blank pessimism to modest optimism. I found myself that one tended to do this even while one was in the Soviet Union. Philosophers would begin to tell me of the improvements they had achieved and the battles they had won. 'Splendid,' I said, 'it won't be long before you'll be sending us some of your graduate students.' There was embarrassment. 'In philosophy it won't be easy for a long time', came the reply. Cynicism, modest confidence and modest optimism, mingled with moods of occasional despair, were the main attitudes I found among those Soviet philosophers and students willing to talk frankly. Before they had finished telling you that some of your criticisms were too harsh, they were breaking off to say that you were too naive in taking all developments at their face value or in thinking that improvements could extend to things taken for granted in the West.

The main ground for their cynicism, perhaps, lies in a readily observable feature of Soviet philosophical life. The most critical element are the undergraduates, and in some departments at least they are praised for asking awkward questions. But, as one graduate student stressed to me, asking awkward questions is all right when you are an undergraduate—it shows that you are exercising intelligence. By the time you are a graduate you are expected to know that these awkward questions have acceptable answers—otherwise you have failed to continue exercising intelligence. The graduate students, indeed, know very well on which side their bread is buttered, and the decline of social protest and criticism as students move into postgraduate studies and then into academic jobs is even more noticeable in the Soviet Union than it is in the West. It forms a stabilising factor of the greatest importance for a regime which is quite subtly substituting careerist pressures for open political threats. And not to have a career in the Soviet Union is to be deprived of everything that makes participation in intellectual life possible.

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HAVEMANN AND THE DIALECTIC

Neil McInnes

THE 'adventures of the dialectic' continue, as *rocambolesques* as ever. Whereas the Spanish censors have banned a work that denounces the official Soviet philosophy of the 'objective dialectic' as vulgar and incoherent,[1] the East Germans have silenced and persecuted a scientist who must be one of the last free spirits to take the 'objective dialectic' seriously.[2] Censors, of course, seldom know their business and often have laboured for their enemies. When it comes to dialectics, their confusion is easily understandable, for that doctrine is as elusive today as it was when Lalande condemned the very word 'dialectics' in his *Dictionary* as useless and misleading.[3] A veneration of dialectic, in one or other of its several inconsistent senses, remains, however, the 'point of honour' of Marxist philosophers,[4] whether their substantive philosophy be positivism or absolute idealism. This is as true of the theorists of the reaction against Stalinist dogmatism as it was when Lenin and Lukacs were maintaining their contemporary and contradictory versions of the dialectic. That is one of the reasons why the dispute about philosophical dogmatism in east Europe and in the communist world generally is proceeding in conditions of extreme confusion. Typical of this is the controversy between communists over Robert Havemann's 'dialectics without dogma'.

Ever since dialectical materialism became the only authorised philosophy in Russia, and then throughout east Europe, scientists there have been able to further their special enquiries only by ignoring it. Soviet physicists or chemists, for example, would have shared the fate of Soviet geneticists if they had tried to square their studies with Diamat. Research would have been stultified, results falsified, and critical discussion replaced by bluff and scurrility, as during the Lysenko affair. Where Diamat could not be ignored, because it had already occupied the field in advance of science (as in social and psychological studies), no empirical enquiry at all was possible. Hence, until recently certain disciplines such as sociology and social anthropology were simply off-limits to students in communist countries. In contrast, in the natural sciences a curious *modus vivendi* was tacitly arrived at: inside the one academy, the professor of philosophy would maintain that relativity,

1 Francisco Fernandez-Santos, *Marxismo como filosofía*. This interesting essay, which develops the idealist dialectic of the young Marx, was refused publication in Spain but may be judged from the chapters printed in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico* (Paris), nos. 2 and 3, 1965.

2 Robert Havemann, *Dialektik ohne Dogma? Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung* (Hamburg, 1964).

3 On this, as well as for a witty lampoon of materialist dialectic as the triumph of obscurantism, see Etiemble, *Six essais sur trois tyrannies* (Paris, 1947), pp. 72-106, 196-99.

4 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la dialectique* (Paris, 1955), p. 98.

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quantum mechanics, developments of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, cosmology, cybernetics, the theory of resonance in chemistry, and hypotheses of finite space or time, were one and all falsehoods, while his colleagues in the physics and chemistry departments were free to draw on some or all of them in order to contribute to the immense (if narrow) progress of Soviet science and technology.[5] This peaceful coexistence of theoretical enemies would seem quite insecure. Yet it must answer some requirement of the system, for the cause of Robert Havemann's disgrace and persecution is that, coming at it from the side of natural science, he sought to bring about a reconciliation between Diamat and the scientists on the basis of an Engels-esque objective dialectics. For that, he has been convicted of ' positivist revisionism ' by the philosophers and, against the opposition of the scientists, deprived of his scientific posts. He has been defended inside the movement by Italian communists who have little use for objective dialectics and who must see that Havemann's position is unscientific and retrograde, but who seem to enjoy the embarrassment he has caused among the last-ditch Stalinists of Pankow.[6]

ROBERT HAVEMANN is a physical chemist who was born in Munich in 1910 and was appointed to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in 1933. The new regime that took over in that year had him removed from the Institute; he had joined the German Communist Party in 1932. Working thereafter at the University of Berlin, Havemann participated in oppositional groups, notably ' Neu-Beginnen ', and founded one of his own during the war, known as ' Europäische Union '. In 1943, just when he had been promoted at the University of Berlin, he was arrested for these extramural activities and sentenced to death by the *Volksgerichtshof* of Roland Freisler. Execution of the sentence was repeatedly postponed, apparently because Havemann was too useful as a physical chemist. Indeed, a laboratory was installed in the Brandenburg prison so that he could continue research work for the armed services. He took advantage of his reprieve to edit a clandestine prison news-sheet.

After the war, the Americans appointed Havemann to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute again, but he was dismissed from there a second time in 1950 (after a few days in jail) for leading an agitation against the atomic bomb. Having become a member of the parliament of the German Democratic Republic in 1949, Havemann transferred his activities to the eastern sector of the city and was appointed professor

[5] For the recent situation in this respect, see John Turkevich, ' The State of the Sciences in the URSS ', in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1966.

[6] Young Italian communists have made Robert Havemann something of a standard-bearer in the battle against every variety of old-fogeyism, an honour he earns by his resolutely Utopian opinions on sexual liberty, marriage, etc. The front cover of the Summer 1966 number of *Giovane Critica* is all taken up by a quotation from Havemann, in which he urges that we put away our fossilised morality in a museum of antiquities.

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of physical chemistry, and director of the Physical Chemistry Institute, at the Humboldt University. For the rest of the decade he appears to have been a communist of fairly strict obedience, taking the turn away from Stalinism in unison with the rest; in 1959 he received the National Prize of the Democratic Republic. His scientific publications include a textbook on thermodynamics and scores of articles, which in recent years have been mainly concerned with photochemistry and the physical properties of haemoglobin compounds.

It is characteristic of a philosophical discussion among communists that some of the preceding facts have come to be denied by Havemann's critics. Seven of East Germany's leading academic philosophers wrote to *L'Unità*, when Lucio Lombardo Radice gave Havemann's book on dialectics favourable notice there,[7] that the author may have suffered 'vexations' at the hands of the Nazis, but that it was a 'legend' that he was an 'old communist', for he had joined the SED only in 1950 and was already expressing heterodox opinions from 1956. More friendly critics have implied that 'a certain dose of arrogance and exhibitionism' may be part of the reason for a scientist running foul of Nazis, Americans, and latter-day Stalinists in turn.[8] As will appear, Havemann's political and philosophical opinions are reason enough.

These began to diverge from official dogma in 1956, or so at least East German critics claim, with the benefit of hindsight. In that year there began in the Democratic Republic a discussion of dialectical materialism in its relation to the empirical sciences, a discussion that spilled over into *Neues Deutschland*, the SED daily. Havemann took part in it in the columns of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* and in the Party review, *Einheit*. In one discussion he earned a reproof from Walter Ulbricht in person for having suggested that the ideological terrorism exercised by Stalinist dialectical materialists had cost East Germany the loss of scientists. As the possibility of franker discussion of these matters seemed confirmed by the gathering thaw, Havemann raised his voice, until in 1962, at a congress in Leipzig on the subject of 'Progressive traditions in German science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', he launched an explicit attack on the pontiffs of Diamat. Posing the question 'Has philosophy [by which was meant dialectical materialism] helped the modern sciences to solve their problems', he answered that, far from helping, it had hindered.[9] He named scientists, both Russian and East German, who had suffered at the hands of the official philosophers to the extent of losing their teaching jobs if not their laboratories, and he named the philosophers, both Russian and East German, who had led attacks, in the name of dialectical materialism, on individual scientists, on certain scientific theories, and even on whole scientific disciplines. He noted that these campaigns 'only

[7] *L'Unità*, 5 April, 5 January 1966.

[8] Cesare Cases, in his introduction to the Italian translation of *Dialektik ohne Dogma?*, *Dialettica senza dogma* (Turin, 1965).

[9] *Dialektik ohne Dogma?*, pp. 9–20.

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approximately coincided with the Stalinist era', i.e. that they were continuing in East Germany. He emphasised that his criticisms were made from the standpoint of a 'properly understood' Diamat which had been discredited in the eyes of scientists by the false and rigid Diamat of the licensed philosophers. If Diamat could be liberated from these dogmatists, it could make an invaluable contribution to the progress of all the sciences.

This speech brought irritated protests to the East German Academy of Sciences, of which Havemann was a member, from the Soviet academician Omelyanovsky and from the East German philosophy professors. Havemann was accused of 'incredible defamation', of seeking to 'discredit Soviet science', and of wanting to 'chuck out dialectical materialism'. Support was not lacking, however, notably from other departments of the University, so in October 1963 Havemann began a series of popular lectures open to students in all faculties, under the general title 'Scientific aspects of philosophical problems'. He undertook to develop the ideas he had set out in Leipzig and attracted a large audience; 1,250 students were inscribed for the course. By the sixth lecture, delivered late in November 1963, the attacks on the content of his course obliged the professor to make a reply. The complaints of the professional philosophers were that he was trying to liquidate philosophy as an independent discipline; that he was blaming philosophical dogmatism instead of political forces (i.e. Stalin) for the oppression of scientific enquiry in the communist world; and that he was claiming that scientists suffered worse than philosophers under Stalinism. Havemann answered that philosophy might or might not have its own field of enquiry but, at all events, philosophers should not intervene in scientific questions; that it was an essential part of political destalinisation to kill philosophical dogmatism; that while some scientists like Lysenko had indeed practised ideological terrorism, it was mostly a case of scientists being persecuted by Diamat philosophers; finally, that 'it would be unjust to cite only Soviet examples when we had enough cases of this in our own country'.

HAVEMANN then resumed the exposition of his philosophy of science, but by the ninth lesson, on 13 December 1963, he noted that the discussion of his course in *Humboldt University* had been censored and then stopped; in particular, articles by Havemann himself and other scientists, replying to the attacks of the philosophy professors, had not been published. The professor of physical chemistry must have realised by then that he had overestimated the liberalisation of intellectual life in the Democratic Republic, but instead of becoming more cautious, he ventured on to more dangerous ground by announcing that he would now turn to questions of 'liberty and morals'. It was these subjects that aroused the greatest interest among his young listeners, for when Havemann completed his lectures, in January 1964, and began a series of seminars, most of the questions students submitted for further

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discussion related to moral and political issues. Among the questions that he read out and volunteered to answer were these: Is Stalinism possible again in the communist world and how can it be prevented? Is communism compatible with human nature and, if we are not scientifically certain it is, is it not undemocratic to force it on the nation? How to explain that in socialist East Germany there are a vast bureaucracy, prisons, restrictions on travel, emigration, and discussion, punishment for jokes about politicians, and discrimination against non-communists, non-voters, and non-workers? Is not the ultimate aim of perfect communism, which serves as the pretext for so much suffering, nothing but a dull Utopia, unlikely to be attained because of the constant danger of dictatorship, and utterly boring if it were attained?

Not surprisingly, discussion of such questions (even though Havemann was apologetic and orthodox in his answers) was not welcome, and, at the third seminar, the professor announced that he would have to drop the subject ' for special reasons ' (*aus besonderen Gründen,* i.e. on order from the authorities) and revert to the philosophy of science, a necessity on which his comment was to quote some obscure verses of Laotse which appeared to be in praise of humility. The fourth and last seminar was held on 7 February 1964, and Havemann introduced it by saying that it would be ' absolutely necessary ' to resume his public courses on these subjects in the following term and challenging those who criticised him so harshly to come to the seminars and accept public debate instead of campaigning against him secretly. In fact, the courses were not resumed, because two days before Havemann issued that challenge, the political committee of the SED had ruled that they should cease because of ' errors ', of which a list was provided. The physical chemist was given two opportunities to debate with official philosophers before a large audience of students, a measure of liberalism that was evidently regretted because within a week of the second debate recourse was had to other methods. The excuse for this was provided by an interview that Havemann granted on 6 March 1964 to a West German social-democratic journalist which contained, at least as printed in a Hamburg newspaper, violent criticism of the Pankow regime. Havemann at once denied having used the expressions attributed to him, but the pretext was too convenient and on 13 March he was expelled from the SED and sacked from his professorship on the charge of having ' defamed the German Democratic Republic in the imperialist press of West Germany ', thereby letting himself become ' the propaganda instrument of the worst enemies of the German people '. Havemann retreated to his photochemistry laboratory, still counting himself a communist and declining to choose the path of emigration. He allowed the text of his Berlin lectures to be published as a book in West Germany in June 1964; except for roneoed transcripts given to students a week after each lecture, they have not been published in East Germany.

The grounds for the next series of measures against Havemann were

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found in an article published by him in *Der Spiegel* in December 1965, in which he argued for legalisation of a West German communist party. This suggestion, which appeared when the official organ of the Italian Communist Party took up Havemann's defence as a communist and a Marxist, might be thought unexceptionable from the East German point of view, especially since Havemann based it on the observation that Bonn's intolerance cast grave doubt on its attachment to the democratic reunification of Germany. Yet, realistically enough, Havemann argued that it would not suffice simply to ask that the small clandestine KPD resume legal activity. Rather, communists should press for the creation of a new legal communist party, 'really new, with statutes that might be copied from those of, say, the Swedish Communist Party and free of all hangovers from Stalinist centralism'. Under the new name of Federal Communist Party (KPB instead of KPD), such a group could only with difficulty be refused the right to operate in a so-called democracy, and it would have a good chance of winning enough voters from the social-democrats and the Pacifist Union (DFU) to exceed the 5 per cent minimum and win representation in the Bundestag. The clandestine KPD immediately rejected these ideas as 'illusory and presumptuous', worse, as a betrayal and an attempt to split their party by one who had placed himself at the disposal of West German reactionaries. The East German communists in turn condemned Havemann's proposal, making more specific the accusation that the professor was 'lending himself' to the activities of the West German counter-espionage and consorting with former SS in order to spread his divisive ideas.[10] The clan of academic philosophers whom Havemann had criticised proclaimed that in thus siding with the reactionary forces of Bonn he was simply showing that 'the internal logic of his un-Marxist position carried him . . . to opinions hostile to socialism and to the Party'.[11]

In reality, the only passage in the *Spiegel* article that might account for these shrill attacks was not one mentioned by his critics; in this Havemann suggested, presumably as a pendant to re-legalisation of communism in West Germany, the possibility of an opposition party in East Germany: 'In the German Democratic Republic there exist several political parties but at the elections they are put on a single list. Must it always be thus? Cannot there be a parliamentary opposition inside socialism?' It is this notion that has the gift of exasperating all communist governments, Marshal Tito's as well as Herr Ulbricht's, for reasons that Raymond Aron lately recalled.[12] The immediate reaction in this instance was Havemann's dismissal from the Institute of Physical Chemistry, and an application by certain SED members for his expulsion from the Academy of Sciences. Protests against this persecution came

[10] *Neues Deutschland*, 21 December 1965, 8 January 1966.
[11] *L'Unità*, 5 April 1966.
[12] Raymond Aron, 'Budapest: Destin d'une révolution', in *Preuves* (Paris), October 1966.

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from western scientists,[13] and the foreign members of the Academy of Sciences helped to prevent Havemann's expulsion when a vote was taken on 24 March 1966: 75 per cent of the membership of 90 academicians was required to pronounce the expulsion, but only 70 per cent voted for it. Havemann hoped that this surprising defeat of the governmental proposal would mean reinstatement at his photo-chemical laboratory, but of course the regime could not accept to be defeated by scientists. What could not be obtained within the rules was encompassed a week later quite arbitrarily: the presidium of the Academy, using a procedure not foreseen by the statutes, simply pronounced Havemann excluded. The scientist now lives on the margin of society; his friends suffer vexations from the police; and a professor of philosophy, Heise, who courageously declined to sign the scurrilous attack on Havemann sent by his colleagues to *L'Unità*, has been suspended.[14]

IN Marxist theory 'dialectics' has two quite separate connotations, of which one is of interest to philosophy in that it is a fairly coherent theory that can at least be argued without dogmatism, whereas the other is an illogical mystification that can be proclaimed dogmatically only under the protection of political authority. The irony of Robert Havemann's courageous but untutored venture into the dialectical labyrinth is that he seems unaware of the first of these theories, the Marxian humanism that today represents a liberating force inside the communist movement, and he wants to make the second doctrine, the Engels-Lenin dialectics of nature, stand up on its own feet without the support of dogmatic official philosophers. It will be necessary to outline briefly, hence inadequately, the two senses of 'dialectic' in current communist discussion.

For the young Marx explicitly, and very probably for the mature Marx too, the relation between man and society, between citizen and institution, between producer and economic object, is a dialectical relation in the sense that it is a mutually constitutive relation. It is a two-way connection in which, failing a breakdown called 'alienation', the two terms generate each other; and that, in this application, is the precise (and etymologically acceptable) meaning of 'dialectical'. The things and forces we encounter in history are not objects out there, like the things we find in nature, but the creations of human effort, the objectification of the human essence. And the people in history, ourselves, are not disembodied spirits or isolated individuals, but the creations of society, the subjectification of material, historical conditions. History is the

[13] And from Italian communists, too. *L'Unità's* comment was (5 April 1966): 'In our judgment, measures of persecution should not intervene in the confrontation of opinions. The socialist state and public institutions should not privilege any one ideology. It is inadmissible that in a socialist country a worker should be expelled from his job because he is religious rather than atheist, positivist rather than Marxist. . . . The habit of describing as enemies of the people and agents of imperialism all comrades who dissent is a characteristic of Stalin and one of the reasons (and not the least) for his grave faults.'

[14] *Censure* (Paris), May 1966.

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circuit in which man realises himself by working to produce society, and then sustains himself by freely using what he has created; and the materialist theory of history simply means that one cannot understand the social process without grasping the dependence on each other, both genetically and logically, of man and social thing. 'The concrete subject produces and reproduces social reality and is himself at the same time produced and reproduced in it. . . . Without the subject, those social products of men are meaningless, while the subject without material conditions and without objective products is an empty mirage. The essence of man is the unity of objectivity and subjectivity.'[15] The further developments that this theory received in the (disowned) works of Lukacs, and is currently receiving in the essays of 'Western Marxists' like Fernandez-Santos or of east European philosophers like the Czech Karel Kosik, do not concern the student of dogmatic dialectics—because, far from being argued dogmatically and supported by political authority, this theory has been dogmatically condemned by both the Second and the Third International. Its reappearance in Poland and Czechoslovakia is a measure of the retreat of dogmatism there.

The other meaning of 'dialectic', of which Marx himself made no use but which was found in Engels's posthumous *Dialectics of Nature*, does not concern exclusively history and society, but applies to the so-called 'external world' generally. There is here no mutually constitutive relation between the knower and the known. The known is perceived as having its own independent existence, but it is found to have a curious mode of existence which is called 'dialectical'. It can contradict itself, meaning (as far as this farrago is capable of exposition, for we have entered a world where 'is' also means 'is not', and so we can say nothing intelligible) that it can have and not have a certain quality, be and not be in a given relation, at one and the same time. This self-contradictory mode of existence is, of course, a tortured state of affairs, so reality shows a revolutionary instability, periodically resolving contradictions (which implies that self-contradictoriness was somehow unnatural, although allegedly universal) in quantity-to-quality leaps and in triadic negation-negating convolutions.

> One still talks about 'dialectic' but it is no longer a paradoxical manner of thinking, the discovery of a relation of implication between the dialectician and his object, the shock of a mind that finds itself preceded in things, anticipated in them; it is the simple acknowledgement of certain characteristics of history or even of nature: there just *are* 'interactions', 'quantitative jumps', and 'contradictions'. These particularities of the object, like others, are registered by scientific thought.[16]

Set out by Engels in terms that have caused both puzzlement and mirth, this 'dialectic' was endorsed by Lenin, though, contrary to communist belief, he made little reference to it and less use of it; it seems to have

[15] Karel Kosik, *Dialettica del concreto* (trans. Pacini, Milan, 1965), pp. 136, 138.
[16] M. Merleau-Ponty, op. cit. p. 85.

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been for him nothing but a learned way of referring to suppleness of political tactics, ever his main concern. Rigidly formalised under Stalin as a compendium of the laws of cosmic development, the dialectic of nature was, in practice, gradually emptied of content. Of its three great laws, the Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality was declared by Stalin (because of its connotation of revolutionary jumps) to operate only in class-divided societies, and thus not to be universal in scope, while the Law of the Negation of the Negation was relegated to the background as too prone to bring ridicule on Marxist philosophy. That left only the Law of the Union of Opposites, which serves to reconcile contradictions and justify inconsistencies—and it has been suggested that this is a useful political function in a regime of political arbitrariness. Whether as a support for arbitrariness or as an obstacle to clear discussion, this ' dialectic ' deserves to disappear. The ruination of its prestige, shored up by political authority placed at the service of philosophical dogmatism, will be an essential part of the process of liberalisation in east Europe.

ROBERT HAVEMANN'S place in this context is that he thinks modern science has discovered an objectively dialectical character in reality, a real self-contradictoriness, but that this character (as well as all the other features of reality) is misrepresented by the official philosophers of Diamat. Official philosophy, in fact all philosophy, can be dispensed with because the scientists henceforth will keep the dialectic alive all by themselves, since they have found that self-contradiction is a positive fact about the things they study. Philosophers just dogmatise about dialectic, thereby hindering research, and periodically get the state to persecute scientists, whereas scientists use, or should use, dialectic as a tool of research, a method of enquiry. As his academic detractors in East Germany correctly say, when Havemann asks for dialectic without dogma, what he really wants is philosophy without philosophers. He wants to liquidate the positive doctrine and the special profession that teaches it, but retain the belief that nature is ' dialectic ', as an aura around scientific thinking.

> It all comes down to this, he said in his Leipzig lecture. Dialectical materialism is not a philosophy in the sense of any earlier philosophical doctrine or system. It is a *Weltanschauung,* a fundamental spiritual attitude and a method of thought, which comprehends the world in its insuperable contradictoriness as well as in its unity. But it is not a philosophical catechism made up of principles and general definitions that are immutable, eternal, and binding . . . the dialectical-materialist philosophy is not a court that can decide questions before they have been settled scientifically.[17]

When pressed by listeners to be more specific about the actual content of dialectic, Havemann regularly falls back on familiar quotations from Engels's *Dialectics of Nature,* but adds that there is no question of

[17] *Dialektik ohne Dogma?*, p. 19.

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'axioms and categories' (i.e. none of Engels's 'laws' of dialectic); there is just the perception that reality is one and contradictory, in itself. Havemann even revives the Hegelian argument that the proposition, as such, is contradictory, in that when we say anything we are saying, 'the subject is the predicate, that is, the different is identical'.[18]

As his listeners point out to him, Havemann is more eloquent about what dialectic is not than about what it is. For one thing, it is not the doctrine of mutual implication between man and society, which constitutes the humanist sense of dialectic, because man and society in Havemann's view are simply subject-matter for natural science, and indeed there cannot be social studies until there is first a highly developed science of nature. But if it is not that heresy of Lukacs and Sartre, neither is it official Diamat, which, in his parody, consists in laying down all the principles and categories of dialectic and then saying: 'Good, now I'm all ready. Physicists! Please come forward, gentlemen! I'll resolve your problems. You just have to tell me what's worrying you' (p. 137). This manner of proceeding, Havemann says, is absurd, and all efforts to lay down *a priori* a dialectic logic lead to abstruse and fantastic doctrines in the manner of Hegel. It is this that has brought dialectical materialism into bad repute, particularly among scientists:

> A terrible thing has happened: for decades dialectical materialism has been discredited by its official representatives in the eyes of all the world's scientists, including the greatest scientists of Soviet Russia. Max Born describes it as pure scholastics; Einstein expressed himself similarly. Today, as a result, any philosophy at all is rejected and condemned by scientists, except those who accept the philosophical doctrines of the bourgeoisie (p. 15).

All that is patently true, and East Germany is one of the few places left where a scientist could be persecuted for saying so. Yet what is peculiar about Havemann's position is his insistence that there is a 'good' Diamat that must not be thrown out with the 'bad' one.

> In my Leipzig lecture I brought a lot of criticism upon myself when I said that till now, surprisingly, dialectical materialism has had little or no creative, productive function in the development of modern scientific theories and in the solution of the principal scientific problems of the last fifty years. Still, I am of the opinion that it could play a significant role and will do so in future. I am convinced that this most progressive philosophy can fecundate the intellectual world of all men, including the ideas of scientists who today are wrestling with difficult problems (p. 137).

Indeed, he had been more positive than that in Leipzig. He had decreed that dialectical thought

> will increasingly become the conscious method whereby the great scientific problems of our time must be resolved. . . . We must

[18] Ibid. pp. 48-49, 165-66. One supposes that Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* is the intermediate source for this argument, which comes from Hegel's article 'Logic' in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

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> start from things themselves, study nature herself, discover her dialectic *concretely* in her particularity before we do so in her universality. . . . Only by starting from the empirical sciences can one attain the dialectic that lies in things themselves and which can be reflected in theory (p. 17).

This is difficult to follow, for if dialectic is, as Havemann often says, a method, an approach, if it is 'dialectical thinking', then one cannot understand how it can rule in advance that reality is going to have such and such characters. Yet if dialectic means a character of things, one wonders why any peculiar state of mind is required to perceive it, why, indeed, every other scientist but Havemann has overlooked it. This confusion is epitomised in the expression just quoted, 'We must . . . discover . . .' (*Man muss . . . entdecken*), for empirical science cannot accept orders in that way about what it should discover in the facts.

As though to meet these objections, Havemann began his course of lectures in Berlin by saying: 'In these lessons I shall indicate with some examples how with dialectic thought one can ascertain the profoundest connections and the essence of phenomena' (p. 25). In reality, what follows is a demonstration that some disputed points in contemporary physics can, without advantage to the progress of knowledge, be restated in quaint Hegelian terminology. For example, Havemann suggests some sort of parallelism between the following 'dialectical couples' of notions: corpuscular-undulatory, discontinuous-continuous, real-possible and chance-necessary. The meaning of that parallelism would be that the corpuscle or particle is the discontinuous reality whose exact location is a matter of chance, whereas the wave defines all the continuous area over which it might possibly be located, an area which is necessarily limited. Nothing new has been said there. Either you see the similarity of those pairs or you don't, and if you do you might think the whole series striking, amusing, or harmless. What is sure is that Havemann's suggestions make no sense unless one is familiar with Hegel's logic of causality and necessity, but the general procedure is so far from new and anti-dogmatic that it was used by the most orthodox of Stalinist dialecticians.[19] It used to be put aggressively: Einstein and Max Planck reject Diamat because of class bias but they cannot help illustrating and confirming it in their scientific theories and discoveries. Havemann puts it more moderately: 'Quantum mechanics . . . can receive . . . a complete and on every point accurate interpretation on the basis of dialectical materialism' (p. 96). The argument is still the same: because an allegorical restatement of certain scientific matters is possible in a language composed decades or centuries before such matters were ever thought of, it is dogmatically asserted that such restatement must be an aid to further enquiry. Havemann, inevitably, is as dogmatic as the most rigid Stalinist because, in truth, the 'dialectic of nature' cannot be maintained without dogmatism. It is always a case of decreeing that scientists must use a language they are not now using, for no better

[19] Paul Sandor, *Histoire de la dialectique* (Paris, 1947).

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reason than that Marx and Engels sometimes used it, having learned it from Hegel. In one respect Havemann is even more dangerous to enquiry than the Diamat dogmatists he attacks, because they had tacitly agreed to let scientists (even, of late, social and psychological scientists) use any language they pleased as long as they caused no scandal by confronting the official philosophy head on, whereas the professor of physical chemistry wants scientists to bring dialectics into the laboratory, into their research techniques, and into their findings.

Before doing so they would surely want to know, among other things, how philosophers like Hegel and Laotse (for Havemann harks back to the ancient sage, noting that dialectic is as old as human thought—as indeed it is, if it means having things both ways) could know in advance the characters of things that the scientists only now are studying. The answer, it appears, is in the miracle of prophecy: . . . ' some theoretical concepts at which quantum mechanics, among others, has arrived are as it were forecast in Hegel. Hegel set out in a really prophetic way many dialectical categories of the greatest importance for certain modern problems . . . his analyses seem an anticipation of future knowledge '.[20] Engels had the same gift of prophecy (pp. 35, 120), while Lenin too could foresee towards what theories modern physics was ' zigzagging ' (pp. 45–46). In fact there are passages in Laotse that ' seem to point to concepts of modern atomic physics ' (p. 132). In short, behind the notion of dialectical science or scientific dialectics there is a faith in prophecy comparable to that required for the exegesis of Indian sacred texts as anticipations of modern knowledge.

ALMOST without exception, scientists in the communist world reject that faith, and they measure the progress of the liberalisation of intellectual life by the area over which they are free to ignore the Engels-Lenin dialectical materialism, an area that has been growing with surprising rapidity of late. Havemann has quite mistaken the sense of the trend in arguing for a non-dogmatic dialectic of nature. First, because that is an impossibility: that reality is dialectic can only and ever be an unsupported assertion in need of protection from criticism, i.e. a dogma. Second, what Havemann offers is not philosophy without dogma but philosophy without doctrine, a ' method ' that cannot be set out in propositions, a vague feeling for the contradictoriness of things. Vagueness and illogicality, however, are not only of no help to science, they are no help to the progress of intellectual liberty in any field, for that can be secured only by the definition of issues, the exposure of error, and the analysis of nebulous preconceptions.

That his philosophy of science is basically reactionary is not inconsistent with the ignoble persecution Havemann is suffering at the hands of the Ulbricht regime. First, he has publicly attacked the clan of

[20] *Dialektik ohne Dogma?*, p. 11. And not only concepts: Hegel anticipates ' the solution of the central question of modern physics ' (p. 89); Hegel's theses ' are in perfect harmony with the conceptions and principles of quantum mechanics ' (p. 910); science has ' confirmed in a wonderful way ' Hegel's logic (p. 92).

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Diamat philosophers who still rule the academic roost in East Germany. The process of liberalisation is less advanced there than elsewhere in the communist world of Europe, but in any event the tacit convention everywhere is that it should proceed with as little unseemly denunciation of yesterday's excesses as possible. Like other retreating forces, Diamat will accept euthanasia but will fight against public execution. One even sees ex-dogmatists *se refaire une virginité* by mastering disciplines they denounced lately as western follies, such as cosmology or the theory of information, without ever formally recanting. Havemann, by naming names and bringing out into the open facts about the persecution of scientists by philosophers, upsets that discreet process of adaptation and indisposes folk who are still powerful.

More than that, Havemann's political and ethical opinions, while of no importance in themselves, offer ample prey to accusations of 'petty-bourgeois anarchism'.[21] In the disjointed and sententious lectures he gave on 'liberty and morals', Havemann showed himself to be an integral and utopian communist, anxious to see the day when the state will have withered away, frugal equality will have been installed in economic life, and moral codes will have been forgotten because society by then will be so perfectly organised that every instinct may be innocently satisfied. Meantime, he is ready to apologise to his students for such necessary evils along that road as the Stalinist tyranny and the gross imperfections of the present socialist stage towards communism. Apparently, however, his patience is running out, for he concluded the last public lecture he was allowed to give with this peroration:

> But when will we be able to abolish orders and laws? When will the state, which wants to pry into and watch over everything, cease to exist? For us, as for Laotse 2,500 years ago, that objective is just a hope, the vision of a distant future. But we do not want simply to enthuse about these grand ideas and then go home, moved and inspired by a beautiful hour of profound reflection upon the world. It is not enough to interpret the world and take note of its sad imperfections, contrasting to it the grand utopia of liberty. Leave that to the philosophers. Let us follow Marx: we want to change the world. We must go ahead with the firm decision to help bring nearer the realisation of those objectives. We must advance along our way, not stop; we must have courage and feel it our duty to fight for the freedom of men and for their happiness.[22]

A youthful East German audience might well have misunderstood.

[21] Duly made by the seven philosophers in the letter to *L'Unità*, and backed up with shameless misquotations and inventions.

[22] This last lecture does not appear in the German text published in Hamburg, but is to be found in the Italian translation, pp. 217–29.

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HERBERT MARCUSE

From Marxism to Pessimism

Alasdair MacIntyre

MARXISM is in most of its versions an optimistic philosophy; so it is, for example, in Herbert Marcuse's earlier writings, when Hegel is castigated because his philosophy 'ends in doubt and resignation' (*Reason and Revolution*, p. 248). But the later Marcuse himself ends in a state of doubt, if not one of resignation: 'Those social groups which dialectical theory identified as the forces of negation are either defeated or reconciled with the established system' (*Reason and Revolution,* Preface to the 1960 edition, p. xiv). This theme has been elaborated at length in *One Dimensional Man,* and it is worth enquiring whether on examination this transformation of Marxism into a pessimism does not reveal something about the character of Marxism and not just something about Marcuse's own intellectual development. To carry through this enquiry it is necessary to note certain features of Marxism.

Lukacs long ago in his essay on 'The Changed Function of Historical Materialism' (in *History and Class-Consciousness*) argued that the time had come for historical materialism to engage in self-scrutiny. The central thesis of historical materialism is that every major philosophical doctrine has features which show it to be the characteristic product of some specific form of social life. Of what specific form of social life then is Marxism itself a characteristic product? Of that nineteenth-century form of bourgeois life in which the economic on the one hand and the political and cultural on the other were so sharply distinguished and segregated that the two could be taken to stand in an external causal relationship, such that the economic basis determined (in some sense) the political and cultural superstructure. That is to say, Marxist theory in its account of the political and the economic reflects the special relation of the non-interventionist state to the free-market economy, and in some hands (most notably those of Engels) has hypostasised certain features of that relationship into eternal characteristics of all forms of social life. But we can be rescued from this error by distinguishing those features of Marxist method which are valid only in their original nineteenth-century context from those which have validity in the present.

If Lukacs is correct, a central feature of Marxism ought to be its capacity to renovate itself by self-scrutiny and self-criticism; and equally, if Lukacs is correct, we must be able to provide a criterion by which we may distinguish between those parts of Marxist theory which merely reflect the age in which it was first conceived and those parts which are more permanently valuable. In fact no Marxist—nor anyone else—has ever produced an adequate version of such a criterion. But it is clear that if such a criterion can be produced, it will be concerned with

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the relation between the empirical content of Marxism and its theoretical and conceptual form. Lukacs indeed wanted to make Marxism's theoretical form entirely independent of the particular contingent empirical content which Marx gave to it; but never in his own writing did he succeed in doing this and he soon abandoned the attempt. If Marcuse perhaps resembles the younger Lukacs in trying to make Marxist theory over-independent of the results of empirical enquiry, it may be that Marcuse's errors have also included the smuggling of an arbitrary empirical content into his otherwise Hegelian version of Marxism.

It is perhaps chiefly as an interpreter of Hegel that Marcuse excels. His early work, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundzüge einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 1932), is a scholarly anticipation of the theories of *Reason and Revolution,* which is certainly the best statement in English and one of the best statements in any language of the connection between Hegel's logic and his social theory. Yet Hegel is an essentially ambiguous author, open to interpretation in a number of ways which are all plausible, and Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel is revelatory of Marcuse as well as of Hegel. What it reveals may be most clearly shown by placing Marcuse's interpretation on a spectrum of Hegel interpretations.

At one end of this spectrum lies a Hegel for whom the world of historical experience is merely the phenomenal clothing of the timeless logical categories which constitute the successive phases of the self-development of the Absolute. The emphasis is on the gap between the partial and inarticulate gropings of those condemned to merely finite perspectives, and the total grasp of reality involved in philosophical thought, in which at its culmination the thought of the philosopher and that of the Absolute have become one. This interpretation of Hegel is fundamentally a theological interpretation and although in this Hegelian scheme the metaphysical reality behind finite experience does not enjoy the independence of its this-worldly manifestations which it does in Christian theology, nonetheless it is this element in Hegel which enabled Right Hegelianism and Lutheranism to cement a relationship. At the other end of the spectrum lies the interpretation of Hegel according to which the categories of the logic are thought of as having no more reality than that bestowed upon them by their embodiment in historical form. Each specific form of human social life is defined by a particular conceptual framework; every framework—and with it every particular set of social forms—develops incoherences which tend to force it into transformations that result in a new and more adequate conceptual scheme. The history of philosophy, of categories and concepts, and the history of social transactions are but two sides of the same coin. This interpretation emphasises the empirical aspect of Hegel's thought, and especially the fact that the logical progress in both societies and conceptual schemes is something that can be discerned only after the event. We cannot discover the patterns of development without a close study of what actually happened. The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk.

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Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel lies midway between these extremes. The sharp contrast which he wishes to draw between dialectical thinking and merely empirical thinking, and the way in which he presents the dialectic as constituted by a set of laws to which all empirical reality must conform and to which we can know in advance that it must conform, separate him from the latter end of the spectrum. He treats, for example, Hegel's account of finitude and potentiality not as a conceptual analysis, but as the statement of a universal law (*Reason and Revolution*, p. 137). Yet he also centrally maintains that Hegel's analysis of social life has application to actual societies, and that in this application lies its main point. The Hegel who maintained at the end of his life that philosophy entered a realm separate from and higher than that of society or politics is, on Marcuse's view (and correctly, I think), unfaithful to the core of his own thought. But in combining these attitudes Marcuse courts disaster. For what he desires is a theory of social life which, while it applies to actual empirical social life, is warranted not by empirical evidence, but by its conforming to the standards of something else which he calls dialectical thinking. In desiring this he desires the logically impossible.

WE can bring out the nature of the difficulties in the face of which Marcuse's enterprise founders by considering one way in which Hegel's central positions can be viewed fruitfully from the standpoint of social theory. Hegel argues that to understand any form of social life one must attend not merely to the presently existing state of affairs, but to the way in which it simultaneously opens up and inhibits certain possibilities of human development. The concept of ' the negative ' in its application to social life is the concept of those forces at once incompatible with and destructive of a given form of social life which are nonetheless inevitably bred out of that form. This Hegelian view of societies as necessarily transforming themselves out of existence can be illuminatingly compared and contrasted with the Parsonian view of social orders as necessarily self-maintaining. Both Hegel and Talcott Parsons have written as if their type of analysis necessarily applied to all societies, and both obviously cannot be right. It may well be the case that some types of society are best analysed in terms of a Parsonian, other in terms of an Hegelian scheme. But whether this is so or not cannot be settled independently of empirical investigation, and this latter point would never have been denied by Marx. It is effectively denied by Marcuse.

It has to be so denied because of Marcuse's attitude to science. Marcuse inherits from Hegel the view that there is the sharpest possible distinction between the study of human life and the natural sciences. His attacks on Saint-Simon and Comte in *Reason and Revolution* centre upon the charge that they assimilate sociology to physics—as indeed they do. He interprets Marx as holding that society cannot be understood in the way that nature is: ' Marx considered society to be irrational and

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hence evil, so long as it continued to be governed by unbreakable objective laws. Progress to him was equivalent to upsetting those laws, an act that was to be consummated by man in his free development' (*Reason and Revolution,* p. 332). Free development is then sharply contrasted with law-governed development. It follows that although the development of capitalism, an unfree form of economy, may be law-governed, the transition to socialism cannot be, and Marcuse therefore consistently affirms that although classical capitalism is necessarily self-destructive, there is no necessity about its replacement by socialism. Moreover sociology is not an empirical discipline in the sense that the natural sciences are. But here he diverges most sharply from Marx. Marx uses both deterministic and non-deterministic language and does not commit himself on the philosophical issues about freedom and causality; but he does ground his beliefs about the transition to socialism not only on general truths about human nature and society as Marcuse does (it is as impossible to imagine Marx writing, as Marcuse does, that 'The transition from capitalism's inevitable death to socialism is necessary, but only in the sense that the full development of the individual is necessary', as it is to understand what this sense is), but upon the actual character of the working-class and the labour movement as he discussed it empirically.

What Marx believed on these points may of course have been false; but it is a question of empirical fact whether it was true or false, while Marcuse, by ignoring the empirical basis of the Marxism he uses, renders it unfalsifiable and unrevisable from an empirical point of view. This has dangerous consequences. For his presentation of Marxism, although unfalsifiable, is not empty of consequences for his beliefs about society. Marcuse identifies the Hegelian negative with the industrial working class; he feeds Marx's empirical findings about that class into his own metaphysical machine in such a way that he is bound to conclude that, if the capitalist form of life is to be replaced by another, only the industrial working class can replace it. What constitutes the working class a revolutionary force for Marcuse is not so much empirical evidence of their historical role, as the fact that they live outside the schematism of the civil order of middle-class society as Hegel defined it. It follows that if the working class were to be domesticated within that order, then there would be lacking any negative forms to transcend and destroy that order. In other words, a particular social order would have become invulnerable; that our own social order has in large part done so is the message of *One Dimensional Man* (1964).

Marcuse's position in *One Dimensional Man* is, so I am committed to arguing, in part a consequence of his having failed to distinguish, as Lukacs urged that we must distinguish, between those elements in Marxism which are always essential to it and those which have application only at a certain period. But it is important to note that in *One Dimensional Man* he not only clings to the unessential, he abandons the essential. For, in spite of all his scorn for contemporary sociology, his

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own account of contemporary society is in many ways very like that of those Parsonians or others who see it as a well-integrated and self-maintaining social order. In his analysis of contemporary society he nowhere seeks for specifically contemporary negative forces, as on his own Hegelian terms he ought to, and his abandonment of this search is reminiscent of Hegel's own belief in the stability he had been prepared to concede to no previous age. But I cannot discuss the analysis in *One Dimensional Man* properly unless I first consider some of the content of *Eros and Civilisation* (1954).

IN this book Marcuse supplemented his Marxism by an adherence to Freudian theory of a largely uncritical kind. He does revise Freud in order to use him; but he does, for example, also appear to accept much Freudian apparatus (including the belief in a Death instinct) which most Freudians reject. Here once again Marcuse's resolute stance against investigating what empirical confirmation his beliefs might have makes criticism difficult. His chief revision of Freud concerns the role of sublimation. Freud saw sublimation as both an agency repressing fundamental human desire and a necessity for cultural achievement; Marcuse envisages the possibility of a society in which sublimation can cease to be repressive, and the sexual desires are at once sublimated *and* realised. But according to *One Dimensional Man* social development has moved not in this direction, but rather in the direction of what Marcuse sees as a controlled and repressive desublimation. Modern western culture by its greater permissiveness towards sexual desires enables these desires to be spent on transient satisfaction instead of informing an attitude of revolt towards the established order.

This psychoanalytic thesis is used by Marcuse in partial explanation of what has happened to the working class. The working class represented for him the forces of negation which might transcend and overcome capitalism. Their motivation, according to Marcuse, in performing this task is revealed by his remark on the subject of the Welfare State that ' there is no reason to insist on self-determination if the administered life is the comfortable and even the " good " life ' (*One Dimensional Man*, p. 49). That is to say, the thesis that the Welfare State, by raising levels of consumption, and a culture of permissive sexuality, by raising levels of satisfaction, have deprived the working class of motives for revolutionary action, shows that Marcuse embraces that crude theory of revolutionary motives according to which only the absolute deprivation of material comfort radicalises workers or anyone else. Why he should believe this proposition is unclear; but it is perhaps part of the penalty paid by those who believe that ' This power of facts is an oppressive power ' (*Reason and Revolution*, Preface to the 1960 edition, p. xiv), that they should find themselves believing what is not the case. Of course the belief that only absolute deprivation radicalises is widely shared by Marxists. Baran and Sweezy's pro-communist position in their *Monopoly Capitalism*, and Deutscher's view of the West

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in *The Great Contest*, both presuppose that the working class has now been permanently domesticated, and that until a desire to emulate the achievements of the Soviet bloc excites a desire for socialism in the West (a fantasy that scarcely deserves comment), the West will remain, just as Marcuse supposes, secure in its self-development.

The lacuna in *One Dimensional Man* that makes it at once too easy and more difficult to criticise, is the total absence of any account of contemporary social structure. If we try to reconstruct one from what Marcuse says on other topics, we encounter another difficulty, namely that Marcuse says that 'My analysis is focused on tendencies in the most highly developed contemporary societies. There are large areas within and without these societies where the described tendencies do not prevail—I would say: not yet prevail.' This reservation constitutes a difficulty, because in the picture he actually constructs Marcuse depicts a totally homogeneous society in which even those elements from whom Marcuse does acquire a minuscule hope of revolutionary action—'the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable'—have no real place. The homogeneous social structure presupposed by his analysis appears to contain only two social groups, the manipulators and the manipulated. The first includes government, private management, and their intellectual allies, the latter everyone else. Characteristically, Marcuse discusses the consequences of a decision by the managing groups to automate the whole economy, rather than the type of decision to automate this or that feature of production taken by a particular management in particular circumstances. From this standpoint then, there disappear from view all those phenomena of complex, uneven, and fragmented development which are so fundamental to advanced industrial life.

If we try to understand the Welfare State in the context of such development, then we have to bring in the fact that it had and has to be politically achieved by the struggles of the labour movement—the notion of it as simply handed down from above, as nothing but an administrative device of the rulers to subordinate the ruled, is historically absurd—and that it is not necessarily a source of political or social stability. For the institutionalisation of welfare, like all other rises in the standard of living, alters the horizons of possibility for different social groups and alters too the standards by which they assess their deserts and their rights. Not absolute but relative deprivation becomes crucially important. The varying pace of technological development, the varying institutional responses to that development, and the changing character of the labour force combine to create in advanced industrial societies all sorts of possibilities of conflict. It does not follow of course that one should expect social disorder.

That is to say, the stability of an advanced industrial order, which is genuine enough in the short run, may depend not, as Marcuse supposes, upon its homogeneity, but upon the very variety of stresses it generates,

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and it follows from this that the possibility of its revolutionary transformation would then have to be set in a very different perspective. Marcuse sees correctly that the type of relationship which once existed between the industrial working class on the one hand and capitalist employers and the nineteenth-century state on the other, exists nowhere in modern society—a single line of cleavage upon which many conflicts focus. He infers incorrectly that society is therefore becoming homogeneous.

The counterpart to his view of society is his view of contemporary ideology as single and all pervasive. Linguistic analysis in philosophy, behaviourism in psychology, operationalism in the natural sciences, the activities of the Rand Corporation, the language of *Time* magazine, and modern American social science are all linked manifestations of that one-dimensional thought in which the possibility of critical opposition to the established order is obliterated. What is wrong with this is of course partly just a matter of the large, crude mistakes about contemporary philosophy and science made by Marcuse (on philosophy see my review in *Dissent*, Spring 1965, and on natural science Peter Sedgwick's brilliant critique of Marcuse, 'Natural Science and Human Theory', in *The Socialist Register, 1966*, ed. R. Milliband and J. Saville), and partly a matter of the same pattern of over-all homogeneity being imposed upon the material. But it also misses, and most strikingly, the contemporary debate about theory in the social sciences. Works like those of Goldschmidt and Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Blau and Homans and Dahrendorf in sociology, reveal a remarkable absence of theoretical consensus. It is not indeed that we have too few theories, as Marcuse suggests, but too many. This richness will not of course last, for some perspectives will prove fruitful and others barren. But it is therefore peculiarly regrettable that at this particular point, what Hegelianism and a Marxism that has learnt from Hegel have to contribute to the theoretical debate should appear in the disguised and disconcerting form which Marcuse gives to it.

The Hegelian account of societies as developing, through their own schemes of thought, points of conflict which become points of transformation, is at the very least an important corrective to other current modes. But it is only a schematism, a set of directives for developing theoretical explanations of actual social phenomena. It is not itself a substantive theory. Marcuse, like some other Marxists, moves from the level of a schematism for constructing theories to that of substantive theory without distinguishing the two, or even being aware that there are two levels. This leads him to suppose that if contemporary society does not exhibit the type of conflict laid down in Marx's theory of classical capitalism, conflict as such must be absent. Because his hope was pinned on that single type of conflict, despair or something very like it therefore ensues, as well as intellectual confusion. But if Hegelianism has anything to teach us, it is that different forms of society will each have their specific form of conflict. It is the very philosophy which Marcuse professes that could have rescued him from his errors.

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JAN WACLAW MACHAJSKI

The 'Conspiracy' of the Intellectuals

Marshall Shatz

IN his recent memoirs, the venerable Soviet writer Konstantin Paustovsky recalled how his mother and sister walked across south Russia to join him in Kiev in the turbulent Civil War days of 1919. His sister, who was almost blind, felt it necessary to remove her glasses, fearing that no one would believe her to be poor if she wore them. 'Everyone,' Paustovsky adds, 'treated people in glasses suspiciously in those violent times. They thought them cunning enemies, and hated them bitterly. It is amazing that this distrust of people wearing glasses has persisted up to the present time.' [1]

The sentiment he describes here had at one time erupted into a political doctrine known as 'Makhaevism', which made its appearance on the Russian revolutionary scene at the end of the nineteenth century. The creation of a now almost forgotten Pole named Jan Waclaw Machajski, Makhaevism (Machajski's name was sometimes corrupted to Makhaev in Russian, hence *Makhaevshchina*, or Makhaevism) was a bitter attack on Imperial Russia's most prominent 'people with glasses', the intelligentsia. In a series of essays and articles written between 1898 and 1911, Machajski developed the theory that the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia was not the disinterested ally of the workers but actually represented a new class of potential rulers which hoped to rise to power on the workers' backs. Makhaevism has generally been treated as a somewhat bizarre footnote to the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, but it is considerably more than that. Despite its rabid tone and its distortions of fact, Machajski's attack on the intelligentsia was a highly original and often penetrating inquiry into the nature and significance of Russian socialism.

Notwithstanding his later views on the intelligentsia, Machajski himself began his radical career as a fairly typical *intelligent*. The son of a poor clerk, he was born in Russian Poland in 1866, in the little town of Busk, near the city of Kielce. Although his father's death left the family in financial distress, Machajski was able to attend high school and then enter Warsaw University, enrolling first in the natural sciences faculty and then in the medical faculty.[2] One of his closest friends both at the school and University was the future novelist Stefan Zeromski, whose reminiscences contain some information on Machajski's early years. Like so many of his counterparts in Russia proper, Machajski

[1] Konstantin Paustovsky, *The Story of a Life* (New York, 1964), p. 615.

[2] 'Machajski's Life to 1903', unpublished manuscript in Russian by Machajski's wife, Vera (Rosa Levin), private collection of Max Nomad, New York City. I am indebted to Mr Nomad for his kindness in making available to me this and other documents on Machajski used in this paper.

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graduated from clandestine readings in radical literature at the high school to conspiratorial activity at the University, both of which, in Polish conditions, took a nationalist form. The two joined a nationalist student group which conducted educational activities among the workers of Warsaw. According to Zeromski, Machajski proved a highly effective and popular teacher.[3] In 1891 he was arrested in Galicia while trying to smuggle nationalist literature into Russian Poland; after a few months in a Cracow prison he was expelled from Austria and emigrated to Zürich.

There he became a Marxist and began to repudiate his former nationalism in favour of international social revolution. According to a later account by his wife, he began at this time to realise that the 'patriotic' Polish intellectuals were adopting socialism not for the purpose of emancipating the masses but in the hope of achieving an independent Polish state which they themselves could dominate. Presumably, then, this was his first lesson in the intelligentsia's 'exploitation' of socialism for its own political purposes, a notion which subsequently became the cornerstone of Makhaevism. In 1892, Machajski set out from Zürich to deliver an incendiary proclamation—which he himself had written—to the striking workers of Lodz. Arrested on the Prussian border, he was imprisoned in Warsaw and Petersburg for three years and finally exiled for five years to Viliuisk, in Eastern Siberia. From this time on, he directed his attention mainly to the problems of revolution in Russia.

Proving once again that the tsarist prison and exile system frequently served as a graduate school for revolutionaries, Machajski managed to use his term of exile for an intensive study of the socialist movement. One of his fellow-exiles succeeded in bringing with him an entire library of socialist literature, and Machajski eagerly set about reading it. From this reading came three small pamphlets, the first in 1898, which Machajski hectographed and circulated among the exiles in the region.[4] These controversial essays provided the exiles with some welcome intellectual refreshment, and in some cases the debates over them even replaced the rather stale arguments between Marxists and Populists. The pamphlets eventually became the foundation for Machajski's principal published work, *The Intellectual Worker* (Umstvennyi rabochii).

On his way back from Siberia in 1900, Machajski fell into the hands of the police in a case of mistaken identity. Finding some copies of his pamphlets on him, the authorities put him in jail, but a group of Irkutsk exiles posted bond for him and soon secured his release. The bond prevented him from leaving Irkutsk, so he and a small band of his

[3] Stefan Zeromski, 'W sprawie Machajskiego', *Elegie i inne pisma* (Warsaw, 1928), p. 104. See also Stanislaw Pigon, 'Zygzaki przyjazni. Jan Waclaw Machajski—Stefan Zeromski', *Mile zycia drobiazgi* (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 346–405.

[4] One of his readers was Trotsky. See L. Trotskii, 'Vospominaniia o moei pervoi sibirskoi ssylke', *Katorga i ssylka* (no. 5, 1923), pp. 91–95. When Trotsky met Lenin in London in 1902, he told him, among other things, about 'the three essays by Machajski' which the political exiles in Siberia had been reading. L. Trotskii, *Moia zhizn: opyt avtobiografii*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1930), p. 167.

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adherents began spreading his ideas among the workers of that Siberian town. These activities led to his rearrest in 1903 and a sentence of six additional years of exile in one of the most remote corners of Siberia.

He did not remain a guest of the tsarist government for very long, however. With the help of Paul Garvy, a social-democrat and fellow-prisoner, he succeeded in escaping from a transfer prison outside Irkutsk. As Garvy describes him in his memoirs, Machajski was 'of medium height, well built, with the eyes of a Polish revolutionary fanatic set in an energetic face framed by a thin beard'. Despite the unbending firmness with which he upheld his unconventional views, he impressed his fellow-inmates with his gaiety and cheerfulness—virtues conspicuously absent from his writings—and perhaps even more with his considerable talents as a cook. He had begun laying plans to escape as soon as he arrived at the prison, hardly a surprising ambition considering the prospect that the next six years held for him. His chance came when he and Garvy received permission to visit a comrade who lived in a near-by village. While Garvy sipped coffee with their guard in the next room, Machajski slipped out of the window and down a conveniently placed ladder—but not without remembering to wave a friendly good-bye to Garvy as he disappeared over the window-sill.[5]

From Irkutsk, Machajski made his way back to European Russia and then to Geneva. There, in the course of the next few years, he published *The Intellectual Worker* and several smaller works. Except for a brief return to Russia in 1906, he remained in western Europe until 1917, isolated geographically from Russia and ideologically from most of his fellow-revolutionaries. Nevertheless, his ideas became fairly well known in Russia, spread by former exiles who had first encountered them in Siberia, by his few adherents, and later by the chief populariser of Makhaevism, Evgeny Lozinsky. A brief summary of some of his views will indicate why they continued to arouse interest despite the obscurity of their originator.

MACHAJSKI had arrived in Siberia an ardent revolutionary, one who had urged the striking workers of Lodz not to stop short of street barricades, bombs, and bullets against the tsar's troops. He never abandoned this ultra-revolutionary spirit, and every page of his writings reflects his total opposition to the existing order. Therefore the question that most agitated him as he began his investigation of socialism was the preoccupation of social-democracy with parliamentarism. In Germany, where Bernstein's revisionist views had just appeared, the social-democrats had become one of the leading parliamentary parties and were relying on legal and pacific methods to attain their ends, while the Russian social-democrats, following Plekhanov's doctrines, maintained that the first step on the road to socialism must be the overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of a parliamentary regime. In his

[5] P. A. Garvi (Garvy), *Vospominaniia sotsialdemokrata* (New York, 1946), pp. 287–318.

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first essay, ' The Evolution of Social-Democracy ' (it later became Part I of *The Intellectual Worker*), Machajski condemned this course and urged the Marxists to return to their original mission of instigating social revolution. His rejection of parliamentarism brought him close to the Russian anarchists, who maintained that the state must be destroyed instead of captured, but he went far beyond the anarchists in his criticism of Marxism. By the end of his first essay he had concluded that the sicknesses of social-democracy were incurable, for it had been fatally infected by the interests of a class hostile to the proletariat. Rejecting Marxism, and with it all other schools of socialism, he devoted his subsequent works to three main propositions: the intelligentsia was an economic class with a vested interest in the continued exploitation of the proletariat; socialism in general and Marxism in particular had arisen to defend and promote the interests of this class; and ' socialisation of the means of production ' would bring the intelligentsia to power while leaving the position of the workers virtually unchanged.

Machajski regarded the Russian intelligentsia not as declassed intellectuals, the usual designation for this unique group, but as ' intellectual workers ', people who, by virtue of superior education, made their living by non-manual work as members of the professions or as managers, technicians, and bureaucrats. In short, the intelligentsia in Machajski's sense consisted of white-collar workers, or what he preferred to call ' white-hands '. He drew on a series of articles by Karl Kautsky in which the German social-democratic leader termed the intelligentsia (*die Intelligenz*), meaning those who lived by mental labour in capitalist society, ' a new, very numerous, and continually growing middle class '.[6] Kautsky, however, had denied that the intelligentsia as a whole had any specific class interest; except for purely professional interests, its members shared, at most, a kind of guild mentality, a sense of exclusiveness and social superiority as the ' aristocracy of the mind '. Machajski drew a much more extreme conclusion in regard to this ' new middle class '. Whereas in Marxism the determinant of class relationships is ownership of the means of production, Machajski denied the overriding importance of ownership. He argued that even without owning land or factories the intelligentsia bore the same relationship to the workers as did the capitalists.

> . . . in every country, in every state, there exists a huge class of people who have neither industrial nor commercial capital and yet live like real masters. They own neither land nor factories nor workshops, but they enjoy a robber's income no smaller than that of the middling and large capitalists. They do not have their own enterprises, but they are white-hands just like the middling and large capitalists. They too spend their whole lives free from manual labour, and if they do participate in production, then it is only as managers, directors, engineers. That is, in relation to the workers,

[6] Karl Kautsky, ' Die Intelligenz und die Sozialdemokratie ', *Die Neue Zeit* (1894–95), no. 27, p. 16. See also ibid. no. 28, pp. 43–49; no. 29, pp. 74–80.

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> to the slaves of manual labour, they are commanders and masters just like the capitalist proprietors.[7]

Although the intelligentsia did not own the material means of production, it did own and exploit a peculiar form of property, namely, education.

> A larger and larger part of bourgeois society receives the funds for its parasitical existence as an intelligentsia, an army of intellectual workers which does not personally possess the means of production but continually increases and multiplies its profits, which it obtains as the hereditary owner of all knowledge, culture, and civilisation.[8]

Machajski regarded only the manual workers as producers of value; all others were parasites living on surplus value wrested from them. Because they received higher incomes than the manual workers, the 'intellectual workers' were able to use this surplus value to educate their children, thus creating an 'hereditary monopoly of knowledge'. In Machajski's scheme of things, the two warring classes of the bourgeois world were not just the capitalists and the proletariat but the educated and the uneducated, those who were condemned to manual labour and those who were not. Throughout the world, '*knowledge*, just as much as land and capital, furnishes the means for the parasitic, lordly existence of the present-day robbers'.[9]

Few of Machajski's readers, whether Marxists, Populists, or anarchists, were willing to accept his argument. His critics objected, quite correctly, that the Russian intelligentsia by no means consisted only of 'intellectual workers', and they denied that even the latter constituted a distinct class. Whether or not Machajski had proved that the intelligentsia was a class in the Marxist sense—and this was clearly his intention—he had raised a larger issue that was to attract a good deal of attention in the future: he had perceived that control and management of the means of production could be as important a source of power as their formal ownership. In this respect Makhaevism can be regarded as the forerunner of such better-known theories as James Burnham's 'managerial revolution' and Milovan Djilas' 'new class'.

Machajski not only branded the intelligentsia an exploiting class but insisted that socialism was its class ideology. His argument took the form of an ingenious reconstruction of the rise of socialism in the nineteenth century. Socialism, he maintained, was the protest of the 'army of privileged "employees" of capital and the capitalist state, who find themselves in antagonism with the latter over the sale of their knowledge and therefore appear, at certain moments of their struggle,

[7] [Jan Waclaw Machajski], *Burzhuaznaia revoliutsiia i rabochee delo* (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 86. This work was first published in Geneva in 1905.

[8] [Jan Waclaw Machajski], *Bankrotstvo sotsializma XIX stoletiia* ([Geneva], 1905), p. 28.

[9] Jan Waclaw Machajski, 'An Unfinished Essay in the Nature of a Critique of Socialism' (unpublished manuscript, in Russian), p. 14. Machajski composed this work in Polish in 1910-11, and his wife subsequently translated it into Russian. A photocopy of the translation is housed in the Slavonic Collection of the New York Public Library.

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as part of the anti-capitalist proletarian army, as a socialist detachment'.[10] Socialism, then, originated as a family quarrel within the bourgeoisie, between the 'intellectual workers' and the 'bourgeois aristocracy'. When capitalism in western Europe began to open its doors to the intelligentsia after 1848, however, the old revolutionary plans of the socialists lost their meaning. Why destroy the capitalist order now? This was the reasoning Machajski imputed to them. Instead of ruining the middle classes, capitalism had created a huge new middle class in the form of the intelligentsia and had given it a privileged position. Therefore socialism must labour not to overthrow capitalism but to develop it.

And Marxism, Machajski contended, had become the dominant socialist doctrine after 1848 precisely because of its abilty to serve this function. For Marxism taught that capitalism not only exploited the workers but at the same time prepared the way for the inevitable coming of socialism. Original 'revolutionary' Marxism transformed itself in the second half of the century into 'evolutionary' Marxism by stressing the 'positive' side of capitalism, capitalism as a necessary stage in the preparation of socialism, which must patiently be allowed to mature. Marxism in western Europe, he argued, had become a screen behind which 'the class of intelligentsia and its defenders, the socialists' were promoting the further development of capitalism.[11]

Machajski viewed Russian Populism as a later edition of the pre-1848 phase of western socialism—the effort to achieve an immediate socialist transformation. At last, however, the Russian intelligentsia too had begun to enjoy the fruits of capitalism and to outgrow the 'fancies of its youth'. With the help of Marxism it came to realise that its real task was a *political* revolution to emancipate those elements of the privileged classes which were oppressed by the tsarist regime and to promote the development of capitalism in Russia. This was Machajski's explanation of the rise of Russian Marxism and the efforts of the social-democrats to overthrow the autocracy and achieve political democracy. In fact, the struggle for political democracy was the key element in Machajski's version of the rise of socialism. Representative government, he held, had been the immediate goal of the intelligentsia, which hoped to be admitted to power 'if only absolutism is destroyed, i.e. the old strong centralised regime which usurps the growing national wealth'. Only when the old regime refused to give way had the intelligentsia both in the West and in Russia turned to socialism. Machajski went so far as to suggest that absolutism, rather than capitalism, was the real object of the socialists' attack. In trying to explain the absence of socialism in capitalist America, he wrote:

> In America, socialism did not manifest itself throughout the century because absolutism had never existed there and the bourgeoisie,

[10] A. Volskii (pseud.), *Umstvennyi rabochii* (3 parts, Geneva, 1904–05), part I, p. vi. Parts I and II were reprinted in St Petersburg in 1906.
[11] 'An Unfinished Essay', pp. 38–40.

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> consisting of emigrants from the Old World, from the very start built its own state on a foundation of political liberty. But in each of the European countries where centralised state power had formed and concentrated over the centuries, there was a point at which it became necessary to draw the worker masses into the struggle with the absolutist monarchical regime or with the remnants of the old nobility.[12]

Like his contemporary Lenin, Machajski noted that socialism was a creation not of the workers but of intellectuals. The real aim of the workers, he maintained, had always been and still was immediate *economic* improvement. Beneath the contradictions in his historical outline lay the provocative theory that the underlying impulse of the intellectuals was *political* protest against the stubborn vestiges of absolutism. Hence socialism could arise even in the absence of capitalism, as did Russian Populism in the 1840s, and become the ideology of intellectuals who in fact bore little resemblance to ' intellectual workers '.[13]

Political democracy was but one step along the intelligentsia's road to power; the final goal was the elimination of the capitalists and the ' socialisation of the means of production '. In Part II of *The Intellectual Worker*, Machajski locked horns with the second volume of Marx's *Capital*. The principal point at issue in his crabbed and highly abstruse critique was Marx's assertion that even with the advent of socialism a large share of production would have to be ploughed back into the economy for investment purposes. Machajski claimed that since material wealth was entirely a product of the workers' labour, it should all be given to them. To maintain the necessity of setting aside from consumption a major portion of the social product in order to replenish the ' social constant capital ' was to withhold the lion's share of the workers' labour for the benefit of the ruling class. And the ruling class, once the capitalists were gone, would be none other than the intelligentsia, which alone had the education necessary to administer a complex economy. Since the social-democrats seemed to have no intention of introducing equality of incomes or of abolishing the right of inheritance, the ' intellectual workers ' would continue to pass on their educational advantages to their children. The end result of social-democracy would be state socialism, operating in the interests of the ' intellectual workers '. As long as the technical knowledge necessary to run the economy and the government remained unattainable for the workers, then, ' regardless of the formal ownership of all material wealth, their bondage will remain unshaken '.[14]

Marx as an economist had little to fear from Machajski. Because Machajski did not share Marx's concern for the continued health of the

[12] *Burzhuaznaia revoliutsiia*, pp. 36–37.
[13] For a similar, and brilliantly argued, interpretation of early socialism as ' quintessential democratic protest against an old regime ', see Martin Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855* (Harvard, 1961), Chap. 6.
[14] ' An Unfinished Essay ', p. 25.

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industrial economy, he could insist that all social production be distributed to the workers for consumption. But was this very far from what the Russian workers themselves had in mind? Machajski perceived that social ownership of the means of production promised the end of private capitalism but not necessarily the end of an economic system that entailed a strictly hierarchical division of labour, wide inequality of incomes, and continued low rewards for the workers—precisely the sources of the workers' discontent.[15] He was keenly aware of the deep commitment of the Marxists to industrialism, and he felt that it even surpassed their commitment to the workers; Marxism had come not so much to destroy capitalism as to cure it of its crises. It was unnecessary to attribute self-seeking motives to the Marxists and the 'intellectual workers' they supposedly represented. Machajski's criticism of the underlying premises of Marxism suggested that in a backward country such as Russia, a ruling group adhering to a world view which deified industrial production might try to achieve the liberation of man by pressing the workers even harder.

WHAT was Machajski's own programme? The *intelligenty*, he claimed, enjoyed their privileges as a result of their monopoly of knowledge. He therefore adopted an anarcho-syndicalist tactic, proposing that the workers repudiate politics and organise a continuing strike movement for higher and higher wages until their income equalled that of the intelligentsia. Then they too would be able to educate their children and attain the Makhaevist utopia, in which everyone was to become an intellectual worker. The proletariat would be emancipated not by socialisation of the means of production alone, but by what Machajski called the 'socialisation of knowledge'.[16]

He left the details of his Utopia extremely vague, and there is some question as to just how seriously he intended it. Makhaevism had other roots besides Marxism. From Marx, Machajski borrowed such doctrines as historical materialism and the theory of class struggle, adapting them to his purposes. But much of his thinking closely paralleled that of Bakunin, although he never acknowledged his influence. Bakunin, too, had stressed the fundamental importance of educational inequality. He had also predicted, in 1873, that, once in power, the Marxists would institute state socialism. In an often quoted prophecy, which was actually an embellishment of a passage from the *Communist Manifesto*, Bakunin wrote that 'Mr Marx and his friends'

> will concentrate the reins of government in a strong hand, because the ignorant people require strong guardianship. They will establish a single state bank, concentrating in their own hands all commercial

[15] As Professor Ulam has put it, 'The chains felt by the proletariat are the chains of the industrial system. The chains Marx urges them to throw off are those of capitalism. Will the workers understand the difference?'. Adam Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York, 1960), p. 44.

[16] *Umstvennyi rabochii*, part II, p. 55; *Rabochii zagovor*, no. 1 ([Geneva], September–October 1907; actually published 1908), pp. 62–63.

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> and industrial, agricultural, and even scientific production, while dividing the bulk of the people into two armies: one industrial and one agricultural, under the direct command of state engineers, who will constitute a new privileged scientific and political class.[17]

Quite possibly this passage, particularly the reference to 'state engineers', provided the inspiration for Machajski's attack on the 'intellectual workers'.

There was an even deeper affinity between Machajski and Bakunin. Bakunin had celebrated the traditional turbulence of the Russian countryside and proposed Razin and Pugachev, the leaders of the great peasant uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the archetypes of Russia's revolutionary forces. Makhaevism was a thoroughly urban doctrine, with little sympathy for the plight of the peasants and just as little faith in their revolutionary potential. But Machajski, moved by the same revolutionary impatience as Bakunin, devoted considerable attention to the sources of unbridled revolt that might be tapped in the Russian towns: the vagrants, the 'hooligans', the unemployed. There is evidence that he was especially interested in recruiting the new industrial workers recently arrived from the countryside, with their deep resentment of urban industrial life and their peasant tradition of anarchistic violence.[18]

This preoccupation with the most desperate, and potentially most violent, categories of the urban population won Makhaevism its unsavoury reputation in left-wing circles. It also suggests that his real aim was not the essentially evolutionary and gradual method of raising the workers' incomes through strikes until they could educate their children to be *intelligenty*—a programme that would have had to rely on the culturally more advanced and steadily employed workers, and which assumed the indefinite existence of the old order. Like Bakunin, he wanted the revolutionary overthrow of that order. And, like his predecessor, while denouncing the dictatorial schemes of other intellectuals, he may have had similar plans for himself. In *The Intellectual Worker* he twice mentions a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. This disappeared from his later works; instead of seizing power the proletariat was merely to 'dictate the laws of state power', i.e. force the enactment of favourable legislation.[19] But in any case the strike movement he proposed was to be co-ordinated by an underground group called the 'Workers' Conspiracy', designed to counter the 'conspiracy of the intelligentsia'. Presumably these professional conspirators were to be Machajski and his friends—and there was no guarantee that they would resist temptation should the old regime crumble and power fall to them.[20]

[17] M. A. Bakunin, *Gosudarstvennost i anarkhiia*, printed as vol. 2 of his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, ed. A. I. Bakunin (St Petersburg [?], n.d.), p. 220.
[18] See, e.g., *Burzhuaznaia revoliutsiia*, pp. 49–50, 77.
[19] *Umstvennyi rabochii*, part I, pp. viii, 30; part II, p. 55; *Burzhuaznaia revoliutsiia*, p. 19.
[20] Cf. Max Nomad, *Dreamers, Dynamiters, and Demagogues* (New York, 1964), p. 203.

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Machajski never had a chance to demonstrate the purity of his intentions, however, for his own revolutionary activity was limited and unsuccessful. The principal accomplishment of his group in Irkutsk in 1902 was a May Day appeal to the workers, urging them to reject the intelligentsia's political aims and declare a general strike. The only other Makhaevist organisation to appear before the 1905 revolution was in Odessa, where a group called the 'Implacables', consisting of anarchists and Makhaevists, arose in 1903 but was shortly broken up by the police. In 1904, the Odessa Makhaevists formed their own group, the 'Workers' Conspiracy', but apparently did little except publish a pamphlet stating their views. Machajski himself returned to Russia in 1906 and organised a 'Workers' Conspiracy' in St Petersburg. It carried on agitation among the workers of the capital, concentrating particularly on the unemployed, but it was soon suppressed and its leader emigrated once more.[21]

Aside from these groups, Machajski's views made some impact on other circles on the extreme left wing of the Russian revolutionary movement. Not surprisingly, they had a particular appeal to anarchists such as D. I. Novomirsky, who founded a group in Odessa in 1905 and echoed some of Machajski's anti-intelligentsia sentiments. Makhaevism may also have played a role in the origins of the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists, for Evgeny Lozinsky (under the pseudonym of Ustinov) was one of the founders of the Maximalist trend in the SR Party before he took up the popularisation of Machajski's views.

ALTHOUGH the scope of Machajski's direct influence was small, clear parallels to Makhaevism can be found in the history of the Russian labour movement. A few examples from the period before 1905 will suffice to indicate that distrust of the intelligentsia cropped up more than once among workers and labour leaders.

In the early days of the social-democratic movement in Russia, between the years 1885 and 1888, a circle called the Association of Petersburg Artisans operated in St Petersburg. Its founder was an *intelligent* named Pavel Tochisky, a Russified Pole who in some respects prefigured Machajski's doctrines. Tochisky relegated the intelligentsia to an auxiliary role, at best, in the labour movement. He believed that the intelligentsia should merely lend the proletariat educational and organisational assistance until it was capable of producing its own leaders. Like Machajski, he seems to have believed that while the aim of the proletariat was social revolution, the ambitions of the intelligentsia stopped at political revolution. According to one of his associates, Tochisky told the intellectuals in his movement: 'You will be with us until the first upheaval, until the first constitution that you get from the government and which you need, but at that point our paths will draw far apart.'[22] Guided by such suspicions, he organised the workers

[21] Letter of Vera Machajska to Max Nomad, 25 July 1932.
[22] Andrei Breitfus, 'Tochiskii i ego kruzhok', *Krasnaia letopis*, no. 7 (1923), p. 326.

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and intellectuals into two separate circles and tried to control and limit contact between them.

At the end of the century a newspaper appeared in Petersburg called *Labour Thought* (Rabochaia mysl), which published fourteen issues between 1897 and 1901, first in the capital and then abroad. It was one of the most outspoken expressions of that trend in Russian social-democracy which came to be known as 'Economism'; it regarded labour organisation and the struggle for economic improvement as the immediate tasks of the workers' movement, rather than large-scale political change. Consisting in large part of articles written by workers themselves on matters of direct interest in the factories, *Labor Thought* adopted a harsh and almost condescending tone towards the intelligentsia. In reply to criticisms on this score, the editors declared that they preferred to print articles written by workers themselves because these were more comprehensible to other workers than the 'abstract writings of *intelligenty*'. Like Tochisky, they welcomed the services that intellectuals could provide, but linked them firmly to the ruling classes: 'It must never be forgotten that while students are revolutionaries today, tomorrow they will be procurators, judges, engineers, factory inspectors, in short, the officials of the Russian government.' [23]

Finally, a word should be said about *Zubatovshchina*, the effort by the head of the Moscow political police, S. V. Zubatov, to set up non-revolutionary labour organisations. One of Zubatov's principal aims was to alienate the workers from the revolutionaries. Hence the literature of the Zubatovite organisations was filled with hostile references to the revolutionary intelligentsia; and their impressive, if short-lived, success suggests that they struck a responsive chord in the workers. For instance, the manifesto of the Jewish Independent Workers' Party, the Zubatovite organisation in Minsk, proclaimed that the Party's aims would be limited to 'bread and knowledge', i.e. material gains and self-improvement; it was criminal to sacrifice 'the material interests of the working class to political goals which at present are alien to it'.[24] In Odessa, the 'Independents' declared that the various parties which sought to organise the workers concentrated so much on the vast project of reorganising society that they had little time to devote to the specific problems of the working class, and one of the constituent craft unions of the Independent Workers' Party in Odessa, the house-painters, issued the following statement: 'The *purely economic* union of house-painters should be distinguished from the various *political* workers' parties. The union is completely independent of political parties. We do not yet know how the government will regard our

[23] *Rabochaia mysl*, no. 4 (October 1898), p. 4. Machajski was familiar with the newspaper, and several years later he used almost the same words to argue against worker support of the student movement. See *Umstvennyi rabochii*, part III, sec. 1, p. 23.

[24] N. A. Bukhbinder, 'Nezavisimaia evreiskaia rabochaia partiia. Po neizdannym arkhivnym dokumentam', *Krasnaia letopis*, nos. 2–3 (1922), p. 242.

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union, but we can be sure that its members will not be exiled to Siberia as political criminals.' [25]

Though the aims of these people were very different from Machajski's—the editors of *Labour Thought* as well as some of the organisers of the Zubatovite movement hoped for the legalisation of trade unions, something which Machajski always condemned as a dangerous compromise with the existing order—they reflected antagonisms similar to those on which Machajski built his much more extreme attack on the intelligentsia. Besides the traditional loyalty of the workers to the tsar, which lasted at least until 1905, and their equally traditional suspicion of the well-bred 'white-hands', friction arose in the labour movement itself. Among the causes were the workers' impatience with the abstract schemes and Utopias of the intellectuals, which seemed to bear little relation to the immediate needs of labour; the fear of prison and exile, which the revolutionaries came to regard almost as a way of life but which had no such appeal to the workers; the often high-handed treatment of workers by intellectuals in labour organisations; and, most significant for Makhaevism, the recurrent suspicion that the revolutionaries might be using the workers as 'cannon fodder' for the attainment of their own ends.

AFTER 1906, except for some brief endeavours in Poland, Machajski gave up active politics. Always a lone wolf in the revolutionary movement, he found it difficult to make ends meet in emigration and was often forced to rely on the kindness of friends, particularly Zeromski. The revolution of 1917 found him working in a bank in Paris. He returned to Russia within a few months, and in 1918 he had one last fling at political journalism, publishing one issue of a little magazine entitled *The Workers' Revolution* (Rabochaia revoliutsiia), in which he accused the Bolsheviks of dragging their feet in the task of expropriating the bourgeoisie. He seemed to feel that they were fulfilling many of his predictions: he condemned the rise of a new 'people's bureaucracy' of intellectuals and 'advanced' workers, and went so far as to assert that power had been seized not by the working class but by the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia.[26] However, he urged the workers not to overthrow the Bolshevik government, which was at least preferable to the Whites, but to push it ever forward with their economic demands.

This was his last political statement. He took a job as copy editor for *National Economy* (Narodnoe khoziaistvo, later renamed Sotsialisticheskoe khoziaistvo), the journal of the Supreme Council of National Economy. He died in Moscow in February 1926—peacefully but, ironically enough, as one of those 'intellectual workers' he had previously singled out as the foremost enemy of the working class.

But Makhaevism did not die with him. It is unlikely that he had any direct connection with such opposition groups as the Workers'

[25] N. A. Bukhbinder, 'O zubatovshchine', *Krasnaia letopis*, no. 4 (1922), pp. 307, 310.
[26] *Rabochaia revoliutsiia*, no. 1 ([Moscow], June-July 1918), pp. 9, 26.

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Truth and the Workers' Group, which arose within the Communist Party in the early twenties; but their complaints against the 'new bourgeoisie' of party bureaucrats and managers bore similarities to Machajski's doctrines. This perhaps helps to explain the continued interest in him in the Soviet Union during the twenties. A lengthy article on Makhaevism graced the columns of *Pravda* (2 March 1926) a few days after Machajski's death. Two years later, an anthology entitled *Our Opponents* (Nashi protivniki) reprinted an excerpt from *The Intellectual Worker*. And in 1931, an entire book, L Syrkin's *Makhaevshchina*, appeared. By 1938, however, Makhaevism had become a dirty word in the Soviet vocabulary. Recognising the stubborn persistence of anti-intelligentsia sentiment, the central committee of the CPSU found it necessary to condemn this 'Makhaevist' attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia as 'outrageous, hooligan, and dangerous to the Soviet State'.[27]

[27] 'O postanovke partiinoi propagandy v sviazi s vypuskom *Kratkogo kursa istorii VKP (b)*', *Pravda*, 15 November 1938. See also 'Chto takoe "makhaevshchina"?' ibid., 18 November 1938, which attempted to explain to the newspaper's puzzled readers just what Makhaevism was.

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SOVIET STATE CAPITALISM?

The History of an Idea

W. Jerome and A. Buick

THE differences between the Soviet system and the social system of Western Europe and North America seem so marked as to justify some label, and the label widely agreed upon for a system of government ownership of the main productive resources is 'socialism'. This wide agreement, however, does not cover disgruntled radicals of assorted shades of opinion who refuse to bestow the accolade 'socialism' on the Soviet system. But among the dissenters themselves there is no agreement on what designation should be applied. The purpose of this essay is to consider briefly the history of one such designation, which describes the Soviet Union as a state-capitalist society.

The theory has been held by three main groups that are ideologically fairly distinct: (1) orthodox Marxists, (2) Council communists, and (3) dissident Leninists.

Orthodox Marxists

It will probably come as a surprise to most readers to learn that it is the English-speaking school of traditional Marxism, descended from Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation and represented by the small Socialist Party of Great Britain (SPGB) and its even smaller companion parties [1] in the English-speaking countries, that has unswervingly maintained that the Bolshevik revolution produced a state-capitalist society.

The SPGB opposed the 1914–18 war and so welcomed the anti-war activities of the Russian Bolsheviks while condemning Lenin's tactics of expediency in urging English workers to support the Labour Party. It did admit that the Bolshevik party contained socialists and that they did attempt to introduce a system of social ownership. [2] However, the SPBG predicted [3] that this attempt would fail because of the absence of the necessary requisites for socialism—a modern industry and a socialist-minded proletariat. Lenin himself admitted that social ownership was out of the question in Russia until capitalism had brought about social production. He referred to the activities of the nationalised

[1] The companion parties consist of the Socialist Party of Canada, the Socialist Party of Australia, the Socialist Party of New Zealand, the World Socialist Party of Ireland, and the World Socialist Party of the United States.

[2] The SPGB distinguishes social or common ownership where everyone has an equal right of access to the means of production from nationalisation or government ownership, which they hold to be merely another form of private property. The SPGB, in common with some other traditional Marxists, refer to government ownership by the state in the interests of the capitalists, as a class, as 'state capitalism' because the relations of wage labour to capital remain unchanged.

[3] *The Socialist Standard*, August 1918.

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sector of the economy, only a small sector at that time, as state capitalism.[4] The SPGB quoted Lenin on this, but it did not construe the *social system* of Soviet Russia as state capitalism. Most of Russian society, as Lenin admitted, consisted of the classical capitalist relationships, familiar in the West, mixed with semi-feudal peasant production and even pre-feudal herding and hunting activities. Since the SPGB believed that the development of capitalism was a necessary prerequisite to socialism, they did not condemn Lenin and the Bolsheviks. However, they did insist that the Soviet Union was not a *socialist* society. They also insisted that 'rule by a minority'—even a Marxist minority—is not 'socialism'.[5] It was only in the period 1929–30 that they began to apply the term 'state capitalism' to the USSR when Stalin collectivised agriculture and organised a planned production of commodities under state supervision.

In Germany, in contrast to Great Britain, Marxist socialists had a large following and fair prospects for election to governmental positions. By 1918 the SPD was the government party, and the reaction of its leaders to the Bolshevik government was determined more by immediate political considerations than by any abstract theoretical analysis. Even Karl Kautsky, the leading theorist of German social-democracy (although a member of the opposition Independent Socialists in 1918), did not attempt any detailed economic analysis of Soviet society. However, in some of his writings against the Bolsheviks, he did refer to the Soviet Union as a state-capitalist society. In *Terrorism and Communism* he said, 'Industrial capitalism, far from being a private system, has now become state capitalism'. 'Today . . . both state and capitalist bureaucracy have merged into one system'.[6] Although this point is not elaborated at any length, apparently Kautsky regarded Russia as ripe only for the abolition of feudal land relations, but not for the abolition of capitalism. Both Kautsky and the Bolsheviks believed that state ownership of the means of production and a wage system were compatible with socialism. They also agreed that although a wageless, stateless society might be possible some time in the future, efforts should be directed to a less ambitious goal. Kautsky and the Bolsheviks disagreed on the means appropriate to obtain this lesser objective. Kautsky's main criticism of the Bolshevik regime was that their repressions negated political democracy, and without political democracy the working class could not control the economic machine to which they were subject, and were left in the same position as they were in any capitalist country. In fact, they were worse off than in those countries where some form of political democracy prevailed.

Later, Kautsky spoke of Lenin 'utilising his state power for the

[4] Vladimir Lenin, 'The Principal Task of Our Day, "Left-Wing" Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality', *Selected Works* (ed. J. Fineberg), Vol. VIII, pp. 360–76.

[5] *The Socialist Standard*, July 1920.

[6] Karl Kautsky, *Terrorism and Communism*, Eng. trans. (London, 1920), p. 200.

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erection of his state capitalism'.[7] He explained that Russia could become socialist 'only when the people expropriate the expropriators'. A change in formal property relations is not enough to establish socialism —there must also be democratic control of the state by the workers. Lacking this, the workers 'find themselves with respect to the problem of control of the means of production in the same situation which confronts the worker in capitalist countries'. To Kautsky, the democratic control of the means of production through the political state was the essential difference between socialism and state capitalism. Kautsky, however, did not adhere firmly to his designation of Soviet Russia as state capitalist. In later writings other terms were used, but his criticism, such as it was, remained the same.

Another leading theoretician, the Austrian Otto Bauer, in line with the traditional Marxist critique of the Bolshevik revolution, indicated that the lack of strong and viable democratic institutions in Russia, as well as its economic backwardness, prevented the attainment of socialism. Unlike Kautsky, Bauer looked forward to a gradual mellowing and democratising of the Soviet regime. The industrialisation programme of the Bolsheviks would lead to 'economic rationalisation'. This in turn would bring the social consequences which Bauer believed followed from economic development—political democracy. Thus he expected the Soviet regime to become more democratic, so 'there will emerge from dictatorial state capitalism, a socialist order of society'. In a sense, Russian state capitalism *was* building socialism. Bauer believed that the transition from state capitalism to socialism would not require a political revolution, and therefore opposed Kautsky's vehement call for a new Russian revolution against the Bolsheviks. Like Kautsky, Bauer did not always use terms consistent with an analysis of the USSR as a form of capitalism. Occasionally he would use the term 'despotic socialism'.[8]

The German and Austrian social-democrats opposed the Bolsheviks because of the dictatorial elements in Bolshevik rule. When they labelled the Soviet regime state capitalism, it was more on *political* than on economic grounds. Unlike the SPGB and the companion parties of socialism, the Germanic social-democrats did not think that the wage-price system, money, and the state were incompatible with socialism. To German social-democrats, socialism meant the democratic control of the productive forces of a highly industrialised society. Later reappraisals of the meaning of the Soviet social-economic system led to an emphasis on the distinctions between traditional capitalism and Soviet society.

In 1940, the then leading German social-democratic theoretician, Rudolf Hilferding, published a criticism of the state-capitalist theory

[7] Karl Kautsky, *Social Democracy versus Communism*, Eng. trans. (New York, 1946), p. 61.

[8] Otto Bauer, *Bolshewismus oder Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1920), pp. 1–5.

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of the USSR in the New York Russian–language periodical, *Socialist Courier*. Hilferding gave as the distinguishing mark of capitalism a market economy where prices are the result of some minimum of competition among the different owners of the means of production. This competition 'in the last analysis gives rise to the law of value', and determines what and how much is produced. 'A state economy, however, eliminates precisely the autonomy of economic laws . . . It is no longer price but rather a state planning commission [that determines production]'. Hilferding designated the Soviet Union as a new economic category, neither capitalist nor socialist, but that of a totalitarian state economy. The German Nazi and Italian fascist economies were less fully developed species of this genus.[9]

Russian traditional Marxists, found mostly in the Menshevik division of the former Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, followed the traditional Marxian position that socialism could follow the development of capitalism only in countries that had passed through their bourgeois revolution. Since Russia had not developed capitalism to any extent, and since the bourgeois revolution had only recently occurred, Russia was not ripe for socialism. In Marxian economic development, capitalism precedes socialism; thus there was a tendency among Mensheviks to label Soviet Russian pre-socialist society as incipient capitalism.

In 1919 one of the leading Mensheviks, Julius Martov, wrote *The State and the Socialist Revolution* in answer to Lenin's *State and Revolution*. In condemning the dictatorship of a minority, Martov emphasised that the 'proletarian class considered as a whole . . . is the only possible builder of the new society and it must consequently be the only successor of the class that formerly dominated the functions of government'. This required full democracy and an atmosphere incompatible with minority dictatorship. It followed that Soviet society was not socialist; but could it be described as capitalist? This question was never clearly answered by Martov.[10]

[9] R. Hilferding, 'State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy', *Modern Review* (June 1947), pp. 267–68. Interestingly enough, Hilferding did recognise that restrictions on the unrestrained market forces were an accompaniment of capitalist development. In *Finance Capital* (Vienna, 1910) he describes the stage of monopoly capitalism where financial interests are able to control industry with a considerable disregard for market laws of laissez-faire capitalism. Furthermore, 'the whole of capitalist production would be consciously regulated by one authority. . . . It would still be a society in antagonistic form. But this antagonism would be one of distribution. The distribution would be consciously regulated'. Hilferding cited in Karl Korsch, 'From Liberalism to Fascism', *Living Marxism* (Spring, 1941), p. 10. The official position of the dissident Trotskyist Workers Party of M. Schachtman, was that the USSR was a new type of society, 'bureaucratic collectivism', while Nazi Germany was still a capitalist society. Dwight MacDonald included Nazi Germany in the bureaucratic-collective category. James Burnham, at one stage, held a related view. He saw 'a managerial society' growing up not only in Russia and Germany, but also in the United States and throughout the world.

[10] J. Martov, 'The State and the Socialist Revolution', translated by Galetin, *International Review*, February, March, June 1937.

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Since the Bolsheviks of this period were themselves speaking of Russian state capitalism, it was natural that some Mensheviks would take up the cry.

Martov died in 1922, and his colleague Abramovich followed the Kautsky position that Russia was a new class society based on terrorist dictatorship. Theodore Dan developed a position somewhat similar to Trotskyism—that the USSR was some sort of a workers' state. This view was opposed by other Mensheviks such as Solomon Schwarz and Aron Yugow, who adopted a managerialist theory of Soviet Russia. The Mensheviks finally came to adopt the standard social-democratic view that the USSR was some kind of new 'totalitarian' society. However, the feeling of many old Russian social-democrats about the Soviet regime erupted in occasional references to Russian state capitalism.

Although Yugow finally came to rest, like other social-democrats, on a managerialist theory of the Soviet Union, at one period he did hold a state-capitalist position on the nature of Soviet society, arguing that the failure of socialism to develop in the highly industrialised countries precluded any Russian jump from pre-capitalist conditions directly into socialism. 'We have seen that the nationalisation of industry in Russia has not produced a socialist economy, but only a bureaucratic and badly functioning State capitalism'.[11] Like Trotsky, Yugow believed that the bureaucrats sought the extension of private ownership of the means of production.

The Italian branch of traditional Marxism, those socialists accepting Marx but rejecting Lenin, have all but disappeared with the *de facto* abandonment of a commitment to Marxism by groups affiliated with the Second International. The Italian social-democrats, the PSDI, who represent the inheritors of the social-democratic tradition, maintain that the USSR is a totalitarian dictatorship in a state capitalist society.[12] In general, the PSDI continues in a vein similar to that of the Germanic branch and the Russian Mensheviks. Like the other social-democrats, the PSDI never engaged in any deep theoretical analysis of Soviet society. The Italian social-democrats of this persuasion, like their German and Russian counterparts, believed that nationalisation and planning, plus political democracy, equal socialism, while nationalisation and planning minus democracy equal state capitalism.

Council Communists

We now turn to the second major category of left-wing theorists who regard the Soviet economy as state capitalist, the Council Communists. The Council Communists never considered themselves followers of Lenin, nor were they connected with any faction of the Bolshevik party

[11] A. Yugoff, *Economic Trends in Soviet Russia* (London, 1929), p. 336.
[12] See *Critica Sociale, passim*. This journal considers itself Marxist.

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of Russia.[13] Since they derive their positions from Marx but do not consider themselves followers of any of Marx's prominent interpreters such as Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky, etc., they could be considered traditional Marxists. This approach would not be wholly inaccurate, but there are several distinctions between the Council Communists and the other traditional Marxists.

The first is their early connection with the anarchist movement and their later agreement with anarchists on several points of tactics. The second would be their temporary membership in the Third International and of the communist parties of their respective countries. Finally, their particular enthusiasm for the Soviet or workers' council, as a means for effecting social revolution (as compared with the state, trade unions, or political parties as such an instrument), distinguishes them from traditional Marxists who did not share this enthusiasm.

The origin of the Council Communists has been traced back to the group associated with Herman Gorter and Anton Pannekoek before 1914. These Dutch Marxists had originally been members of the Social-Democratic Labour Party (SDAP), which had early connections with the anarchist movement; in fact, the founder of Dutch social-democracy, Romela Nieuwenhuis, later became a full-fledged anarchist. When the SDAP proceeded in a reformist direction, a group of enthusiasts, including Gorter and Pannekoek, formed a separate organisation, the Social-Democratic Party, which, when war broke out, denounced the pro-war socialists as traitors to socialist principles. They welcomed the Bolshevik revolution as an anti-war movement of the working class. They were also attracted to the Soviets as a spontaneous formation of workers that was immune to the degeneration inherent in the political party and the trade union. These Dutch Marxists, plus kindred groups in Germany and Great Britain, rallied to the new communist parties. Dissatisfaction over the tactics urged by the Comintern and disapproval of the repressive measures of the Bolsheviks, such as the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising, caused them to leave the Comintern. In Germany the majority of the Communist Party broke away to form the Communist Workers Party (KAPD). At first Lenin tried to win these dissenters to his views, but when this failed, he launched his *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* at them. Herman Gorter replied with *Open Letter to Comrade Lenin.* Pannekoek later criticised Lenin's philosophy in his *Lenin as Philosopher.* The Council Communist movement was composed of small groups in Germany, Holland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the United States; Karl Korsch, a prominent German communist, became connected with this movement.

Council Communist theory clashed in several areas with that of other Marxists. They opposed trade unions as appendages of the

[13] They were sympathetic to the Workers' Opposition faction, however, and made some contacts with them. See Bernhard Reichenbach, 'Moscow 1921', *Survey*, No. 53, and Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1948), p. 182.

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bourgeois state that turn workers against each other. They condemned parliamentary activity as a sham that encouraged reformist illusions. They envisaged the revolution as involving the formation of workers' councils which would gain the support of the working class, end capitalist domination, and go on to administer industry under the guidance of a central planning authority. Starting from Lenin's admission that state capitalism was developing in Russia, the Council Communists came to the conclusion that Bolshevik state capitalism was merely another type of capitalism. The relations of wage labour to capital remained the same. 'The Leninist goal of state capitalism under the control of the workers has cut out the workers entirely; what is left is state capitalism.' [14]

Herman Gorter viewed the Bolshevik seizure of power as an attempted socialist revolution that failed because of peasant resistance. The necessity of gaining peasant support led the Bolsheviks to compromise their position from the start—as, for example, by approving the peasant partition of the land in small farms held as private property. However, Gorter viewed such measures as nationalisation of industry, distribution of free consumer goods without money, and the establishment of workers' councils as 'proletarian and communistic'; but when peasant discontent forced the Bolsheviks to abandon these measures and introduce the New Economic Policy, 'communism vanished like a ghost' and 'capitalism reappeared'. [15] Gorter condemned the Bolshevik 'party dictatorship' and 'bureaucratic despotism' and referred to the developing system as 'state capitalism'. He disagreed with Lenin's advice to collaborate with the social-democrats in the West in a united front tactic. He did excuse the failure of the Bolsheviks because 'you had to retreat when the European revolution did not materialise'. Their real fault was to foist a counter-revolutionary programme and tactics on the world proletariat.

By far the largest group of Council Communists was the Communist Workers Party of Germany. Their *Manifesto of the Fourth Communist International* [16] declared that the Russian revolution was in reality two revolutions. In the large towns it was a change from capitalism to socialism; in the countryside it was a change from feudalism to capitalism. This class contradiction was ultimately resolved in favour of capitalism. The Bolsheviks were forced to recognise personal private property, then taxation, and finally capitalist production for profit in the towns. The state and economic machine was penetrated by bureaucracy. The personnel of the bureaucracy consisted of merchants, former officials of the old regime, etc., because these people had the

[14] Cited in William Isaacs, 'Contemporary Marxian Political Movements in the United States', unpublished doctoral dissertation (New York University, April 1939), p. 603.
[15] Herman Gorter, 'The World Revolution', *Workers' Dreadnought*, 9, 16, 23 February, 11, 15, 29 March, 10 May 1924.
[16] Published in English in *Workers' Dreadnought*, 8, 15 October, 5, 12 November, 10 December 1921.

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necessary educational requirements and administrative experience. Thus an antagonism began between the Soviet government and the proletariat.

Famine and the desperate need for foreign goods meant that the Bolsheviks had to reach some compromise with international capitalism. They were forced to carry out a bourgeois revolution. Capitalism creates the division of classes in society, class antagonisms, and the class struggle between capital and the working class. 'The introduction of capitalism in Russia as it is now inaugurated by the Soviet Government, must be attended with the same class division, the same class struggle'.

Anton Pannekoek indicated that the new ruling class that arose in the USSR was not a new bourgeoisie, since its members did not own the means of production individually as the bourgeoisie do, but collectively. It was more accurate to term the new ruling class a bureaucracy, and the system 'state instead of private capitalism'.[17]

Karl Korsch believed that the transition throughout the world from competitive private capitalism to planned monopoly or state capitalism, was inevitable, and irreversible.[18]

Those Council Communists who remain argue that destalinisation represents a transfer of power from party bureaucrats to the top managers, political, economic, and military.[19]

Dissident Leninists

We now turn to the third major division of those applying a theory of state capitalism to the USSR—the dissident Leninists.

In 1918 a short-lived faction whose members referred to themselves as 'Proletarian Communists', which included Bukharin, Radek, Ossinsky and others, published an opposition paper, *Kommunist*, in which they declared that the Soviet republic was threatening to evolve in the direction of state capitalism. This challenge brought forth a blast from Lenin, in the course of which he answered that state capitalism would be an advance over the existing state of affairs.[20]

This faction quickly broke up, but their forebodings[21] remained in the minds of many Bolsheviks. When in 1921 the Bolsheviks were again forced by circumstances to retreat and introduce the New Economic Policy, Left Bolshevik views reappeared. Of the many and

[17] A. Pannekoek, 'Why Past Revolutionary Movements Failed', *Living Marxism*, Fall 1940, p. 20.

[18] Karl Korsch, 'Fascist Counter Revolution', ibid., p. 34.

[19] See 'Van Beria tot Zjokoy-Social economischeachtergrond van de destalinsakie', *De Spartacusbond* (1961), p. 16.

[20] Vladimir I. Lenin, 'Left Wing Childishness and Petty Bourgeois Mentality', *loc. cit.*

[21] 'Once we renounce our active proletarian policy, the achievements of the . . . revolution will be petrified into a system of state capitalism. . . . The defence of the socialist fatherland will then in fact be the defence of a petty bourgeois fatherland that is subject to the influence of international capital. . . . Instead of a transition from the partial nationalisation to the general socialisation of industry, this will be into immense trusts directed by industrial captains, which from the outside will appear to be state enterprises.' 'Theses of the Left Communists', quoted in R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

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various small opposition groups of this period, some held that Soviet Russia had begun to move in the direction of state capitalism. These groups, one of which was linked with the KAPD, were suppressed and some of their members including Anton Ciliga were sent to Siberia. Others went into exile. In some respects, these Left Bolsheviks came near to the anarchists and syndicalists.[22] Boris Souvarine[23] and Victor Serge[24] can be considered within this tendency.

After Lenin's death, the struggle for power among his successors involved criticism of the road along which the party was leading the country. Zinoviev brought the concept of state capitalism into the controversy. He distinguished 'state capitalism in a proletarian state' from state capitalism in a bourgeois country where control of the state rested in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This distinction was also drawn by Lenin.[25] Zinoviev maintained that, in the absence of an extension of the world revolution, Russia would be more and more driven to develop in a capitalist direction. His argument centred on relations between workers and management. State industry in the Soviet Union was not socialist, but state capitalist. Socialism means more than the nationalisation of industry; it means a fundamental change in the relations between man and man. State industry is as exploitative as private industry. Socialism includes a change in the relations between workers and industrial management; the workers must have the key control in management. New ways, said Zinoviev, must be found to defend Russian workers against the exploitation of the Russian state. Kamenev also referred to state capitalism in Russia.[26]

At the fourteenth party congress, the question of Lenin's definition of state capitalism came to the fore. The majority held to the interpretation that Lenin thought the nationalised industry of the USSR was already of a 'socialist type', but that, in so far as the state encouraged the existence of millions of peasant producers interested in production for a market, in so far as the state granted concessions to foreign and local capitalists, it was thereby encouraging capitalism and hence could be called 'state capitalism'. This of course was in direct contrast to

[22] Groups of syndicalists did enter the various communist parties, especially the French. However, they soon became disillusioned and left. The journal *Revolution Prolétarienne* is representative of this position. Some of them hold a state-capitalist position on Russia. See, for example, Robert Lauzon, 'L'Asie, l'Europe et le Capitalisme d'Etat', *Revolution Prolétarienne*, July 1952, pp. 15–23.

[23] Boris Souvarine, *Stalin* (New York, 1939). Souvarine believed the Soviet system was still evolving. He mentions that the state-capitalist label has been applied to the USSR (p. 672). He himself uses the term 'bureaucratic feudalism' (p. 674).

[24] Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (London, 1963). Apparently Serge never actually used the state-capitalist label. See Peter Sedgwick, 'Victor Serge and Socialism', *International Socialism*, Autumn 1963, p. 22.

[25] G. Zinoviev, *Le Léninisme* (Paris, 1926), p. 201. Lenin, 'Tactics of the RCP (B)', in *Selected Works*, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[26] Zinoviev's arguments summarised in R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, p. 487. She adds: 'Those remarks had never been fully developed into one coherent analysis of the new trends in Russia'. Cf. Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, p. 211.

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Zinoviev's position that the nationalised industry itself was state capitalism, since workers could not select the managers.

Another argument on the state-capitalist character of the Soviet Union was used by the followers of the Italian communist, Amadeo Bordiga. They contended that in the given stage of development, socialism could not be established through the advance of state capitalism. The Bolshevik party seized power in a proletarian revolution, but Lenin recognised that until the revolution occurred elsewhere, he had no choice but to rely upon private capitalism and state capitalism to develop Russian society. Capitalist development threw up a new class of capitalists who were able to liquidate the workers' state established by Lenin. The salaries of the administrators included a veiled form of surplus value: another form was interest on state bonds. The Russian state economy was subject to the same laws of motion as any other capitalist society.[27]

Bordigists, unlike the Left Bolsheviks and the Trotskyists, did not try to maintain that the 'workers' state' established by Lenin was an economic category distinct from state capitalism. The 'workers' state' was to them a political term referring to an attempt to achieve socialism in a backward country, an attempt made in the hope that the advanced countries would undergo a revolution that would make this possible. Russia underwent a transition from semi-feudal capitalism to state capitalism, while the political structure remained in the hands of a party originally committed to socialism but forced by circumstances to replace that commitment by a commitment to state capitalism.

Another dissident communist maintaining similar views was the Yugoslav, Anton Ciliga. He tells us that he came to see that three social systems were in conflict—state capitalism, private capitalism, and socialism. These three systems represented three classes: the bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie (including the kulaks), and the proletariat. Both Stalin and Trotsky

> . . . wanted to pass off the State as being the proletariat, the bureaucratic dictatorship over the proletariat as the proletarian dictatorship, the victory of state capitalism over both private capitalism and socialism as the victory of the latter . . . We were shown with abundant detail that the present system in Russia had preserved all the essential characteristics of capitalism: production of goods, wages, exchange markets, money, profits, and even partial sharing out of profits among bureaucrats in the form of high salaries, privileges, and so on.[28]

The Yugoslav Communist League itself occasionally applied the state-capitalist label to the USSR during some of their disputes with Moscow.[29] However, since Titoist analyses of the Soviet social structure

[27] 'Aspects of the Russian Question', *International Bulletin*, March–April 1949, p. 7.
[28] Anton Ciliga, *The Russian Enigma* (London, 1940), pp. 104, 194–95.
[29] Iva Lapenna, *State and Law in Soviet and Yugoslav Theory* (New Haven, 1965), pp. 5–7, 24.

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fluctuated greatly according to the demands of their foreign policy, it is impossible to take this designation as an intellectually serious presentation. It is interesting to note that in the present Sino-Soviet dispute, Yugoslavia herself has been called state capitalist, and at times the Chinese sometimes seem on the verge of referring to the USSR in this fashion.

The followers of Leon Trotsky have produced a large number of splinter groups, some of which adopted a state-capitalist thesis on the USSR. Although Trotsky himself considered state capitalism, that is, complete state ownership of the means of production in the interest of capital, theoretically possible, he rejected the position that applied this formulation to the Soviet Union.[30] He believed that the nationalised state property preserved in Stalin's Russia represented an advance over the individual and corporate ownership of other countries. The USSR was a degenerated workers' state that must be 'defended' against outside aggression. However, difficulties in applying this view led to a reconsideration of the 'Russian question' and to the gradual separation of different groups from the orthodox Trotskyists. In 1939, a faction of the Trotskyist organisation, the Socialist Workers' Party of the USA, led by Max Shachtman, organised the Workers' Party. The majority of this party maintained that the USSR was a bureaucratic collectivist society, while a minority faction, led by F. Forest (pen name of Raya Dunayevskaya) and J. Johnson (pen name of C. L. R. James), held it to be a state-capitalist society. In 1947, this group rejoined the SWP, but left again in 1951. They now run a periodical called *News and Letters*, edited by Raya Dunayevskaya, who was the first to provide a detailed analysis of any length of the meaning and function of state capitalism in the USSR.[31]

In Great Britain, a similar development occurred. An English Trotskyist named Worral presented an analysis of the Soviet state capitalist economy in *Left* in 1939, and another English Trotskyist, Tony Cliff, published in 1955 *Stalinist Russia* (re-issued in 1964 as *Russia: A Marxist Analysis*), giving a detailed presentation of the state-capitalist analysis of the USSR. Both Cliff and Dunayevskaya see the USSR as subject to the same laws of motion as western societies. In these developments, the law of value, the spiralling accumulation of capital, the lack of correlation between production of the means of production and production of the means of consumption, the falling rate of profit, unemployment, and all the other contradictions of capitalism are inexorably linked. Like most orthodox Marxists, they see the absence

[30] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York, 1937), p. 245.

[31] F. Forest, 'The Nature of the Russian Economy', *The New International* (New York, December 1942, pp. 327–40; January 1943, pp. 17–21; February 1943, pp. 52–58; December 1946, pp. 313–18; and January 1947, pp. 27–30). Cf. R. Dunayevskaya, 'A New Revision of Marxian Economics', *American Economic Review* (September 1944 and September 1945). Many of these ideas, plus other aspects of Marxism, are treated in her book *Marxism and Freedom* (New York, 1958).

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of political democracy as an essential difference between socialism and the Soviet system. However, unlike the companion parties of socialism, the Council Communists, and the Bordigists, the Trotskyists support the idea that Lenin did set up a system distinct from both capitalism and socialism, a workers' state, which they believe was a transitional form on the road to socialism but one which, unfortunately, never reached its goal. This position caused dissension in the European ranks of dissident Leninists. The journal, *Socialisme ou Barbarie*,[32] came out against the idea that the Soviet Union is a workers' state. Although *Socialisme ou Barbarie* regarded the Bolshevik revolution as a proletarian revolution, they attribute to Lenin and his introduction of one-man management in 1918 responsibility for sowing the seeds of degeneration. It is the power of ordinary workers to choose their managers that is regarded as especially significant. Without this, workers fall under the power of the managerial class.

Outside of the three main strands of the state-capitalist theory of the Soviet Union, there stands a wide assortment of miscellaneous individuals using this concept. These commentators range widely over the political spectrum. Only one of them, Henry Pachter, has made any original contribution to the theory. To him the difference between a socialist and any other economy is 'the divorce of production from capital or property class'.[33] In a socialist economy, goods enter into the consumption funds of society and are distributed and used as the need arises, without any consideration being given to other goals such as profit maximisation, while under a system of state capitalism such as is found in the USSR, property relations still govern all economic calculations. The system of equations representing relations between buyers and sellers must still be balanced. As Pachter puts it:

> Under a regime of scarcity, commodities and services have prices which constitute costs for the producers . . . Whatever their system of equations, it must be capable of simultaneous resolution, service must be paid; capital must be amortised and must bear interest; even though production may be nationalised, property relations still govern all economic calculations.

Conclusion

In the wide range of state-capitalist interpretations of the Soviet Union, there are two basic approaches. One holds that capitalism exists where workers cannot control the economic machinery that governs their lives. Hence a system of state ownership without political democracy means state capitalism. The other approach holds that capitalism, the social system embodying capital, means a society of wages, money, prices, and

[32] *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (Paris, March–April 1949), p. 746. This group prefers the term 'bureaucratic capitalism' to state capitalism.

[33] Henry M. Pachter, 'Capitalism, The Welfare State, and Socialism', *Dissent*, Spring 1964, p. 52.

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private property upheld by state power. The difference between the two approaches relates to the basic meaning of capitalism and socialism in the modern age.

As our presentation is mainly intended as a history of the theory of Soviet state capitalism, we have not discussed the merits of this theory in its various versions. At this point it is appropriate to consider the approach of Milovan Djilas, who had occasion to examine the state-capitalist theory of the USSR. At first he accepted the theory, but later came to feel that this label was confusing because the new ruling class occupied a different position from the old one.

He admits that under the Soviet regime 'social relations resemble state capitalism', and that the rulers behave as if they were working a system of state capitalism, but insists that the ruling class there is a new class 'previously unknown to history'. In spite of his remark that ownership is nothing other than the right to profit and control, he concludes:

> If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting class.[34]

His conclusion, it could be argued, need not follow. If ownership equals control, and if the bureaucrats control state property, then they are the *de facto* owners. Perhaps by 'profit' Djilas is thinking of 'dividends' in the sense of a formal share of profit. However, if profit is considered in the Marxian sense of surplus value, and if the bureaucrats extract and consume surplus value through the market system, then they are capitalists in the traditional Marxian sense.

Djilas' hesitation brings into relief one difficulty with state-capitalist theories. If the social relations of the Soviet Union are the same as those of classical capitalist societies (wage labour to capital), in which workers are forced by economic necessity to sell to the owners of the means of production their labour power in return for wages, still, the ruling class has a different legal position. In communist countries, all bureaucrats depend upon the receipt of a salary for their income. To get this income, they, like any worker, sell their labour power. Therefore, at first glance, bureaucrats appear to be only workers, not differing in this fundamental respect from other wage-earners. What then? Do we have a capitalist system, capitalist social relations, but no capitalist class *legally* distinct from other classes?

Proponents of the state-capitalist theory would say that it is true that, legally, the bureaucrats do not individually own the state. However, it is substance, not form, that is decisive, and legal formalities do not always reflect the substance. In the Middle Ages, the nobility did not own the means of production (land). They did not have a fee simple title but a usufruct—that is, they could not alienate the land (by bequest,

[34] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1957), pp. 34-5, 69.

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sale, etc.), but only use it. The nobles' right to control the land was subject to the performance of their duties to their feudal superiors. The upper clergy were part of the ruling class, and many of the clergy had more wealth and power than the lay nobleman. Yet popes, bishops, abbots, etc., did not own in their own right. Rather they controlled corporate organisations—diocese, abbeys, etc., which held title to the property. In a similar manner, it is argued, the bureaucrats of the USSR form a ruling class. By controlling the political state which owns property, they, in effect, control the property; 'the state bureaucracy possesses the state as private property'.[35] The concept of a ruling class that does not possess legal title to the property they control is not as inconceivable as might appear at first glance.

[35] Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, cited in Tony Cliff, *Marxist Analysis*, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

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THE FRENCH LEFT

From Marxism to Structuralism

Francois Furet

THE 'end of the ideologies' diagnosed by Raymond Aron, for instance, in his last book [1] refers generally to the developed societies of America and western Europe. It connects prosperity, economic growth, and social integration on the one hand with the progressive decline of political extremisms on the other; the car, the refrigerator and television are said to have killed the revolution. This type of analysis has already inspired endless comment on neo-capitalism, the gaullist regime, and the kind of political torpor which has characterised France since the end of the Algerian war; as if one of the functions of gaullist nationalism were now to counterbalance an objective process of French 'Americanisation'.

But does the end of the ideologies mean the end of the ideologues? If it is true that present-day France tends in its social depths to be dozing off into a society of abundance and social integration, is the diagnosis true also of the groups and the men whose profession is thinking and writing? It will perhaps be objected that this question implies a certain modification of our initial proposition, for the relations of intellectuals to ideologies differ in nature from those of the general public, or are at any rate more complicated (even if they are apparently simple or deliberately simplified). But French intellectuals, because of the authority they have enjoyed since the period of the Enlightenment, have often been indicative of the problems and choices of society as a whole. There can be no greater historical over-simplification than deifying the intelligentsia's purely protesting role; claiming a long line of great but damned ancestors is a cheap way of entering into an exceptional heritage. But Voltaire was the most acclaimed hero of the eighteenth century, the Revolution put Rousseau in the Pantheon, and Victor Hugo's coffin was followed by an enormous crowd. The intellectual left has rarely governed the France of its time, but it has supplied its universal values. Neither the Dreyfus case nor the Popular Front nor the post-war spread of communism are intelligible if the part played by the intellectuals and their ideological elaboration is left out of account.

That is why ideology is far from consisting exclusively of a theory of history, though in the France of yesterday Marxism-Leninism was the most widespread and extreme form it took. Ideology is born of the feeling that a great historical problem can and must be solved by individual commitment. Hence the passion inseparable from it, the

[1] Raymond Aron, *Trois essais sur l'âge industriel.*

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proselytism, the condemnation of the enemy and even of the indifferent, the identification of personal morality with historical necessity. The class struggle has different aims according to Guizot or Marx. The former hails the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the second the advent of the proletariat, but both, even if this is denied, as it is by Marx, imply a moral view of politics, distinction between good and evil, and commitment to the side of the good.

Thus the French left has no monopoly of ideology; on the contrary, for nearly two hundred years the conflict between right and left has been the warp on which ideologies have been woven. The Frenchman of the right, armed with Barrès *v.* Zola, Maurras *v.* Romain Rolland, and Drieu de la Rochelle *v.* Aragon, also has his cultural pedigree, whose assumptions and political hypocrisy the left has frequently denounced. The national masochism of the Pétainist bourgeoisie or fifteen years later the nationalist enthusiasm for *l'Algérie française*, refer back to the same system of intellectual and moral arguments, only the terms of which vary with the event. Why, then, the privileged position enjoyed today by the ideology of the left and by the left-wing intellectual? The answer is that the last great battle of right-wing ideology was fought by fascism—and lost. Since the end of the war ideological elaboration has consequently been a quasi-monopoly of the left.

How the celebrated Hegelian tribunal which had become the 'opium of the intellectuals' was wildly misused by the victorious left after it had been 'proved right' by history was described by Raymond Aron even before the politico-moral tribunal of Stalinism broke down with the death of Stalin. Up to that moment historical certainty and moral judgment had combined and reinforced each other; now both factors in the apogee of the ideological age were simultaneously punctured by developments in the contemporary world.

Destalinisation raised the issue of justice and truth in the communist world, there turned out to be other enemies besides the bourgeoisie, and it came to be seen that the Soviet Union was not always necessarily and inherently in the advance guard of human history. This led to a new diaspora of communist and progressive intellectuals; a whole world collapsed, as I well remember, because I was part of it. Warsaw, Budapest, the Chinese schism have only accentuated the process, providing the last rites for a Marxism-Leninism that had been both incarnate and universal. But during those very years a new universalist mirage, an *ersatz* Messianism, presented itself to the revolutionary intellectuals, namely, the struggle for independence of the Third World or, in the French context, support for the FLN in the Algerian war. This additional experiment in ideological extremism was the more characteristic of left-wing intellectual circles in that it was experienced in social isolation, disclaimed by the Communist Party and not understood by the working class. The western intellectual looked oversea

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for his (mythical) tie with the oppressed and the agents of world revolution, in the ranks of an enemy who was assumed by definition to be socialist and internationalist. The Muslim fellah celebrated by Fanon had become the latest ally of revolutionary defeatism of the Leninist type. The outcome is familiar. The left-wing intellectual had invested his liquid revolutionary capital in religious nationalism; in seeking the Bolshevik Party of 1917 it found Islam, and instead of Lenin it found Boumédienne.

The disconcerting outcome in Algeria and the very victories of the colonial peoples have slowed down left-wing intellectual investment in the Third World, for the difficulties in the way of economic 'take-off' are often too technical in nature to nourish passion, and the love affair between FLN's French war-time friends and the Algeria of Colonel Boumédienne has ended in disappointment. Nevertheless the economic setbacks that have taken place in most of the recently decolonised countries have in a way restored to honour the idea of a Leninist—or Maoist—dictatorship. For lack of suitable soil for experimentation of this type at home, some western intellectuals proclaim its necessity in the underdeveloped countries as the only way of demolishing the obstacles in the path of the mobilisation of labour and national saving for capital formation. A few years ago it was chiefly the romantic and anti-bureaucratic character of the Cuban revolution (which contrasted so sharply with socialism of the Soviet type) that roused enthusiasm, but the Chinese model now seems to be restoring priority to economic rationality, and this classic slant may again enable it to be used in the defence of totalitarianism. But it is too obviously inapplicable to European conditions, its culture being too 'exotic' and its antecedents too well known, and so it is unlikely to rally a great deal of support; and finally the hostility of the French Communist Party deprives it of a great deal of influence.

The irruption into history of the nations of the Third World, instead of promoting a 'Chinese' version of Marxism, has in fact contributed to hastening the end of the ideologies in contemporary French culture. Superficially and for a brief moment it seemed to lend a new lease of life to great universal visions of social transformation, but in reality it served to discredit lastingly and in depth the philosophies of history of the nineteenth century. The phenomenon could be crudely summed up by saying that the place occupied by Marxism twenty years ago in French intellectual life, which is so sensitive to fashions, has been taken by structuralism.

It is probably no chance, nor is it the mere result of an incidentally only too obvious cultural chauvinism, that structuralism, which has dominated European linguistic research since the first post-war period, was popularised in France not by linguistics but by the progress of anthropology; anthropology and the anthropological approach appeared at the right moment to meet a historical situation, fulfil a social expectation.

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For decolonisation revealed to all the secrets of the anthropologists, those pioneers of anti-colonialism: namely, that cultures are multiple, are all equally worthy of respect, and manifest themselves in terms of permanence rather than of change. French colonisation (which it must not be forgotten, was often 'left' in origin) claimed to place them in western 'time', putting them through European stages of progress whether they liked it or not. Now, however, there is perhaps a trace of expiatory masochism in the revaluation of these extra-European worlds.

Above all, a profound overnight change has taken place in the French intellectual's idea of the world and the part played in it by his country. The transference of his revolutionary hopes to the Soviet Union and then to the Third World was in itself an implicit confession of impotence concerning the possibilities in his own country. But it also betrayed the survival of the Jacobin tradition, nostalgia for the France of 1793, a patriotism temporarily frustrated but nevertheless still optimistic; France would one day again pick up the torch of revolutionary history. But now even this dream is fading. Not only has the Soviet flame gone out and the Third World disconcerted or disappointed its friends of the heroic age, but France itself is no longer France. The French intellectual, heir to a prestige less fragile than power and unconsciously used to a universal radiation of his culture, is not yet reduced to the sad state of the Belgian, but he is increasingly aware of being a citizen of a country that, in spite of gaullist rhetoric, no longer has the sense of making human history. Having been expelled from history, the France in which he lives consents the more willingly to expel history. It can look at the world with eyes no longer veiled by its own example and civilising obsession; with eyes now sceptical about the 'lessons' and 'meaning' of history. Valéry admirably foresaw this phenomenon after the First World War in his *Regards sur le monde actuel.*

Thus the recent disappointments of the French intellectuals and the general political situation combine to cast doubt on history—for so long a tyrannical mistress before she became an unfaithful one.

IT is without doubt this situation which explains the great impact of the kind of thinking of which Lévi-Strauss is both a model and a representative. It is however uncertain, even unlikely, that Lévi-Strauss, who has a passion for accuracy, would accept this vague and general attribution of paternity affixed to him under the label of 'structuralism'. But from the point of view of the social character of his audience, that matters little. It is, on the other hand, significant that a work as specific and as technical as his should have had so widespread an impact on men of letters, art critics, and philosophers. To enumerate its great themes and aspirations is not to evade the significance of the intellectual movement which reflects the scope of its influence, since

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that is precisely what has to be understood. In the first place, however abstract and high-powered it may be, the effect of his work is to revive something like the great Rousseauist paradox that split the eighteenth century. One feels it to be suffused by love of nature, the countryside and flowers, a fondness for 'primitive' man that inevitably stimulates nostalgia for a happiness lost by industrial societies. Lévi-Strauss writes of a world in which the eagle, the bear and meadow-sage still exist, but he believes no more than Rousseau, who is one of his favourite authors, in a return to a primitive happiness that has disappeared for ever. The heir to Boas and Mauss knows that there is no such thing as a state of nature, but that there are many communities and cultures which are so many ways of facing nature and that there is no positive way of establishing any hierarchy between them. Thus the industrial society of Europe or America loses the privileged position to which it believes itself entitled in relation to tribes buried in the forests of the Amazon. 'A great deal of egocentricity and naiveté is required if one is to believe that the whole of man has taken refuge in a single one of his historical or geographical modes of being, while the truth about man lies in the system of their differences and common properties' (*Pensée sauvage*, p. 329). Thus the 'primitive' does not provide us with an image of man's childhood, as was believed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in accordance with a naively European model of human history; he does not even provide us with one adequate image among others. As soon as it is granted that he has conceived very varied societies and uses a logic as profound—or simple—as that of modern science, he no longer exists as such, or as a 'primitive'. He merely offers us, as the so-called developed societies do, a multiplicity of cultural solutions of the eternal conflict between man and nature.

The role of the anthropologist is thus to classify cultural systems, to undertake for each of them an objective analysis of their systems of symbols and their articulation. The objectives of the psycho-analyst are implicitly transferred from the individual to the collective, from clinical analysis to the 'decoding' of a social language like the myth. In his last years Freud was greatly attracted by the interpretation of anthropological data (which he had not completely mastered). Lévi-Strauss rejects the methodological confusion implied in this illicit anthropology-psychoanalysis relationship, based on the old idea that the savage reveals man in his infancy, which assumes that the individual and the social are of the same nature; he never extrapolates into his own field the procedures of psycho-analysis. But his ideas about myths extend to the collective, the objectives of individual psychoanalytic treatment; they are intended to bring to the surface the subconscious structure of social beliefs, the code underlying man's thinking, and which finally determines what he does think of himself and of others. On this Lévi-Strauss agrees with Marx and Freud. Like that of the myth, the realm of ideologies is the realm of a false consciousness of reality, which must

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be explained at another level. But, unlike Marx, he sees no historical remedy for this false consciousness, no reconciliation of man and his true history.

Moreover, structural anthropology at long last promises an advance of the human sciences to a methodology as rigorous as that of the exact sciences. For in one sense the work of anthropological analysis resembles a laboratory experiment. In both cases the object under observation is treated as a natural object, is laid out in space, is amenable to any amount of experimentation, and there is awareness of the distance between the observer and the observed. In another sense, however, the methodological quarrels of the anthropologists threaten the assimilation of anthropology to the exact sciences. Lévi-Strauss is constantly aware both of the kinship and of the gap still to be filled in; hence the originality of his work, and no doubt also its wide range, which contrasts with the deliberately restricted nature of ethnological description. Working with a few societies into which history has not introduced its chaos and in which reduction to a few variables is relatively easy, he has been able to satisfy his concern for scientific rigour and his obsession with the linguistic 'model' in the best possible conditions. It is true, as he often repeats, that he has never ventured beyond, though, as always happens whenever a book becomes fashionable, imprudent or over-zealous disciples tend to extend his method towards building up a general theory of societies. But frivolous or perhaps illusory though this anticipation may be, it underlines the methodological influence of his work. Is not this entomologist of human behaviour, capable of the feat of emerging from his own cultural world, the reverse of Sartrian man, on whom engulfment in history and the emergence of a revolutionary practice imposes his celebrated commitment? The fact that he belongs to the same generation as Sartre and has lived through practically the same history and is also considered to belong to the 'left' is thus immaterial; to him these things belong to the domain of opinion and not to that of science. And in what way does he belong to the 'left'? The term hardly has meaning to a man who believes that in their state of babbling infancy the human sciences to which he has devoted his life and outside which he wishes to say nothing have for the time being nothing serious, still less useful, to offer to the *polis* and its struggles—except a relapse into ideology. In fact their chance of one day deserving their name specifically depends on their keeping silent. 'One may legitimately ask the exact and natural sciences what they are. But the social and human sciences are not yet in a state to render accounts. If these are required of them, or if on political grounds it is considered clever to pretend to do so, it will not be surprising if all one gets is phoney balance-sheets' (*Revue internationale des sciences sociales*, 1964).

Is this scruple to be regarded as a real rupture with history? It would be highly significant for our argument if it were so. But Lévi-Strauss continually denies it, and pays explicit tribute to history, allowing

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it even to 'reserve its rights' (*Inaugural lecture*). But until when? And what is the history to which he refers? Is it the meaning of history created by Sartre's dialectical reason? Evidently not, for, except at the price of unscrupulous falsification, looking back cannot demonstrate in the present the necessary outcome of the past. To Sartre a man can always draw logical conclusions; to Lévi-Strauss he can only think that he does so. A stubborn illusion grants the present the rather foolish privilege without seeing that it itself introduces into successive events a connecting link drawn from its own depths. Thus the assurance of a retrogressive movement of truth vanishes under the anthropologist's eye, and the philosophy of history becomes a myth, the necessity of which only emphasises its lack of substance. Lévi-Strauss, criticising the fabrication of historical meaning by Sartre's dialectical reason, wrote this significant passage on the history of the French Revolution: 'Those described as men of the left still cling to a period of contemporary history that granted them the privilege of consistency between practical imperatives and patterns of interpretation. Perhaps that golden age of the historical conscience has already passed; and the fact that one can at least imagine the possibility shows that this was merely a fortuitous situation, resembling the chance "focusing" on a heavenly body of an optical instrument with which it happened to be in a state of relative motion. We are still "focused" on the French Revolution; but if we had lived earlier we might have been focused on the Fronde' (*Pensée Sauvage*).

Having settled accounts with this pseudo-science, however, the fact remains that societies change and that there are histories—if not a single history—that are entitled to their observers. History, like Le Verrier's planet, thus becomes a perpetual 'disturbing factor' introducing structural disequilibriums. Now, it is impossible to grasp everything at once; synchronism and diachronism cannot be taken in at the same glance. Increasing one's knowledge in one field proportionally diminishes one's chances of acquiring it in another. Thus structural anthropologists are needed to study order and historians to study disorder. This division of labour is equal only in appearance, however. The study of structures has a double advantage, chronological and logical: chronological because the description of structures provides it with a starting-point, and this gives completed autonomy to the work of the structuralists, while the opposite is not true; the work of the historian is dependent, ornamental, or at all events relegated to a distant future. And logical because after the structures have been analysed the normal in the event has been pulverised and history can hardly be rationalised, and perhaps cannot be rationalised at all.

From this point of view, which is perhaps the most significant for our argument, Marx and Sartre are on the same side of the barricade, that of history, while Lévi-Strauss is on the other, that of structure. Like Hegel and Marx, Sartre still describes an advent, a history to be fulfilled by man, while Lévi-Strauss reduces multiple man to common

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mechanisms, dissolves him in a universal determinism, in the last resort displays him like a natural object. His books, written with a rather precious rigour, are a pitiless commentary on man's nothingness, marking a probably fundamental epistemological breach with the 'ideological era'. This is systematised in Foucault's latest book.

I do not wish to relapse into over-facile identifications, unduly confusing books and authors, but from the point of view of this analysis it is permissible to compare the work of Barthes and Foucault with that of Lévi-Strauss. Their fields of work are very different, but the methodological inspiration is the same; it is to try to obtain an anthropological view of contemporary societies and cultures. Foucault, imitating the use of the anthropologist's cultural telescope and reversing it, tries to gain more light from it that way. Lévi-Strauss mingles the Jivaro world with his European outlook, while Foucault sets out to consider European culture from a Jivaro angle in order to turn it into a scientific object and make it examinable. He tries to describe, not individual patterns, which would result in a study of opinions, but the conceptual structures which in each period make those opinions possible; the present intellectual revolution consists in his view in the breach with historicism and the end of humanist anthropocentrism. This makes Sartre the last 'nineteenth-century philosopher'—which cannot be pleasing to him. Foucault's methodological aggressiveness, which is probably one of the clues to the success of his book, has the interest of trying to systematise the general significance of structuralism in European culture of the present day; the analysts of man's 'dissolution' have succeeded the prophets of his advent.

BUT, if what Foucault says is indeed true, and if structuralism confines Marx to a nineteenth century tyrannised over by history, it is very curious and sociologically extremely interesting that structuralism should have developed in France so systematically and so late and in the same left-wing intellectual circles that (in the broad sense of the term) had been Marxist since the liberation. This leaves us with the task of trying to describe and understand this paradoxical phenomenon, as well as the curious and, I think, specifically French mutual contamination that has taken place between Marxism and structuralism.

At a first level of analysis, it is evident that if Marxism continues to lie at the heart of the French intellectual debate, it is less as a theory than as an ideal, less as an intellectual tool than as a political heritage. Twenty years have now passed since Sartre tried to reconcile the existentialist self with Marxist determinism, that is, his theory of personal liberty with his progressive opinions. It is this that forced him in his last philosophical book to substitute his dialectics of individual liberty for Marxist dialectical materialism while quoting as 'evidence' and approving without the slightest critical analysis the sum-total of the propositions put forward in *Das Kapital*, that is to say, the essentials

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of the Marxist philosophy of history.[2] By this subterfuge he reconciles his philosophic conscience with his political progressiveness, but at the same time illustrates the profound duality of his work and the uneven quality of his intellectual rigour. What interests him is the establishment of new existential foundations for human history and the revision of what he considers the mark of 'scientism' in Marx. The respectful and distant doffing of his hat to *Das Kapital* does not derive from the same level of analysis; it signifies merely his allegiance to the left-wing intelligentsia, the resistance of yesterday and the present-day struggles against imperialism. It is the historical symbol of an age, that is, the ideological age. Sartre speaks and will always speak as big brother to all those who lived profoundly through the times of fascism and communism. The genius of this professional philosopher resides, paradoxically perhaps, in the secret of his sensibility and art rather than in the clarity of his thought. In vain he refuses to be what he has become, for he is caught up in the pitiless history of literature. He has turned into a patriarchal figure, a big brother ageing in glory, a Nobel prizewinner in spite of himself, but a Nobel prizewinner all the same. That is the last trick played on him by 'words'.

It is true that Lévi-Strauss has also emphasised his debt to Marxism. But his is of a different kind. Having deliberately abstained from post-war political struggles, shut in his student's and scholar's ivory tower, he has felt no need to state his position in relation to communism or anti-communism; the few interviews that—obviously without pleasure—he has given the press betray more than prudence—a professional desire to keep his distance from his own cultural world and the chaotic history that introduces its disorders into it. Nevertheless he can perhaps be considered more faithful than Sartre to Marx's philosophic premises and materialist determinism. He has inherited from Marx the scientific ambition of interpreting in intelligible terms the ideas that men form about the natural and social worlds by another system underlying them; he accepts the idea of a global society in which the determining factors will in the last resort be the relations between men and nature. But he transforms it profoundly by drawing up a veritable theory of superstructures. One of the plainest symptoms of the end of the ideological age among French intellectuals is, incidentally, this passion for the study of superstructures, as if they desire to track down, unveil, and understand the intellectual products of men and groups from their most hidden motivations. But this is also the weakest point in Marx's analysis. To Lévi-Strauss, who made himself plain on the subject in *Pénsee sauvage*, the primacy of infrastructures is like a hand dealt at cards; what societies do with the hand imposed upon them depends on men's cultural inventiveness. But an unlimited number of variables are not open to this inventiveness. On the contrary, it betrays structures and logical systems whose appearance and mutations, far from being necessary and inevitable as so many stages in an identical human

[2] *Cf. Esprit*, November 1963.

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evolution, depend on a calculation of probabilities; this takes into account the concomitant multiplicity of societies and cultures.

It is true that from other passages in his books less materialist and less Marxist interpretations can be drawn, for one can never be sure whether the logical structure brought to light by the analysis is of the same nature as the material produced by it or whether it informs reality. In fact the problem whether it is materialist or Kantian (a Kantianism without transcendental subject, Paul Ricoeur has said) is of little interest to Lévi-Strauss, who seems to accept both hypotheses; that is to say, he takes little interest in his philosophical relations with Marxism.

Moreover, he has always refused all extrapolation of his analytic procedures to mythologies, beliefs, or 'historical' societies; he did so explicitly in reply to Edmund Leach, the British anthropologist, who suggested a Lévi-Straussian 'decoding' of the Book of Genesis—and the contrast between the theoretical ambition implicit in his ideas and the thinness of their field of application rouses the mistrust of many of his colleagues in the English-speaking world, who remain attached to the empirical accumulation of facts.[3] In France, however, it is this ambition, or rather its special contribution to South American anthropology, which has roused the enthusiasm of intellectuals and led rapidly to discussions at the most general level—existentialism, Marxism, and structuralism. The left-wing periodicals bear witness to this; the anthropologist has been consecrated a philosopher rather in spite of himself. Perhaps this should be regarded, as certain English-speaking anthropologists regard it, as a special feature of the French national tradition. But in this instance the fascination exercised by Lévi-Strauss over many Marxist or ex-Marxist intellectuals seems to me to require a more specific explanation. It is born neither of fraternity of political opinion—for Lévi-Strauss is the opposite of a 'committed' man—nor of philosophical kinship—which is highly problematical if it exists at all, and is in any case a matter of indifference to Lévi-Strauss—but from an inverse relationship in which nostalgia for Marxism has been able to insert itself. Stated simply, the structural description of man as object has taken the place of the historical advent of the man-god.

But there is yet another and still more surprising aspect of the relationship between the Marxists and the structuralists. It is significant that a whole trend of communist thought implicitly relies on structuralism, not to break with Marxism, but to renovate it. That is the meaning of the work of Althusser and his friends, who are trying to restore the theoretical value of the work of Marx and Lenin by rigorous analysis of their operative concepts in order to free it of the banally humanist ideology in which Garaudy diluted it. Instead of being concerned, like Sartre, with reconciling an epistemology with progressive ideas, their object is to marry structuralist method and Marxist theory.

[3] *Cf.* E. Leach, 'Genesis as Myth', *Discovery*, May 1962; 'The Legitimacy of Solomon', *Archives Européennes de sociologie*, 1966; C. Lévi-Strauss, 'Anthropologie et philosophie', *New Left Review*, 1966.

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From this there emerges a Marxism purged of its Hegelian paternity and of all contamination by bourgeois humanism, and differing from Marx's own teaching, since the latter is redefined by the bringing to light of its fundamental conceptual structures. It is on this condition alone, in Althusser's view, that Marxism can again become what it really is—this having been masked by the huge amount of social and historical sedimentation that has taken place—that is to say, *the* theory, *the* science *par excellence* as opposed to the ideologies. This explains the curious path taken by Althusser. Trying as he is to 'de-ideologise' Marxism, he nevertheless uses it both as an object of study and as his sole point of scientific reference. Structural analysis, which is an attempt to extend the methods of natural science to the 'human sciences', is thus subtly diverted in the direction of Marxist dogmatism, which is assumed as a self-evident premise—for the Marxist model is assimilated from the outset to the scientific model. Hence the epistemological contradiction and political ambiguity of the works of Althusser and his friends, which are devoted to restoring life to Marx by rigorous analysis but are blocked by bigoted adherence to a conceptual apparatus which, brilliant though it may have been, dates from another age and another world.

But perhaps on another plane this ambiguity itself is significant of the development of some communist intellectuals who have remained in the party since the destalinisation crisis, and of younger ones who have since joined it in a climate that has become much more tolerant and much more critical than that of the fifties. Althusser simultaneously offers structuralism and Marxism, critical study and doctrinaire intransigence, loyalty to the French Communist Party and reservations about it. There are many reasons to suppose that a sociological study of his present audience would disclose these factors, which are so characteristic of the present and the recent past of communist intellectuals. No matter that they are contradictory; it is precisely because they are contradictory that a structuralist interpretation of Marx is able to offer them a temporary home. Intellectual and sociological contradiction mutually explain and reinforce each other; the structuralist 'de-ideologising' of Marxism undoubtedly offers a way of living through the end of the ideologies inside the communist world.

If this analysis is as a whole correct, if there is indeed a link between a general phenomenon like the end of the ideologies and the attractiveness of structuralism in the special environment of the French intellectuals, it will strike one as surprising that the disintegration of ideological certainties and of the 'meaning' of history has not led to a return to favour of empirical research and the gathering of factual information on the pattern of the English-speaking world. Not that such research and the accumulation of factual information is not growing in France; on the contrary, there as elsewhere sociological investigations, public opinion polls, massive searches of documents are multiplying. But everything is more than ever subordinated, even

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more than it was yesterday, to the search for a general theory. Everything is happening as if the crisis of Marxism had cleared the ground for a methodology of another kind but at the same level, heir to the same ambition for global, systematic understanding. What for lack of a better term is called the Parisian 'fashion' for structuralism, that is, its social success and its timing, would thus be explained by its deep relationship, both contradictory and homogeneous, to Marxism. The natural-sciences model has displaced the history model, man as object has taken the place of man as subject, structure has taken the place of process, concept that of practice. But all this lies within the same determinist ambition and derives from the same desire to decipher what underlies the apparent or merely conscious meaning of human behaviour.

Thus it is probable that the end of the ideological age among the French intellectuals embraces two distinct phenomena differing in nature. Destalinisation, the Sino-Soviet schism, the crisis of the Third World—and French and European prosperity—have punctured the progressivism of the fifties that was so characteristic of the ideological age. Hence there was a readiness of intellectual opinion, a kind of expectation—rather as a century ago the inglorious check to the romantics of 1848 preceded and facilitated the formation of the realist and positivist generation. But it facilitated this, it did not create it; intellectual change does not itself call for sociological explanation. At the present time the political disappointments suffered by progressivism have weakened the influence of Marxism among the left intellectuals, but it is Lévi-Strauss and not Raymond Aron who reigns in the void thus created. What prevails is not a liberal and empirical criticism of Marxism, but a hyper-intellectual, systematic way of thinking, aiming at a general theory of man. Not only have Marxists or ex-Marxists been able to invest their past in this without repudiating it; they have also rediscovered in it their ambition for an all-embracing science of man and their old all-embracing dream, freed from the naivetés of commitment and of the meaning of history. To that extent perhaps the case of the French intellectuals deserves to become a classic; the end of the ideological age has found its doctrinaires.

(This article was originally intended for an international colloquium to have been held in Barcelona in December 1966 on the theme of 'The end of ideologies' in the contemporary world. In prohibiting the holding of this debate on its territory, the government of General Franco has involuntarily but usefully shown the limits of the proposed theme, reminding us once again that the fascist ideology is not dead, and that the fight for liberty is no less necessary today than it was yesterday. The colloquium has been postponed. In explaining that this was meant to be no more than a contribution to the debate, the writer hopes that the reader will excuse the brevity and the gaps in it.)

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NEO-MARXISM AND THE BRITISH NEW LEFT

James D. Young

THE New Left grew out of the upheavals in British social and political life revolving round the Suez crisis, the Khrushchev revelations, the Hungarian revolution, the frustrations and alienation of 'the scholarship boy', and the preoccupations of socially-conscious intellectuals with the 'pernicious influence' of advertising and television. It was both a product of and a response to a mood of social discontent among a new generation of intellectuals, of university graduates and undergraduates in the 1950s. This mood was reflected in the universal enthusiasm with which Richard Hoggart's book, *The Uses of Literacy*, was reviewed in 1957. By 1958 the political mood within the New Left had hardened, and the movement as a whole was committed to a form of neo-Marxist analysis of contemporary society. Thus E. P. Thompson confessed that 'I still prefer to call myself a dissident communist rather than a late convert to democratic socialism or any other hybrid. I think there is some point in some of us in the West asserting our communist origins, instead of hoping our traces will be covered by the dust of time; we may be ashamed of past gullibility, arguments and attitudes, but we need not be ashamed of our basic decision to stand on the side on which we did when faced with this historical dilemma.' [1]

The Khruschchev 'revelations' at the twentieth congress of the CPSU was the key event triggering off the emergence and crystallisation of opposition within the British Communist Party. At that time a group of communist intellectuals published and circulated a duplicated bulletin, *The Reasoner*, in open defiance of the party bureaucrats in King Street; and, when the second wave of Russian tanks rolled into Budapest to crush the Hungarian workers' rising, most of the opposition leaders within the party at once resigned. The immediate upshot of the resignation of E. P. Thompson and John Saville, who had roots in the industrial North of England, was the emergence of *The New Reasoner*—a printed 'quarterly journal of socialist humanism'.

Side by side with this development a group of Labour and dissident communist undergraduates launched early in 1957 a new socialist journal, *Universities and Left Review*. Both journals were concerned with developing a socialist-humanist philosophy relevant to the times, related to what was happening in their own society and to the labour movement as a whole, and with the arts. The neo-Marxist tendency had now repudiated the concept of keeping 'artists in uniform'; the 'scholarship boys' had opted out of the 'culture of prosperity' with its 'bitter-sweet taste'; and they had all agreed that imaginative literature

[1] 'Agency and Choice', by E. P. Thompson in *The New Reasoner*, Summer, 1958. In this essay Thompson captured the mood of the neo-Marxists in the New Left when he wrote: 'Marx's greatness lies in his refusal to fall into facile economic progressivism on the one hand, or equally facile moral absolutism on the other.'

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and socialist humanism were complementary. But while *The New Reasoner* concentrated on systematic attempts to rescue Marxism from the stifling, stultifying hand of Stalinist orthodoxy, *Universities and Left Review* turned its attention to sociological criticism, the cinema, literary criticism, and community planning. Its pages were packed with articles and contributions from prominent novelists, artists, and journalists; it attracted a large number of readers, carried regular articles and review notices on a wide range of problems worrying the whole spectrum of professional people from the school teacher to the film director; and it soon won favourable comment, high praise, and enthusiastic recommendation in the glossy magazines and quality newspapers. On the other hand *The New Reasoner* had a much smaller circulation (estimated at about 2,300 at its peak in 1959), reflecting the 'harder' political origins and commitment of its editors and supporters, and it therefore took a more serious and consistent interest in the goings-on of the trade unions and the Labour Party. Nonetheless there was considerable overlapping at times, as when, for example, *Universities and Left Review* published 'The Insiders', a study of 'the men who rule British industry' in 1957, in a determined effort to influence the Labour Party conference debate on public ownership. Conversely, *The New Reasoner* carried short stories by Doris Lessing, poems by Christopher Logue and Bertolt Brecht, and art supplements on the work of William Blake and Diego Rivera.

Yet *The New Reasoner* was the main pole of attraction for the dissident communists and the emergent non-party neo-Marxists (such as Peter Worsley) who were academics, scholars, and specialists interested in bringing 'the Marxist method' to bear on their own research and writings. Still others among them were engaged in sociological excavations to re-discover 'the early Marx'. Though they were always a minority within the New Left, the neo-or-revisionist Marxists had deeper roots in the labour movement than the empirical 'socialist humanists' belonging to the *Universities and Left Review* tendency, and they stamped their neo-Marxism on the New Left as early as 1957. This was, in turn, a reflection of their factional experience and political maturity, their talents and their uncompromising opposition to the values of the Establishment.

HOWEVER, the neo-Marxist analysis of contemporary society to which the New Left as a whole was irrevocably committed was not generally recognised by outsiders. Only the odd discerning reader realised that the cultural sociology of Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and Richard Hoggart was becoming subordinate to the evolving ideology of the neo-Marxist tendency. Thus Professor Cameron devoted all of three broadcast talks to a scrutiny of the New Left's political philosophy, and to a critique of its 'vestigial Bolshevism'. Being resident in the University of Leeds, where the New Left philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre was issuing his 'Notes from the Moral Wilderness', Professor Cameron

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was in an unusually good position to sound out what was going on in the New Left. Those who were less discerning saw it as a cultural movement or as a political movement interested in 'cultural' questions, as opposed to the basic bread-and-butter preoccupations of the Old Left.

Occasionally a few American socialists appeared to possess a much sharper insight into the predicament of the New Left than any observers or commentators, whether critical or sympathetic, in Britain. Thus Wright Mills touched the heart of the problem when he appealed to the New Left to scuttle 'the labour metaphysic'.[2] A variant of this approach was seen in the penetrating comments of Irving Howe, an editor of the American socialist journal, *Dissent,* when he wrote: 'I suspect that in their stress upon the working-class neighbourhood and its indigenous culture men like Williams and Hoggart are turning to something that is fast slipping away.' But while Wright Mills wanted the New Left to repudiate the idea that the working class is a historic agency of change, Irving Howe criticised their 'organic vision of socialism for being a bit too harmonious and, if I may risk being misunderstood, a bit too wholesome'. He and the other editors of *Dissent* had repeatedly expressed their solidarity with the Marxist revisionists in Poland and Hungary (as had the editors of *The New Reasoner*), yet even Howe was attracted to *Universities and Left Review*—a journal which showed little interest in the Marxist revisionists in eastern Europe—and to writers like Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart who lacked 'a touch of anarchist disaffection that would burst out no matter "who is the State".'[3]

But then the cultural apparatus of the New Left was based in London, and within a stone's throw of the great publishing houses and the quality newspapers. The Partisan ('London's left-wing coffee house') was situated in Soho's Carlyle Street which also housed a socialist library and the editorial and administrative offices of *Universities and Left Review*. For journalists and foreign visitors, this was the New Left; and a New Left which, if Raymond Williams' work was anything to go by, belonged to a long line of British radical dissent. In any case the New Left in London was a widespread movement, with weekly political meetings in various basements in Oxford Street pulling in audiences of 500, and reinforced by adjuncts as far-ranging as the Left Scientists group, the Education group, the History of Socialism group, the Literature group, the Social Priorities group, the London Schools Left Club (for teenagers still at school), and an International Forum.

A high-water mark of the activity and achievement of the movement was the merging of *Universities and Left Review* and *The New Reasoner* into *New Left Review* in December 1959. In the last issue of *The New Reasoner,* the decision to thrust 'forward into the Red Sixties' (the phrase is Isaac Deutscher's) was defended, and the foundation of *New*

[2] 'Open Letter to the New Left' from C. Wright Mills, in *New Left Review*, September 1960.
[3] 'A Mind's Turning', by Irving Howe, in *Dissent*, Winter 1960.

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Left Review justified as a means of providing 'a stimulus and a sense of direction to the movement'.[4] As it happened, the neo-Marxist tendency lost more from the fusion of the two journals than it gained; and nothing was heard in the pages of *New Left Review* of the Marxist revisionists in eastern Europe or of the neo-Marxists or dissident communists in Britain.

At the same time *Out of Apathy* was published as the first of a series of New Left Books aiming at a 'moral diagnosis of contemporary society'. It was (apart from a reprint of Irving Howe's *Literature and Politics*) also the last book to be published in that series under the imprint of New Left Books.

Out of Apathy was given good reviews in the general as well as in the labour press, and held out the promise of providing dissident communists, disenchanted Bevanites, and rationalist CNDers with a common rationale for their hectic and sometimes near-anarchistic political activities. Then the New Left political movement dipped towards a decline—a dip that was soon to escalate into a gallop. By the end of 1961 *New Left Review* had a circulation of 9,000; two years later the circulation had dropped to under 4,000.

By the beginning of 1959 the New Left movement had forty-five clubs scattered throughout the country. Some of them were firmly tied to traditional labour organisations (i.e. the trade unions and the Labour party), and others, like the Fife Socialist League, were straddled between the Labour party and the Communist party, poaching members from both, injecting the ideas of 'socialist humanism' into the trade unions at the pit and factory level, and struggling for the soul of the labour movement. In the industrial North of England and in Scotland the neo-Marxists grouped around *The New Reasoner* were not content merely to assert their adherence to class struggle, socialist humanism, and the role of human agency as against an impersonal historic process; they were also preparing themselves, in the phrase of Ralph Milliband, for 'the politics of the long haul'. A New Left monthly journal called *Forum* was beamed at rank-and-file militants in factories, mines, and workshops; and was later replaced by industrial bulletins putting the case of the neo-Marxists in the plain language of the industrial worker. Many of the rank-and-file industrial workers in the New Left co-operated with the agitational plans and projects of the Socialist Labour League, the main Trotskyist organisation in Britain, while gently but firmly chiding Gerry Healy, Peter Fryer, and Brian Behan (then forming the Trotskyist high command) for their petty and unfraternal attacks on the New Left revisionist intellectuals. For example, Lawrence Daly, the most talented and influential worker in the New Left (and now Scottish secretary of the National Union of Miners), announced his 'critical support' (a phrase popular in Marxist circles) for the Trotskyist National Industrial Rank-and-File Conference in 1958, thus suggesting that the far-left had finally

[4] 'A Pressay in Ephology', by E. P. Thompson, in *The New Reasoner*, Autumn, 1959.

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'made it'. A perceptive journalist in *The Times* had no such illusions, and committed his own prognostications to paper: 'The composition of the group is so diverse that it would be surprising if they were to cohere for long'. When Peter Fryer, Brian Behan, and Alasdair MacIntyre (a late-comer to the Socialist Labour League) baled out of their commitment to Trotskyism a year later, the prediction of *The Times* was vindicated.

Nonetheless the neo-Marxists, while assisting the industrial workers of their tendency by helping them to produce industrial bulletins, had not forgotten that theoretical work is the chief province of Marxist intellectuals, and their contribution to neo-Marxist creativity was impressive. A whole host of books manifesting a neo-Marxist tendency came off the printing presses before and after the abortive New Left Books venture had failed. Among them were *Parliamentary Socialism* by Ralph Milliband, *Puritanism and Revolution* by Christopher Hill, *Essays in Labour History* by John Saville and Asa Briggs, *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People* by David Craig, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* by Peter Worsley, *The Making of the English Working Class* by E. P. Thompson, and Victor Serge's *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, translated, edited and with an introduction by Peter Sedgwick.

THE central predicament of the New Left was that as its 'moral diagnosis' of British capitalism was assimilated by the Establishment, and its cultural prescriptions and remedies accepted for consideration by socio-cultural committees and party committees in Transport House, a division between the two tendencies was building up. That was not, however, the only source of tension, but rather a symptom of unresolved theoretical divergences and conflicting practical aims as a whole.

The half-partisan authoritarian voices in the background kept nagging and insisting that the New Left should drop the 'Labour metaphysic'. In an early issue of *New Left Review*, E. P. Thompson offered a stringent, though fraternal, criticism of Raymond Williams' book, *The Long Revolution*, on the grounds that his model of society had made insufficient allowance for the creative role of the class struggle. In the event, Thompson's neo-Marxist creativity met defeat in an internal factional struggle. Despite the dominant faction's obsession with 'images' and cultural 'fashions' (Brecht, for example, replacing Sean O'Casey), the crippling voices of a sectarian past kept creeping into the pages of *New Left Review*. Not a few of the voices were new, belonging, as they did, to the sophisticated but politically innocent; yet the *tone* had been shaped in the 1930s when Stalin was enjoying his heyday.

Thus the editor of *New Left Review* could write of the situation in Cuba: 'Elections and party government is seen now as a rupturing of the transitional period, slowing down its pace and altering its style. It would formalise the system and fracture the fraternity between people and leaders formed in the revolutionary war. With the memory of Batista's electoral hoax fresh in their minds, the Cuban poor regard

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elections as a bureaucratic postponement of the revolution '.[5] Once the creative role of the working class, whether reformist labour or dissident communist, had been written off, the majority of new leftists fell back on a mythology of socialist saints and reactionary sinners. (After Labour lost the general election in 1959 *Universities and Left Review* held a meeting in London under the title 'The Permanent Tory Majority'.) Hence the search for allies, enemies, and revolutions as engines of history in the backward countries, where the class lines could be sharply drawn and the saints and demons allotted their historic roles. When the indigenous working class had failed to act out its pre-ordained historic role, the substitutionalists soon found their saints and saviours in Cuba and Algeria. By the late autumn of 1961 Stuart Hall (the only full-time functionary in the New Left) had vacated the editorial chair of *New Left Review* and the substitutionalists had also succeeded in edging the neo-Marxists out of the New Left altogether. The New Left had died as it had begun, in a mood of weary, disgruntled defeat.

The factional fight was fierce and prolonged, and duplicated factional documents were circulated among the leadership. Yet no public statement was ever made or published concerning the differences that divided what has not inaccurately been called the old New Left and the new New Left. At the root of the conflict was a mood, just as a mood had played a large part in the evolution of the New Left in the 1950s. Not that the upheavals of 1956, with the revolt in the Communist party and the disenchantment of the Bevanites, would not inevitably have led to a regrouping of left-wing forces in Britain. A peculiar confluence of circumstances and political forces was present at the birth of the New Left. And so at its death; for die it did, though a journal called *New Left Review* still issues from the old editorial offices in Soho.

E. P. Thompson led the attack of the defeated faction who favoured greater political activity and less concern with 'images' and cultural fashions. Paradoxically, the victorious faction led by Perry Anderson, the present editor of *New Left Review*, had come from nowhere. They had belonged to neither of the tendencies in the old New Left, and they were largely unknown outside of Oxford, where they had produced a student socialist journal called *New University*. Culturally and politically they are now the equivalent of the Social-Democratic Federation when it went through its worst sectarian phase—except that the SDF believed in human agency rather than passive political comment and back-seat driving. This new New Left believes in the inevitable 'logic of history' rather than the class struggle or labour reformism.

A page of New Left history, of strivings and searchings for a humanistic socialism built by working people themselves had closed.[6] As the New Left in Britain collapsed, a whole crop of New Left movements sprang up in America.

[5] 'Notes on the Cuban Dilemma', by Stuart Hall and Norman Fruckter, in *New Left Review*, May-June 1961.

[6] See my article, 'The Two Faces of Socialism', in *Socialist Commentary*, October 1963, where I discuss the democratic and authoritarian conceptions of socialism.

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THE STUDENT LEFT IN THE USA

Lewis S. Feuer

WHEN the student movement began to revive in 1960, it went through an 'issue-searching stage.' It had not yet arrived at the perception of the strategic significance of the merger of the civil rights movement with its own generational struggle. The first book of the student movement to appear in a generation, *Student*, published in 1962, and written by David Horowitz, a leading Berkeley activist, in its seventeen chapter headings of student causes never mentioned the civil rights movement. It gave primacy rather to criticism of the University as 'an assembly line for high-grade technicians'; 'the most powerful force defeating us in our lives as students', it said, 'is the irrelevance of knowledge in America today'.

Unlike the old, the new student movement made no pretence at being rooted in economic issues. Early in its issue-searching stage, an article in one of its organs observed:

> Little, if any, concern has been evidenced over economic issues—certainly only a very few students have shed tears over the strike defeats of unions, massive unemployment, right-to-work laws, urban re-development, etc. The dramatic, clear-cut, and relatively easy-to-comprehend yet appalling conditions of the farm labourers have aroused some sympathy—but mostly in the highly politicized California area. Affluent society or not, these issues are strange to primarily middle-class students, and are far too complex to arouse a moral or emotional reaction, except for a few from pro-labour backgrounds.[1]

No longer could the American student activist satisfy his back-to-the-people impulse by identifying with the labour movement. For labour had ceased to be a movement; it had its everyday material interests but no apocalyptic goals; it was smug, self-satisfied, suspicious of idealistic intellectuals. A former president of the newly organised Students for a Democratic Society described the students' disenchantment with labour: Labour, he said, had once been an 'opposition group', championing the causes of the people against oppression, and putting forward a set of values and a social image of industrial democracy:

> No longer does labour have this image. It appears not as an opposition group but as a reform club within the 'establishment'. It does not call for militant rank and file action, it does not basically challenge the structure of the Democratic Party, it doesn't challenge the economic privilege of corporate elites. Even more disheartening to students, its failure to banish discrimination from

[1] Otto Feinstein, 'Is There a Student Movement?' *New University Thought*, Summer 1961, p. 24.

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> within its own house makes it a party to the racism that pervades almost every institution of American life.[2]

Labour had failed 'even to support the students who are at the radical front in the civil rights effort', and had 'acceded to Johnson as Kennedy's second man'.

IF the New Student Left, disenchanted with labour, was at odds with the Old Marxists, the Old Left, it also utterly rejected the Old Liberals. For the latter had committed the unpardonable sin—they had joined the Establishment. The new student movement refused to identify itself with any part of the System or the Establishment. It scorned the Old Liberals as 'Establishment Intellectuals'. A vice-president of the United States National Student Association said in June 1963: 'Involvement has meant to the post-war intellectual service in the Establishment. . . . So that, in the late fifties, there was a good deal of celebration of the fact that intellectuals were to be found in all power structures of the society'. Now, however, new alternatives posed themselves for the intellectual—it was no longer a choice of either the Establishment or isolation. 'For the first time there is a base of power outside the university to which the intellectual can turn.' The Young Left sought a new road to power through new sources of discontent; its elitism blended with a new populism and new tactics of direct action: 'But there is a new understanding gained through direct participation in social movements, that power is something that can be created, that it can be generated at the base of the social structure; and the intellectual can obtain power by involving himself in the emerging centres of power in society: the civil rights movement, the peace movement, the discussion of economic issues.'[3]

The New Left in the sixties were as contemptuous of the Old Liberals as the young activists of the thirties had been of the liberals of the twenties. As one of them wrote in the same leaflet:

> The symbol of the 'old order', of the intellectuals of the fifties, is Arthur Schlesinger, and the reaction to Arthur Schlesinger underlines the healthy reaction of the intellectuals to the trap that they were (and Schlesinger is) in. And the more articles that Arthur Schlesinger writes, lecturing intellectuals, telling them that they are out of their minds not to be serving the Establishment, the better off we'll be.

Such a middle-aged veteran radical as James Wechsler was dismissed as essentially well-meaning but ineffectual because too much part of the System. His *Reflections of an Angry Middle-Aged Editor* was treated in much the same terms that Wechsler himself had used on the Columbia liberals thirty years before: 'For all Wechsler's amiable arguments, this is a depressing book. He says as many of the right

[2] R. Alan Haber, *Students and Labor*, leaflet, SDS, September 1962, New York.
[3] Paul Potter, *The Intellectual as an Agent of Social Change*, leaflet, SDS, June 1963.

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things, more or less as they have been said for so many years, and it is not enough. In his way he is as devoted to *realpolitik* as are Nixon and Johnson.'[4] The trend of the New Left was to work 'outside the framework of party politics'. It had the distinctive new generational tactic of direct action: the sit-downs in the South, the pacifist demonstrations against atomic installations and bomb-testing, the Montgomery bus strike—these were the guiding examples. One could pass directly from moral principle to direct action without the distortion of an intervening refractory political machine. One could pit one's will against the System, and it would yield. One could make history instead of being made by it.

AN elitist trend in the American student movement emerged early in the sixties, finding its most explicit spokesman in C. Wright Mills. Disillusioned with labour, and at odds with the middle class and what he called the power elite, Mills, by a process of elimination, had only the intellectuals to turn to as the agents of social change. He was recapitulating the same processes of disillusionment with the people and apotheosis of the intellectuals through which the Russian Populists had gone. As the Russian students became disillusioned with the Bakuninist metaphysic which had exalted the revolutionary potential of the masses, so now Mills threw aside the outmoded 'labour metaphysic':

> What I do not quite understand about some new left writers is why they cling so mightily to 'the working class' of the advanced capitalist societies as *the* historic agency, or even as the most important agency, in the face of the really impressive historical evidence that now stands against this expectation. Such a labour metaphysic, I think, is a legacy from Victorian Marxism that is now quite unrealistic.[5]

But now Mills made the intellectual class into the historical elite, the makers of history. 'Who is it that is thinking and acting in radical ways? All over the world—in the bloc, outside the bloc and in between—the answer is the same: it is the young intelligentsia.'

> In the Soviet bloc, who is it that has been breaking out of apathy? It has been students and young professors and writers; . . . That is why we have got to study these new generations of intellectuals around the world as real live agencies of historic change . . . 'But it is just some kind of moral upsurge, isn't it?' Correct. But under it: no apathy. Much of it is direct non-violent action, and it seems to be working, here and there. Now we must learn from the practice of these young intellectuals and with them work out new forms of action.

There was considerable perturbation at Mills' espousal of intellectual

[4] Charles Chadwick, 'Angry Liberals', *Liberation*, July–August 1960, p. 29.
[5] C. Wright Mills, 'On the New Left', *Studies on the Left*, vol. II, No. 1, 1961, pp. 70–71.

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elitism, yet he had clearly caught an undercurrent of the student movement. 'The books of C. Wright Mills are well-thumbed by us, and it is his sort of radicalism with which many of us identify', wrote a Stanford student leader, the head of Palo Alto Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[6]

The neo-elitist ideology blended with adulation of and identification with such a figure as Fidel Castro. Castro was an intellectual, a student leader who had galvanised the masses. Castro was anti-American, and the new student movement was emotionally attracted to whoever was anti-American. Anti-Americanism was the ideology of rejecting all that the fathers stood for. History was going to be made by the Anti-Americans of the world, the 'uncommitted' peoples of the world, the coloured races of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Negro in the United States. The fathers were defined by the unconscious of the student movement as without virtues, the oppressors 'of all that was living in the world'.

The emotional appeal of Castro to American students was founded on precisely its amalgam of elitism and populism. American activists longed to share such an experience as the Cuban students' back-to-the-people movement:

> They had all volunteered to leave their homes and promising careers for three years to go to the mountains to teach the children there the simple elements of a basic education . . . Fidel Castro was speaking. He warned them of the difficulties they would face there, their isolation from all to which they had become accustomed in their lives, and the natural resistance they would find among the peasants to the new venture. He urged patience upon them and then thanked them for their sacrifice.[7]

To lead the people, to be its pure, youthful guides, to sacrifice oneself for them, to live by an ideal higher than the ordinary career, and by a faith higher than the objectivities of science, such was the creed of which Castro seemed the prophet. When the missiles crisis of 1962 took place, and the United States insisted on the withdrawal of the Soviet missile installations, the student activists were ready to believe it was all an invention of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the Cuban crisis receded, and as Castro himself became embroiled with China over her attempts to dominate his policy and Cuba became less stridently anti-American, the student activists became perceptibly less enthusiastic for Castro; the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare and the stalwart anti-American onslaughts of Mao Tse-tung became the more suitable objects of generational admiration.

But a foreign identification was never a sufficient channel for the back-to-the-people longings of the emerging American student movement. If there was no proletariat, no peasantry, no downtrodden people with which to merge oneself, there was a challenge of identification with

[6] Dale L. Johnson, 'On the Ideology of the Campus Revolution', *Studies on the Left*, vol. II, No. 1, 1961, p. 75.
[7] David Horowitz, *Student*, p. 11.

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the American lowliest, who stood outside the ordinary boundaries of the class system, the Negro. And meanwhile in 1960 came the sudden stimulus of the rise of the Negro student movement.

THE negro student movement came spontaneously into existence on 1 February 1960.[8] Its immediate objective was to desegregate lunch-counters; its ultimate aim was to destroy the entire Jim Crow system of discrimination in transportation, rest rooms, restaurants, recreational facilities. On 1 February 1960, four Negro students sat down at a dime store counter and asked for cups of coffee; they set off a chain of reactions throughout the campuses of Negro colleges throughout the country, and had the deepest subsequent effect on the American student movement generally. The students were bullied and beaten, but they could not be browbeaten. Their sit-ins were truly spontaneous, for no organisation such as NAACP, CORE, or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference planned or organised them.[9] The initiative was that of the Negro students themselves, though they had the example before them of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955. It was the Negro middle class which had conceived and inspired the Montgomery boycott [10]; it was their sons who, less than three years afterwards, proceeded to the even more direct confrontation of sit-ins. The fathers had abstained from using a public utility; the sons demanded the use of one.

Meanwhile, activists and student leaders sought to contrive new forms of populism dissociated from the Establishment. They tried to go back to the people directly in the slums, without benefit of mediation by the government or the labour movement.

Tom Hayden, a founder of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and later a participant in the three-man mission of self-appointed diplomats to North Vietnam in December 1965, was one such rare activist filled with a missionary, back-to-the-people spirit. An admiring article in *The Village Voice*, organ of the young intellectuals of Greenwich Village, held him up as a model.

> For the last year-and-a-half Tom Hayden, 26, has been invisible to the mass media as he worked to build a community union in Newark's Negro ghetto. He led an exhausting, spartan life there. He ate and slept irregularly, worked hard, lived with frustration and failure. . . . But NCUP (Newark Community Union Project) persevered. . . . Eventually, there were small triumphs: better garbage collection, repairs of rundown tenements, the de-activation of the city's urban renewal scheme that would have uprooted thousands of low-income families.
>
> Hayden, a former graduate student at the University of Michigan, . . . was there—in Newark—because he chose to live his

[8] Howard Zinn, *SNCC: the New Abolitionists* (Boston, 1964), p. 19.
[9] Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York, 1963), pp. 96, 134; Tom Kahn, *Unfinished Revolution* (New York, 1960), p. 12; *Sit-Ins: The Students' Report* (New York, May 1960); James Peck, *Freedom Ride* (New York, 1962), p. 56 ff.
[10] Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: the Montgomery Story* (New York, 1958), pp. 131, 36.

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> theory that social change comes from the disinherited of society. He disagreed with the wisest—and often the best—of the older radicals. . . . Hayden could have had his choice of juicy jobs. . . . Instead, he chose to live on $10 a week and remain invisible in Newark where he sometimes seemed a religious prophet fasting outside the gates of Sodom.[11]

Here, in Newark, said Jack Newfield, the root ideas of the New Left were being tested: 'Could a lasting alliance be forged between university intellectuals bred on Mills and Camus and the excluded of the ghetto with their lack of education and enormous despair?'

Very quickly, however, American student activists began undergoing an experience very much like their Russian forebears. They found themselves rejected, in a sense, by the poor whom they came to save. In 1963, for instance, the SDS had resolved to make the organisation of the white poor its main objective. 'The young people who joined SDS after Kennedy and the mass media discovered the poor saw the organisation as one which would organise the poor.' Michael Harrington, author of *The Other America,* the prophet of poverty, was received on many campuses by enthusiastic audiences. Two years later, however, this back-to-the-people spirit had ebbed, and was being replaced by a more unadorned elitism of the intellectual class. *Viewpoints,* a journal of members of New York SDS, tried to explain the reasons for this intellectual and emotional change. The projects, it said, 'have disappointed many others who had higher hopes . . . the fact that the poor as a "class" do not have the power to change society by themselves is coming to be understood by more and more members'; meanwhile, the intellectuals were on the march; 'the anti-war movement and the Berkeley events have brought into visible protest middle-class intellectuals, faculty members, political figures, and a few trade unionists'. The emphasis was increasingly strong on middle-class intellectuals as the chosen disinherited: 'middle-class groups such as teachers, welfare workers, and other white-collar elements are coming to be seen along with the working poor and unionised workers as groups which have problems, suffer alienation, are organisable and, in fact, are organising already'. Lastly, the students were getting too tired of giving their emotions so fully to the poor. As the author put it more circumspectly, 'perhaps most important, is simply that this generation of students is far too flexible and fluid to stay with any perspective once it begins to be dogmatic and limiting'.[12]

The failure of the masses to respond, and the plain fact that the initiative was that of the 'students and professors', began to affect student ideologists. They began to recognise and accept their apparent role as the primary makers of history, to conceive the role of intellectuals exactly as Lavrov had when he told the Russian students, disillusioned

[11] Jack Newfield, 'Tom Hayden: Prophet Comes to Sodom', *The Village Voice,* 20 January 1966.

[12] Steve Max, 'The 1965 SDS Convention: From Port Huron to Maplehurst', *Viewpoint,* vol. I, No. 10 (Summer, 1965), pp. 7-10.

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with the people's passivity, that the historical mission belonged to the 'critically thinking individuals'. The chief ideologist of the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley in the fall of 1965 was metamorphosing into such an ideologist of intellectual elitism. 'Extreme action on their [the students'] part', wrote Steve Weissman, 'might move whole other sectors of the population. If not, we should perhaps find out now so that we can plan our futures differently.' [13]

THE so-called 'New Left' which came into existence between 1960 and 1965 sought to differentiate itself from the 'Old Left'. The dividing line was primarily generational; there were new emotions of revolt which wanted their own distinctive style, vocabulary, and tactics. But when it came to the formulation of an explicit ideology, the New Left found itself to its embarrassment repeating the lines of the Old Left. The Old Left demanded to know how precisely the New Left differed in what they were saying from what their predecessors had said. The New Left found it hard to differentiate itself from the Old Left in ideological terms. But their generational rejection was clear; the Old Left in their eyes had lost authority; it was defeated. In Berkeley they ignored the plea of the fifty-year-old socialist and Trotskyist, Harold Draper, to recognise their socialist identity with the Old Left; the New Left, feeling that they were making mass history, talked disparagingly and mockingly of the aged 'grouplets'. For the new student activists wished to maintain a generational autonomy and searched for an ideological demarcation, not too successfully, from the old. Clark Kissinger, the former National Secretary of Students for a Democratic Society, for instance, tried to portray the New Left as less dogmatic: 'The old Marxist Left was intensely ideological. They could rattle off the cause of any war as capitalism, imperialism, fight for markets: one, two, three. We are characterised primarily by scepticism.' Actually, however, the New Left is just as hostile to the sceptics who have proclaimed the concept of the 'end of ideology'. They denounce that whole concept as part of the previous generation's sellout. (Says Kissinger, 'When they proclaim the end of ideology, it's like an old man proclaiming the end of sex. Because he doesn't feel it any more, he thinks it has disappeared'.) [14] The real cleavage is indeed generational. The New Left rejects whatever smacks of the older generation, whether it be ideology or the end of ideology. 'Virtually the entire established Left, from Norman Thomas to the Communist Party, is viewed as having "copped out" to "the power structure" or "the Establishment".' [15]

In the first months of 1965 the student movement began to turn rapidly from the civil rights issue to that of Vietnam. It was not that the problems of civil rights had suddenly ceased to exist; rather the issue no

[13] *SDS Bulletin*, vol. 4, No. 1, p. 7.
[14] Steven Kelman, 'SDS: Troubled Voice of the New Left', *The New Leader*, 27 September 1965, p. 12.
[15] *Ibid.*

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longer offered as much of an emotional opportunity for conducting a generational struggle. The Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, for instance, when at its height in 1964, proclaimed its primary concern with civil rights and the welfare of the Negro community. For a brief time after its success there was a flurry of concern over establishing volunteer tutorial classes for Negro children which would enable them to compensate for deprivations in background. Within a few weeks all these efforts and concerns had vanished. The passage of the Voter Registration Act made it harder to draw a strict generational line on the question of civil rights; with every act and intervention of the government, the student movement's enthusiasm for organising classes for Negro children dwindled. An issue was attractive to the degree that it could readily channel generational resentment; involvement in an issue subsided when it failed to provide the occasion for a clear generational struggle. It is this which largely explains the curious movement from issue to issue on the part of the student movement. Thus, there arose the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley to supersede the dominant concern with civil rights. Its chief spokesman wrote:

> The VDC began as an idea in the heads of four people over supper one day last April, an idea to organize a large community teach-in at a time when the civil rights and free speech movement were waning. . . . The same individuals involved in free speech and democracy on the campus, and civil rights, became involved in the struggle against USA policy in Vietnam.[16]

Thus, the emotion of generational struggle defined the direction of transition from issue to issue. The young student who just a few weeks earlier thrilled to the thought of teaching Negro children lost interest in the project. To parade, to protest, to 'confront' the local police was more of an adventure, more satisfying to one's aggressive impulses. 'Confrontation' always had a generational overtone of the son standing up to the father, and if an issue, or a cause, lacked this element, it was not emotionally satisfying. Pure 'do-gooding' would never satisfy the student activist because it lacked this element of confrontation, of conflict, of the occasion for aggression. The VDC spokesman, by contrast, was able to redefine themes for generational conflict. When the older generation in its anti-poverty programme tried to reduce the number of school drop-outs, the *VDC News* proclaimed the meaninglessness of schools, and called for a revolt against them: 'We should ask people to quit school and forget middle-class futures and join a movement to change America.'

The theme of identification with the lowliest, that recurrent theme in all student movements, reached a new stage. The people, peasantry, proletariat, the Negro and poor of one's own country were now supplanted altogether by an identification with the backward peoples and races of other continents.

[16] Jerry Rubin, 'October 15–16 and the VDC', *The VDC News*, published by the Berkeley VDC, 11 October 1965.

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> On the back of the VDC membership card is written the words: 'We must build a New America and join with those peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America building a New World. . . .' The USA is for the status quo. But I as an American want to be with those making history, not with those freezing it.

Anti-Americanism thus became a recognised article of faith in the ideology of generational revolt. Naturally, it was cast in the current idiom of 'alienation':

> We are the country's alienated—alienated by America's values, alienated by America's mass culture, alienated by America's image of the Good Society. We are repelled by the idea of exporting Americanism overseas.[17]

In the economic depression of the thirties, the student activists had forecast the breakdown of American capitalism and the future hegemony of the working class. In the mid-sixties, the American capitalist system was impressively stable and prosperous, and its workers largely contented. The rebellious activists conscious of a diffused resentment called it 'alienation', but their rejection of America sometimes tended to be total, as they felt themselves without any class allies in America, and frustrated by the society's stability. Therefore they began to turn abroad for their identifications. They were rather anti-American than anti-capitalist. Where they criticised the capitalist order, it was because it partook of American, western civilisation.

As the new student movement found itself 'alienated' in American society, its most active element began to move towards an exaltation of violence. The May 2nd Movement especially expressed this trend. It welcomed the Watts riots as 'a people's uprising' against 'imperialist' America, as part of the same guerrilla warfare which was being carried on from Vietnam to Los Angeles against the United States:

> Vietnam, of course, is the most organized and coherent of the self-determination movements, but the seemingly structureless riots in Watts heralded the beginnings of the organized build-up of Negro militance and even violence in this country. . . . Watts was a 'people's uprising,' as the *Liberator* said. There were no illusions about who the enemy was—the Los Angeles police and 'imperialist' merchants of the Watts shopping areas. . . . By the end of the active opposition (?), the sniping and guerrilla action had become tightly organized. . . . The Chinese Communist Party maintains that at this time the Negro struggle, like the Vietnamese, is a national struggle, and Mao Tse-tung has said, 'In the final analysis, a national struggle is a question of class struggle. . . .' Revolutionary action by the black citizens of the U.S. is neither foolhardy nor an adventurist fantasy—in truth there is no other choice.[18]

[17] Ibid.
[18] Dave Slavin, 'The Watts Ghetto: A People's Uprising', *Free Student*, No. 5, p. 12.

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'PARTICIPATORY democracy' is the contribution of the New Student Left to political theory. It was born of their meetings, small and large, minute and mass, where the speaker, heckler, or chairman would feel that he had articulated in words what was trying to emerge from a long, often inchoate discussion. Suddenly the mass seemed inspired; words passed into action; the spontaneity of the mass broke through the formal paraphernalia of formal democracy with its parliamentary rules. 'Participatory democracy' was 'democratic anarchy' fulfilled. The phrase appeared in the Port Huron statement of the founding convention of Students for a Democratic Society in 1962: 'In a participatory democracy, the political life would be based . . . [on the principle that] decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings.' An issue of the pacifiist *Bulletin* of the Committee for Nonviolent Action undertook to explain how it had operated in the Assembly of Unrepresented People (AOUP), a group of 2,000 composed largely of students, drawn from all segments of the New Left, which convened for four days in Washington in August 1965 to press for peace in Vietnam, and which led to the arrest of more than 350 demonstrators:

> AOUP had no organizational structure nor established discipline because its decision-making process was by 'participatory democracy'. This meant that not a single policy was predetermined and imposed; all policies could be established or modified by the participants in the Assembly. Because participatory democracy is likely to be around the radical movements for some time and may eventually be accepted almost universally, it is important that this mode of organization be studied and understood.
>
> Participatory democracy has no initial organization or policies for a demonstration. . . . Decision is by neither voting nor consensus. In fact, decisions in the usual sense don't occur. Policies are set and action determined by those who in the maelstrom of discussion and debate, exert the most influence through courage, articulateness, reasonableness and sensitivity to the feelings of the group. Influence is enhanced by image characteristics such as reputation, looks and style of living that appeal to young people. . . .
>
> Participatory democracy is unsuited for steady activities in which careful reason dominates, clear policy statements are important, and dissonant minorities would become conspicuous. The method is best suited to an action movement, mobilizing and focussing the moral energies of young people in brief, one-event actions. In such a milieu a leader's declaration of intent is a policy, his actions a decision; all currents move toward a crescendo, overwhelming discordant notes.[19]

The advocates of the new 'participatory democracy' explained that what they were advocating was a democracy of direct action in which the concerned activists could intervene directly in political processes, and

[19] Bradford Lytle, 'After Washington?—Three Views', *Committee for Non-violent Action Bulletin*, 27 August 1965.

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affect their outcome without the intervention of an electorate and the machinery of representative democracy. The direct actions of a participatory democracy would be set up parallel to the institutions of representative democracy which they would then supersede. Staughton Lynd, an active civil rights worker, and an assistant professor at Yale, saw participatory democracy as an American version of the Russian Soviet, with admixtures of Gandhi's pro-village ideology, and the back-to-the-people spirit of the Russian student movement of the nineteenth century.

> In form, parallelism suggests a kinship between participatory democracy and Trotsky's conception of the Soviets as a 'dual power', or Gandhi's concern to preserve the Indian village analogy. . . . Let the teacher leave the university and teach in Freedom Schools; let the reporter quit his job on a metropolitan daily and start a community newspaper; generally, let the intellectual make insurgency a full-time rather than a part-time occupation. As the Russian radical movement grew from Tolstoyism and the Narodniks' concern to dress simply, speak truth, and 'go to the people', so participatory democracy at this point speaks most clearly to the middle-class man, daring him to forsake powerlessness and act.[20]

The participatory democrat saw the people bestirring themselves spontaneously from the fetters of the System, throwing off its rigidities, its formalistic elections and votings and bureaucracies, and acting directly, humanly. A spontaneous protest might suddenly grow into a direct action against the government itself, to supersede it with this new revolutionary spontaneity. Lynd wrote with apocalyptic emotion of a demonstration in Washington against the war in Vietnam:

> Still more poignant was the perception—and I checked my reaction with many others who felt as I did—that as the crowd moved down the Mall towards the seat of government, . . . so that there was nowhere to go but forward towards the waiting policemen, it seemed that the great mass of people would simply flow on through and over the marble building, that our forward movement was irresistibly strong, that had some been shot or arrested nothing could have stopped that crowd from taking possession of its Government. Perhaps next time we should keep going.[21]

The kinship between 'participatory democracy' and 'Soviet democracy', which Lynd acknowledges, takes us to the heart of the political theory of the New Left. In essence, it is Lenin's theory of revolutionary action by a small, dictatorial elite translated into the language of the 'nonviolent' movement. Where Lenin wrote that the people would dispense with parliamentary procedures and substitute for them the direct action of 'the simple organisation of the armed masses (such as the Soviets

[20] Staughton Lynd, 'The New Radicals and "Participatory Democracy",' *Dissent*, vol. XII (1965), pp. 328-29.

[21] Staughton Lynd, 'Coalition Politics or Nonviolent Revolution?' Liberation, June–July 1965, p. 21.

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of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies)',[22] Staughton Lynd has the non-violent student mass surging forward to take possession of the government. The Senate and House of Representatives would be closed permanently as the Constituent Assembly was in St Petersburg in 1918. The 'complex machinery' (as Lenin called it) of formal elections in representative democracy would be replaced by 'participatory democracy'. Just as Lenin promised that in the Soviets, within twenty-four hours of the revolution, there would be a 'universal participation of the people' to replace all the machinery of the bourgeois state and economic administration, so the New Left envisages the direct action participation of the moving mass supplanting the Establishment, the organs of the System. As Lynd writes:

> One can now begin to envision a series of nonviolent protests which would from the beginning question the legitimacy of the Administration's authority where it has gone beyond constitutional and moral limits, and might, if its insane foreign policy continues, culminate in the decision of hundreds of thousands of people to recognise the authority of alternative institutions of their own making.[23]

The crux of a revolution, says Lynd, learning from Trotsky, is when the troops desert to the side of the rioters. This he envisages as a 'scenario' for America. 'A constitutional crisis' exists in America, he declares; 'we have moved into a twilight zone between democratically elected authority and something accurately called "fascism".' He envisages the dénouement of the next major demonstration: 'Perhaps next time we should keep going, occupying for a time the rooms from which orders issue . . . until those who make policy for us . . . consent to enter into dialogue with us and with mankind.'

Behind all the phraseology of dialogue there is the simple fact that the ideology of the New Left is one of imposing the will of a small elite, a band of activists, on national policy. The students are summoned to be the shock troops of the elite: 'If students chained themselves to the Capitol this summer in wave after wave of massive civil disobedience, even the Johnson Administration would be constrained in its choice of means.' What begins as talk of a higher form of democracy, of the people directly participating in decisions, turns out to be the defensive formula for action by a student elite which would contravene the will of the majority as expressed in the institutions of representative democracy. 'The Movement', like 'the Party', seizes power; the one has the myth of 'participatory democracy', the other has the myth of the Soviets.

As the veteran civil rights leader, Bayard Rustin, trenchantly declared: 'Under whose mandate are the 20,000 Washington marchers entitled to occupy "their government" for even ten minutes? Does Lynd believe that they represent the views of anything approaching the

[22] V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 75.
[23] Staughton Lynd, 'Coalition Politics or Nonviolent Revolution?', pp. 19–21.

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majority of the people on the question of Vietnam? . . . What gives the disaffected sons and daughters of the middle class the right even symbolically to become the government? '[24]

Translated into ostensibly nonviolent terms, the tactical means of participatory democracy was identical with the principle of political tactics which Lenin enunciated in justifying the seizure of power, and defending his dissolution of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly: 'Have an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive moment—this "law" of military success is also the law of political success, especially in that fierce, seething class war which is called revolution.' It was simply not possible, said Lenin, for the working class to acquire a sufficient firmness of character, perception, and wide political outlook to enable them to vote intelligently; therefore a minority must seize the state power; then, holding power, it would in 'a long and fierce struggle' convince the majority of the workers to accept its policies.[25] The participatory democrat likewise has no use for elections, votes, parliamentary procedures; he founds himself on the notion that since the masses are non-participant, the elite activists will act on their behalf. The votes of the electorate and Congress are simply dismissed; the 'power structure' has befuddled the masses. The participatory democrats will surge forward, take hold of the state, and establish new organs of rule, of their own hegemony. Thus the line of reasoning which began with the intellectual elitism of Wright Mills, with his ridicule of the 'labour metaphysics', has culminated in Staughton Lynd's conception of the dictatorship of a student elite in the guise of participatory democracy.

The notion of participatory democracy involved a basic alteration in the concept of civil disobedience. Originally, as conceived by such persons as Martin Luther King, it was at bottom an appeal to the conscience of the community; the civilly disobedient undertook to violate some unjust or unconstitutional ordinance in order to draw the attention of the electorate and the government to ignored wrongs; they still retained a faith in the workings of representative democracy. The student movement, on the other hand, rapidly losing faith in representative democracy, began to conceive of civil disobedience as a first step in a 'confrontation' with the 'power structure' which would lead in some vague, undefined way to a seizure of power by the student movement. The two conceptions of civil disobedience clashed basically in Selma, Alabama, in the spring of 1965. As Staughton Lynd writes:

> The old politics and the new confronted each other once again in Selma. SNCC was the first civil rights group on the ground there. . . . Then, by agreement with SNCC but nonetheless traumatically for the SNCC workers in Selma, Dr King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference moved in. SCLC's focus was the passage of national

[24] Bayard Rustin, 'New Radicalism: round III', *Partisan Review*, 1965, pp. 26–42.
[25] V. I. Lenin, *The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 14, 27.

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> legislation, not the political maturing of persons in the Alabama Black Belt. . . . SNCC could only experience Selma with mixed feelings and considerable frustration. The 'march' of 9 March, when Dr King led people to a confrontation he knew would not occur and then accused the police of bad faith for exposing his hypocrisy, must have seemed to those in SNCC a symbolic summation of much that had gone before.[26]

'SNCC', wrote Professor James W. Silver, 'is seldom amenable to compromise. . . . These activists were unimpressed with legalism and constitutionalism; they were the "new abolitionists".'[27]

What SNCC had wanted was the kind of movement Staughton Lynd had dreamed of, the confrontation, the unpredictable occurrence, the elite and their allies surging forward, the seizure of power, the creation of the New Society, the release of the creative energies of all activists in the student movement and their allies.

The fate of the notion of participatory democracy is instructive. It began as the apparent expression of a strong populist identification with the 'unstated assumption', in Lynd's words, 'that the poor, when they find voice, will produce a truer, sounder radicalism than any which alienated intellectuals might prescribe'.[28] As the doctrine evolved, however, it became the ideological bearer of elitism. It began ostensibly with seeking a political participation by the American citizen which would be more than 'the annual act of pulling a lever in a little curtained room'.[29] But as the citizenry proved quiescent, or failed to follow the students' lead, the doctrine, with its 'insistence that decisions should come about through a process of personal confrontation and encounter', metamorphosed into an apologetic for the putschist action of a small student elite to impose its will on the recalcitrant majority of the people. Thus participatory democracy was recapitulating in large measure the career of 'proletarian democracy'. Between the intellectual elitism of Wright Mills and the participatory democracy of Tom Hayden and Staughton Lynd there was a clear line of continuity; the last fulfilled the first. All were intellectual authoritarians, the only difference being that Hayden and Lynd used existentialist vocabulary whereas Mills spoke in neo-Marxist terms.

[26] Staughton Lynd, 'The New Radicals and "Participatory Democracy"', pp. 326–7.
[27] James W. Silver, *Mississippi: The Closed Society* (new ed., New York, 1966), p. 342.
[28] Staughton Lynd, 'The New Radicals and "Participatory Democracy"', p. 328.
[29] Staughton Lynd, 'Socialism, the Forbidden Word', *Studies on the Left*, vol. 3, No. 3 (1963), p. 19.

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MARXISM AND AMERICA'S NEW LEFT

Henry M. Pachter

ALTHOUGH Marxism in America is to be found in many guises, 'Russian' and 'Chinese', Bolsheviks and ex-Bolsheviks, Trotskyites and ex-Trotskyites, each group propagating itself by division, it must be admitted that the old spirit of vigorous sectarian ultimatism is vanishing; instead of expelling each other, they speak at each other's meetings and form joint action committees which may even be able to agree on a manifesto, say, against the war in Vietnam, signed by individuals representing as many as twelve different organisations. They have worked loyally together in the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley living with each other. Most would be amazed to learn that truths they hold to be as self-evident as the Declaration of Independence really belong in the body of Marxist doctrine as taught in Moscow. Foremost among them is the belief, shared by all Americans, that Progress is as inevitable as Hegel's World Spirit. Political scientists also believe that politics is essentially the game of who gets what, and that all questions of government are basically economic. While learned economists will deny Marx's theory of surplus value, few will quarrel with his explanation of the business cycle. Even the *Wall Street Journal* may use Marxist formulas without suspecting it. Most Americans, when asked to explain European colonialism, will spontaneously come up with a creditable and in running the 'Free University', located at Union Square in New York's traditional left-labour centre. It is true that this popular-front spirit can be attributed mainly to the small numbers engaged, and exclusionism has already set in: in October 1965, after the march of 40,000 on Washington against the war in Vietnam, those who wished to continue the united front expelled those who did not. Nevertheless, they continued in friendly debate. There are also the Marxists who don't know that they are Marxists; they are numerous and have no trouble replica of the Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism, and no American historian will write a book on any particular period of the past without first introducing his readers to its economic foundations.

The academic community hardly distinguishes between an astronomer who happens to be a communist and a communist who teaches history, political science, economics, etc., where Marxist orthodoxy may be just as incompatible with independent judgment and research as Catholic orthodoxy. Conversely, neither the academic committees which circulate protest petitions nor the public which reads them make any distinctions between the considered opinion of an East Asia specialist and the generous response of a humanities teacher or a scientist. All signatures count as equally weighty because it is assumed that 'the intelligentsia' or 'the professors' constitute a solid body of opinion,

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that that opinion is well informed and well considered, and that it is tending towards 'advanced' conceptions, 'progressive' solutions, and agreement with the forces of the future abroad, notably in the third world and in the more enlightened countries where there are no enemies on the left. This assumption is partly true, partly it is deliberately fostered by the protest marchers. The United States *Statistical Abstract* lists 424,862 faculty members (including administrators) at institutions of higher learning. If 500 signatures can be collected among these, they still look impressive. It is true that these 500 or even thousand signatures can be collected within 48 hours at a dozen academic institutions. However, the majority of those who sign are far from welcoming a victory of the Viet Cong or from wishing to help the 'socialist camp'. They just want to end the war, and it would never occur to them that publication of their protest might influence the decision-makers in Hanoi or Peking; or rather, if such a thought does occur to them, they would probably assume that their signatures will indicate to people in Peking and Hanoi that the United States is full of people of good will and therefore the Vietnamese have nothing to fear from its might.[1]

Yet these are not the only reasons for the support, or at least toleration, which Marxist policies find on the American campus, among professors even more than among students. As to the professors, it seems to me that the phenomenon is largely generational. At the leading universities in America, many chairmen, heads of department, deans, administrators were radicals in the turbulent thirties, and though most of them have shed the Marxism of their student days, they still are emotionally attached to others who shared their experience. The probability that they stayed in the academic professions and continued to consider themselves as 'clerks', in the Julien Benda sense, is considerably higher than for those of conservative inclinations, who rather went on into business and law. All this creates an atmosphere of 'liberalism' which pervades the humanities and social science departments at the better universities, and similar observations can be made about the literary magazines. It has been possible to speak of a 'liberal establishment' which allegedly dominates intellectual life in the United States, and though the membership list of this establishment has been obtained by an analysis of the few 'little magazines' where one would expect to find the former radicals, it nevertheless is suggestive that

[1] *Studies on the Left*, No. 2, 1966, p. 62. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse and define the opposition to the war in Vietnam. Suffice it to make two observations. The academic speakers at the teach-ins may be of two or three varieties—conservatives like Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, who really think it unwise and unnecessary for the United States to get entangled in South-East Asian land wars, and liberals or radicals whose conscience rebels against the desecration of American ideals in that war; as has been pointed out frequently, there are also experts whose sceptical advice was rejected. The Senatorial opposition, interestingly, comes from States which in the thirties and forties were isolationist; then they were represented by Republicans who also fomented or exploited the farmer-middle class opposition against 'bureaucracy'; meanwhile these States and these classes have returned to their earlier allegiance to a strongly isolationist Populism or Progressivism.

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ex-communists and ex-trotskyites today constitute a majority among those who count. The fact is that true conformists may have a hard time getting published or landing academic jobs. Only the 'Outs' are 'in'.[2]

THE question arises whether the communists can exploit this situation today, as they were able to exploit it in the late thirties and the forties. So far, it seems, they have not been very successful. They may initiate a protest movement but they cannot channel it into their organisations. One reason, of course, is the split in the communist ranks. The 'Chinese', the 'Russians', and the Trotskyites are more anxious to prevent each other exploiting the movement than to exploit it themselves. Secondly, there are the experienced old-timers who left the communist movement at some point—either during the purges or at the time of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact or the Hungarian rising—who are sophisticated enough to prevent *noyoutage*. Nevertheless, there is a constant tug-of-war. A typical instance is the competition of the flags: every time a protest march is staged against the war in Vietnam, 'Peking' communists will appear with Viet Cong flags. Of course, the press photographers will see that they get most of the publicity and thus ensure that the entire demonstration is credited to them. Moscow partisans and non-communists therefore must bring a sufficient number of American flags to surround and cover the Viet Cong flags. Likewise, at teach-ins, great care is taken to give prominence to speakers whose aim is strictly limited: that an honourable way of ending the war be found, excluding unilateral withdrawal and other proposals which might encourage the Viet Cong.

The same is largely true of the civil rights movement. Some Negroes have been placed in positions of leadership within the Communist Party, and more are prominent in the small Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), the 'Chinese' communist party. That almost automatically excludes them from becoming prominent in the civil rights movement. Some of the more dynamic civil rights leaders are all for militancy, but they carefully avoid any attempt to educate and indoctrinate the militants. The fight against discrimination and segregation is not supposed to merge into a Leninist fight against capitalism; it is directed against the 'white power structure' (which probably includes capitalism but is not defined as a class relationship), and if any 'system' is threatened with ultimate destruction, it is the white man's domination in the world. For that purpose, the radical civil rights leaders welcome the help of Marxist, neo-Marxist, and pseudo-Marxist groups.

[2] Robert Lekachman, writing in *Social Research*, June 1965, lists 149 names, based on *Commentary*, *Partisan Review*, *New Republic*, *New Leader* and, above all, the new and high-powered *New York Review of Books*; he does not include the *New Yorker*, *Esquire*, *Saturday Review of Literature*, or the *American Scholar*; hence some obvious omissions from his list of many writers who have expressed opposition to American policies abroad, and are well connected on the New Left. The borderline between the Liberal Establishment and the New Left is indeed rather fluid.

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However, the Soviet Union has lost prestige in their eyes. It did nothing about the murder of Lumumba, it fails to support 'wars of liberation', it leaves the Vietnamese in the lurch, it has been placed in the defendants' dock by Mao, and it has told Castro to soft-pedal his attacks on the United States. In fact, it is shifting towards a policy of co-operation with the imperialists and behaves like a white nation. The alignment here is determined not by ideological criteria but simply by 'the enemy one makes'. One is either white or coloured, either colonialist or anti-colonialist, either for or against the 'power structure'. Hence the communists, who retain their traditional ties with the causes of the old radical left and the interests of the Soviet Union, cannot indoctrinate the new radical movement, which is moving rapidly towards a complete break with any cause that is seeking to gain power in the established regime.

WRIGHT MILLS has had an extraordinary influence on the generation of the new Left. It is therefore necessary to look into his background. A huge man from Texas, who even as a Columbia professor built his house with his own hands, he came from a 'Wobbly' family and burst into the old left with views which were a strange blend of syndicalism and Jack London. He never quite rid himself of the *Iron Heel* theory of capitalism, though for a time he was able to translate it into Marxist language. His main work, *The Power Elite*, proclaimed this view in its very title. In his subtler writings he was a powerful critic of contemporary sociology and political science; in his last years he became a spokesman for Castro, and shared a passion for motor-cycles with that other idol of American youth, James Dean. Mills understood the students who were to become the New Left, and he appealed to them in the same way and for the same purpose that Marx appealed to the proletariat:

> It is with the problem of agency in mind that I have been studying the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals as a possible, immediate radical agency for change . . . it may be a very relevant idea indeed. . . . Who is it that is getting fed up? Who is it that is getting disgusted with what Marx called 'the old crap'? All over the world—in the [Soviet] bloc, outside the bloc and in between—the answer is the same: the young intelligentsia.

Mills believed in the effectiveness of elites for good and for evil. The students consider themselves an elite not in the sense of a Leninist vanguard, but in the more Young-Hegelian sense of men of conscience whose historical task it is to save humanity from 'mass society'. It is impossible to understand the New Left apart from the revulsion from 'mass society' and 'alienation' which they learned from Mills, Riesman, Dwight Macdonald, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Hannah Arendt. Mills introduced Max Weber to America, Fromm published Marx's *Frühschriften*, Marcuse lectured and wrote on Marx, Hegel, and Freud, Arendt introduced Kafka and Heidegger. The literary critics

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who had been Marxist in their own youth but had grown up to admire Hemingway, Faulkner, and above all T. S. Eliot, had prepared the ground for an elitist myth. What the New Left did, however, was something unsuspected: it substituted 'conscience' for 'consciousness'. Its rebellion was moral, not rational. The comrades of the new movement knew each other not by The Word or The Faith, but by the sacrifice they were ready to make, by the devotion and honesty of their effort, by 'action'. This pragmatic approach, of course, parallels the positivist mood of American philosophy and a similar pragmatism in the elite theory of American management. Obviously, this generation of the New Left thinks that its philosophy is 'existentialist', but few know the philosophic meaning of the term. Most of them connect it with notions of a literary youth movement, like dada or futurism fifty years ago.

Since my concern is ideology, this is not the place to psycho-analyse the New Left, nor do I believe in putting anyone on the couch without his co-operation. But for our purpose it will be useful to compare the New Left attitude with that of the Narodniki, or of the German *Jugendbewegung*, or of the 'lost generation' of the twenties who exiled themselves to the *rive gauche*. There is the same concern with purity of intention and with the decided gesture of rejection; the same feeling that the traditional society is beyond reform or redemption. Action therefore cannot be imagined within society but must aim to destroy it, to set up 'parallel institutions' or to exile the actors. 'Going to the People' or 'taking a trip' (slang for the use of hallucinatory drugs) may be as valid a way of overcoming the alienation among upper-middle-class youth as picketing.[3] What counts in each case is the rejection of society. The borderlines between the beat culture, the folk singers, the cult of Norman Mailer, Malcolm X, or Allen Ginzberg, and political radicalism are fluid; just as some of the *Freideutsche* leaders went communist in 1918, Bob Dylan and Joan Baez have made more proselytes for the New Left than Marx and Mao—and Dylan is now excommunicated.

GENERATIONAL rebellions may advertise alienation and live on gestures of uncompromising defiance in every country. But it is difficult to name any youth movement which ever rejected its country and its civilisation so completely. The German youth movement went back to old German traditions or to Goethe, or to some values that came out of the inherited culture. The American youth movement inherits nothing and rejects everything. 'I am so ashamed of this country I want to emigrate', or 'Suppose the establishment is shrewd enough to grant everything we want—where is then the revolution?'. I have heard such remarks more than once from my students. They will create issues even where there are none ('free speech' never was an issue at Berkeley); if necessary they will demonstrate for the right to use drugs

[3] With the exception of some Negroes, the students who went to Cuba in defiance of a State Department ban were all well-to-do. Two were children of leading literary men, five were children of millionaires.

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or to buy contraceptives at the school store. Fortunately, there is the war in Vietnam and the draft to give the movement the appearance of purpose. But even in this way they do not come to grips with their society: they are not really trying to change the President's policy; they are fighting for their own right to opt out of this war: the principal demand now is that conscientious objection should be permitted on political grounds and for each war separately.[3]

Yet the absence of meaningful action also drives some frustrated leaders into gestures of romantic defiance. Pacifist Staughton Lynd once proposed to occupy the government buildings in Washington. The Progressive Labor Movement taught its adherents how to prepare Molotov cocktails, and used them in the Harlem riots; one of its Negro leaders, R. F. Williams, who has recently moved from his Cuban exile to China, advocated 'sporadic rioting and massive sniping' as a method to win victory. Another, Bill Epton, was sent to prison for inciting a mob to kill a cop. Some Negro youths were talking of the need to form armed groups. When the new civil rights laws were slow in being enforced, there was disappointment both with the government and with the non-violent methods of Dr Martin Luther King. The old radicals have become too soft: James Farmer, a socialist and the leader of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality, which started the sit-ins), took a government job and his successor considers all new government programmes a hoax. SNCC (the Students' Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, which provided most of the manpower for the sit-ins), recently adopted a programme which will practically end all co-operation with whites and thus segregate this organisation which had started out as the pioneer of integration.

Even Dr King is now denounced as 'part of the power structure' because he remains dedicated to non-violence. Perhaps one should say because he really believes in non-violence and in the improvement of the Negro community. For the students, non-violence is rather a way of expressing hostility to society, if not of provoking the establishment to the use of violence, thus unmasking the liberal-labour illusions of meliorism and the hypocrisy of the American ideology. Martin Luther King, once feared by the establishment as a rabble-rousing riot-monger, has revealed himself as the man who really wants to integrate black Americans into the white society; he is not bent on destroying the American 'system'—whatever that may be. Hence he is now suspect to the young idealists who seek above all to project the gesture of protest and who, one suspects, hardly believe that the Negroes whom they know can compete successfully with whites on an equal basis. To make integration a success, it is necesary first to make the Negroes over, and this can be done, the militants argue, only by making them stand up and fight the white power structure in all its manifestations. Here the need of the students to be rebels and the need of the Negroes to become

[3] Religious objection is controlled by severe checks. On the draft see Michael Walzer in *Dissent*, January 1966, and my answer, ibid., May 1966.

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revolutionary meet: the highly militant spirit of 'black nationalism' attracts them, not because they believe in 'apartheid in reverse', but because the concept of 'black power' seems to be a total rejection of Americanism. Likewise, of course, they are for Lumumba, Castro, or anybody abroad who will defy the United States government.

Against the advice of Dr King and other civil rights leaders, Negro militants from Mississippi walked out of the Democratic Convention in 1964 (they had ample provocation, it must be admitted) and founded their own 'Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party', which has increasingly adopted kamikaze tactics. In the 1966 primaries SNCC and MFDP ran, under the sign of the Black Panther, their own candidates for local office and thus helped to defeat liberal candidates. Since, in the Deep South, the Democratic Party has a practical monopoly on local offices, the primary amounts to election; and since precisely for the cause of civil rights and voting rights the occupant of the sheriff's office is all that counts, the Black Panther strategy was really suicidal. Are they afraid of success? Now they have the vote for which they fought so valiantly, they disdain to use it—it's a hoax.

ORIGINALLY, the students were the militant element in the peaceful demonstrations against the war in Vietnam; but recently they have refused to take part in them because, like all parliamentary manoeuvres, they seem to be of no avail. One such demonstration, in May 1966, collapsed because the students boycotted it.

Radical movements seem to operate under a law of permanent revolution. The moment they reach a wider audience, they must split away from it and withdraw into sectarianism. As an example of this process, we shall cite the best and still soundest of all New Left organisations. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was originally the youth branch of the social-democratic League for Industrial Democracy, which is subsidised by the older (European-born) trade union leaders. At its Lake Huron meeting in 1962, SDS dropped from its charter the paragraph which excluded communists from its ranks; three years later it dropped from its declaration of principles a paragraph denouncing the totalitarian governments of the Soviet Union and China. These acts, however, did not mean that communists had infiltrated it or that the SDS had now become friendly to communism. Rather they were an announcement that SDS would no longer be committed to any ideology, that it did not care what ideology anyone was committed to, and that all that mattered was action. The students worked in the civil rights movement and in the Free Speech movement at Berkeley; they organised anti-war marches on Washington and picketed the places where students were taking their draft examinations. They also engaged in 'community work', organising the poor to stand up for their rights, and if possible to obtain a voice in the distribution of funds that became available for Johnson's War on Poverty. They had a conception of 'participatory democracy' which at its most obvious level goes back

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to the old New England town meeting, but in its vision of the future lurches out towards a sort of council or Soviet movement, instituting 'parallel organisations' to the official institutions and setting up a government of the poor, the alienated, and the angry young. This concept had hardly got into gear when it bogged down in the question: who is going to be a participant in the participating democracy? Old-style coalitions between trade unions, coloured or other minorities, and liberals obviously were out of the question. On the other hand, coalitions between the paupers and the alienated students did not work too well, and the pure among the students objected to compromises of any sort. Soon, therefore, the student movement was thrown back on its own ingrown sectarianism:

> Perhaps economic and social ills are too deep to be healed by Lyndon even with all his allies. Perhaps even the community organisers, even SNCC and SDS, are too conservative for the angriest people in the country. Perhaps the only action appropriate for angry people is violent. Perhaps a small minority, by setting ablaze New York and Washington, could damage this country forever in the court of world opinion. . . . Some days when I feel the violence everywhere . . . or see how little support we get for the kind of work we are doing, I expect Los Angeles to happen everywhere.[5]

Tom Hayden may not speak for all members of the New Left, but he is typical of both their devotion and their confusion. His quarterly, *Studies on the Left*, edited by professors of political science, history, and sociology, is not distinguished by clarity, not even by an attempt to clarify the place of the New Left in American politics, to give it a theory or to identify goals, either Utopian or practical. So far this a-theoretical or anti-theoretical stance has been deliberate. It was supposed to keep the movement clear of the old problems which beset Marxists for half a century or more, and in particular of the cold-war issues; it was not just easier to deny that the nature of the Soviet state mattered, it was necessary to turn one's back on this kind of question. It was not just easier to allow confusion and misunderstandings so that a broad front of pacifists, civil rights workers, revolutionaries, and alienated persons could unite on a policy of dissent; it was necessary to tap all the sources of dissent from the air-conditioned nightmare of the American middle-class consensus. They might have gone for Stevenson or for Kennedy but they had to assemble left of Johnson. As a result the New Left is the most irritating crazy-quilt of old and new protesters, each of whom interprets freedom his own way. It is in fact a *new* movement—not a renewal of any old movement; in its ideas, its attitudes, its utterances and actions it is different from anything America has seen

[5] 'I work with a lot of maids [coloured, in the New Jersey community project]. They are disgusted with the family structure of the people they serve. Maybe a new coalition, of those who have slaved for the middle class and those who were born into it, can figure a way.' Tom Hayden, *Partisan Review*, Winter, 1966. The last reference is to the riots in the Negro ghetto of Los Angeles.

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so far, and in this plasticity it is as admirable as in its sincerity and devotion. Nor is it 'ultra-left' in any old sense, since its frame of reference defines nothing to which it could be to the left.

However, this absence of ideological commitments is a virtue only so long as it helps to prepare the way for a new theory. It becomes a vice if it only helps to perpetuate old theories and new confusions. Of both there is ample evidence. In a radio debate which I had with some of the students who had gone to Cuba, they said they had admired everything—including a housing project which they did not know had been started by Batista, and the 'most beautiful cows we ever saw', which again they did not know had been imported from Canada. When I asked them whether there had not been anything they had less reason to admire, one of them answered: Well, Castro failed to make a sexual revolution. If there is any 'ideological work', as they call it at Berkeley, it is being done by old Trotskyites, ex-Trotskyites, and ex-communists.

Considering the theoretical dearth on the New Left, one sympathises with *Studies* when it bemoans 'the archetype new radical who has chosen not to think'; but one must wonder what the raison d'être of the movement can be if the authors correctly state the causes to which its emotionalism must be attributed: 'There are no immediately available alternative theories, no "alternative" to the alternative has been named. . . . The system seems to be infinitely flexible and impenetrable. . . . Few radicals are willing to make the kind of commitment required to build a revolutionary movement and party.' [6]

Though most radicals will in a vague way profess that they are socialists, they cannot tell socialism from rheumatism. They think in terms of personalities—Fidel, Mao, Babu, Malcolm X. They are mostly alienated middle-class and upper-class students, but some of them are among the best students of their year.[7] They are more interested in movement and action than in ideas, and they are more against than for anything.[8] They seek an alliance with the ghetto people, the lumpenproletariat, and other 'unrepresented groups', to lead them in a fight

[6] *Studies on the Left*, no. 2, 1966. In the same issue the leading article extols Castro for mastering a problem which Batista could never solve: the power of organised labour which was hamstringing the economy. 'The modern "free" labor market was the outcome of the growth of capitalist markets and the factory system. Where product markets are planned, the idea of "free" labor markets and independent collective bargaining must of necessity undergo a transformation.' I would not have been surprised to find this article in the *Harvard Business Review*, but as the theoretical product of the 'New Left' it is shameful; it shows not only their confusion, but their entire lack of links with the old labour movement. Indeed, it would be possible to suggest a theory of the New Left built on the rift between labour and radicalism in the United States. Since the New Left is never forced to use the language of old-style proletarian radicalism, it cannot be called ultra-left in the Comintern sense.

[7] Among the students who staged the Berkeley movement, this fact could be ascertained statistically. There also were a great number of teaching fellows among the rebels.

[8] Also at Berkeley, 18 per cent of all students said they did not sympathise with the aims of the Free Speech Movement, but were attracted by its tactics and the forms of its protest; 30 per cent were for the aims and the tactics, 30 per cent for the aims but against the tactics, 22 per cent against both aims and tactics.

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against 'the system', but in practical questions they soon discover that these people are more interested in reaching middle-class status than in abolishing the middle class, and that their electoral or other coalitions tarnish the purity of the government. Unlike Marx, they do not look to native culture heroes and they do not intend to inherit the civilisation they wish to destroy. They look to oriental Robin Hoods or Genghis Khans to avenge their frustrations in this society. Unlike Marx, they want to abolish not the proletariat but the middle class. Many of its leaders are children of old-timers, but they are not particularly eager to join the communists themselves, nor do their buddies in the movement mind if they do.

The role of anti-culture hero, which the assassinated Malcolm X played for many enthusiasts, has now been taken by Stokely Carmichael, the new leader of SNCC. 10,000 students—mostly white—filled the Greek Theatre at Berkeley to hear and cheer him, enjoying every insult he hurled at them. An eloquent West Indian Negro, he can speak in the inarticulate language of the Southern farm hand or the language of Shakespeare or the language of Marx, and his new slogan of 'black power' has given Negroes North and South a new feeling of identity. But he has disrupted the New Left as much as the civil rights movement, since he rejects all coalitions and all compromises. His involvement in acts of violence has forced other Negro leaders to disengage themselves; but his defiance of the draft has drawn upon him the admiration of white and black students alike. More recently, students have shifted their activities to other goals, such as the demand for student participation in the government of their institutions. But often these demands appear to be trumped up for the sole purpose of justifying a sit-in. As always, the students are more interested in the form of the protest movement than in its aims, and any excuse is good enough to defy 'the Establishment' or 'the power structure'.

All radical groups together probably have 12,000 to 15,000 members, and the membership is a flucuating one. Assuming that for each member there is a close sympathiser, and that each of them influences ten more people, Professor Amitai Etzioni, himself a friend of the movement, has estimated that the radical left encompasses 200,000 students or 4 per cent of the college population, who don't mind being called radical, peacenik, subversive, or even unpatriotic. Society in turn accepts them as part of the scenery, a phenomenon more akin to the Beatles than to old-fashioned subversion. In fact it has become somewhat unfashionable to take communism seriously.

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CULTURE, DOGMA, AND THE PCI

Gino Bianco

WHAT is happening amongst Italian communist intellectuals? What is the significance of the debate on the party's so-called cultural problems? On the one hand it is preoccupied with the ideological muddle, the mixture of Leninism, historicism, crude pragmatism, and the 'doctrine of well-being' on which the liturgy of the communist bureaucracy has till now rested. On the other it involves a protest against ideological and organisational failings in the party's cultural policy regarding problems caused by the development and diffusion of the culture industry and mass media, and regarding the control and inspiration (i.e. gaining hegemony over them—a thing not so easy now as in the past) of cultural groups and tendencies, research groups, artists and so on, among whom Zhdanov's theories of socialist realism, Stalin's linguistic theories, Lysenko's biological theories and so on, no longer cut any ice.

Moreover Togliatti's famous 'Yalta memorandum', which expressed the doubts of the Italian communists about the 'schism' with China and criticised the slow progress of destalinisation in Soviet Russia as well as the religious and cultural policy of that country, provided a further stimulus for political and cultural debate within the Italian communist party and, in a way, provided a new kind of 'orthodoxy'.

On the survival of religious feeling despite the changes in economic and social conditions Togliatti wrote: 'The old atheistic propaganda is no use to us. The problem of the religious consciousness itself, of its content, its roots in the masses, and how it is to be overcome, should be stated in a new and different way.' And on the crucial problems of political and cultural freedom in the communist world he maintained: 'It is we who should become the champions of the freedom of intellectual life, of free artistic creation and free scientific progress. . . . In this field much help could come, but has not always done so, from the countries where we are already in charge of all social life. . . . The problem to which greatest attention is paid . . . is that of getting over the regime inaugurated by Stalin, of the restriction and suppression of democratic and personal freedom. . . . The general impression is one of slowness and recalcitrance when it comes to restoring the Leninist standards which—both within the party and outside it—guaranteed broad freedom of expression and discussion in the cultural, artistic, and even political fields. We find this slowness and recalcitrance hard to understand—above all in view of present conditions, when capitalist encirclement no longer exists and there have been magnificent achievements in economic construction.[1]

[1] P. Togliatti, 'Il memorandum di Yalta', *Rinascita*, 5 September 1964.

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But it is also true that the cultural quarrel within the party is both instrumental and agitational in character, inasmuch as it marks a struggle of groups and political tendencies for control of the party; and there is the rather paradoxical fact—though in the logic of communist institutions it is a normal one—that all this is provided for and 'guided' by the party bureaucracy itself.

Were the cultural and 'doctrinal' problems now causing trouble amongst the intellectuals of the Italian communist party taken seriously, criticism would involve a radical challenge to the party line and the group directing it. For if authoritarianism (and bureaucratic centralisation), which in practice still survives in communism, were deprived of an 'orthodoxy' and all ideological trappings, it would appear as a naked bureaucratic fact of mere power. Moreover, to ward off any danger that open discussion might come to conclusions which would bring about a de-mystification, Alicata weighed in to indicate the limits beyond which criticism would be highly unsuitable: 'I shall be found in disagreement with certain judgments I have come across in recent articles by comrade Rossana Rossanda and also comrade Spinella (as regards the latter I am referring particularly to an article appearing in *Menabò*) concerning Italian culture since the war—articles involving by implication the political objectives that the party is said to have set before itself for solving the problem of the peasant and the Mezzogiorno in the struggle for the Italian revolution, and so on and so on'; as Alicata explains, the debate 'has involved taking up positions that start out from cultural problems and end up (sometimes) by disputing, in a strange mixture of opportunism and extremism, the party political line'.[2] There is no doubt that what is happening amongst Italian communists is a reflection of the general crisis in Marxism-Leninism which has exploded in such a dramatic way with the collapse of Stalinism, with the emergence of differing orthodoxies, with the explicit manifestation of conflicts between communist States, and with economic and territorial controversies. To quote Rossana Rossanda: 'Our answer to the crisis of ideologies is that the unity of the international workers' movement can be restored only on a scientific basis . . . [because Marxism] alone has raised to the level of theoretical certainty the motives of the subject of the revolution—the proletariat.' But Rossanda's concern is not with ideas (and respect for them); for she confesses, 'As communists we are interested in ideas as political forms'; what is essential is not to lose 'unity of theory in the interpretation of society', otherwise 'on what are the politics of the workers' movement to be based?'[3]

TRUTH to tell, the spectacle of Marxism manipulated as a dogma and reduced to a pretext for empty systematisation is not new and is even older than Leninism. The Second International, and above all

[2] M. Alicata, 'I comunisti e la cultura italiana', *Rinascita*, 18 December 1965.
[3] R. Rossanda, 'Marxismo e Storicismo', *Rinascita*, 13 November 1965.

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German social-democracy, not only widened the influence of 'scientific socialism' with the help, amongst other things, of the unity of ideological dogmas (e.g. as imposed by the Dresden congress in 1903), but increased its doctrinal rigidity. It is ironic to see how the old dilemmas reappear. This time it is not the old socialist leaders but the communists who find it difficult to reconcile their 'scientific' claims with their power, electoral, and trade union interests.

Nonetheless, as Rossana Rossanda peremptorily writes, in the same article, if Marxism as science be abandoned, 'the link between theory and practice, science and history, is entirely lost in the sea of what may seem to be historical objectivity but is really pure empiricism or pure subjectivism, in which every kind of policy contains its own justification and even the very principle of the possibility of interpreting the social mechanism—based on an objective materialist *reality* of this mechanism —has been lost'. Marxist theory owes its 'scientific' claims to its analysis of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, of the capitalist mechanism of development and reproduction, and on its claim to have discovered laws of dialectical causality (derived from Hegel) which determine social development and social transformation. But is it possible to say that Marxist forecasts have been borne out by the course of events? Has 'scientific socialism' kept up with the development of social and economic reality? On the contrary: Marxist analysis has proved itself to be inadequate and insufficient when it comes to interpreting the complex sum of social, economic, religious, and human facts. The theory of growing impoverishment, of a catastrophic evolution of capitalism with a series of destructive crises as outcome—or, according to the Leninist version, war—has been contradicted by the course of events. Again: in Marxist theory there is an obvious lack of understanding of the modern economic world and modern capitalism, of the part played by the State in administrative and economic life, of the possibility of transforming the mechanism of capitalism through trade union and political action, of the dynamism of the social classes; the theory regarding the problems of economic development is inadequate and so on. Despite all this, Cesare Luporini claims that Marxism-Leninism can be equated with an experimental method (deriving from the spirit of Galileo), capable at one and the same time of discovering the laws corresponding to the 'regular movements' of society and of grasping and verifying in social reality those so-called 'inner contradictions' on which the party must then take action. In this, he says, 'lies the impressive analogy between Marxist economic criticism and the point of departure attained with such a struggle in the seventeenth century by the modern natural sciences'.[4] When it comes to deepening the specific methodologies for a scientifically correct rather than ideologically deformed knowledge, Luporini adds that Engels' teaching is still valuable: 'Engels' ideal of a unified science (but in this case Engels was only thinking of the natural sciences) setting out from contents worked

[4] C. Luporini, 'Una visione critica dell'uomo', *Rinascita*, 25 December 1965.

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out by dialectics (an ideal in some way opposite to, but not totally different from, that of the formal unification of scientific terminologies) should not be dismissed as such. But its achievement is still far off and in any case can never be merely formalistic.'

As is known, there has been a withdrawal from this ideal of a unified science, even of one limited solely to the natural sciences. In the last century the scientific discoveries (which incidentally lay behind the confidence in unlimited progress and the ideologies of the epoch) gave grounds for hoping that a principle unifying all the sciences could be attained; whereas now further developments in physics, mathematics, biology and so on have not only shown the incredible complexity of the reality, but have taken us far from this unitary perspective and from an all-embracing picture of nature (for instance in physics with the emergence of the principle of duality).

But Luporini's faith in science is of a special kind. As he writes: 'A scientific model is useful insofar as it helps in the interpretation of reality, that is to say insofar as it can be applied. And that is what Lenin grasped . . . that is, for Marxism, economics and politics (objective economic analysis and revolutionary action) are inseparable.' And further on he points out as an example of what has 'effectively produced modern Marxism', 'the Marxist doctrine concerning the State, hegemony, power, cultural revolution, etc.'.

It is difficult to take the so-called Marxist-Leninist theories on law, the State, and power, as examples of 'the science of socialism'; those theories, though they continue to define law and the State as class attributes and instruments (consisting according to the classical Marxist conception of law in the 'reduction of the philosophy of law to a philosophy of economics'), acclaim and justify the State and law in their bolshevik and Stalinist dress. In essentials, those doctrines hail the advent and triumph of a social ethic which has been manifested only in the communist political and juridical order. So that while, for instance, a State with a social-democratic government would still remain a class State, indirectly dominated by the bourgeoisie, a State entrusted to the one and only communist party would be the expression of the totality of the economic and moral interests of its citizens. But, as Hans Kelsen noted, the undeniable infamies of 'socialist legality', and of the juridical science which justified its violation, involve the prostration of the intellect and submission to the government. And as for Lenin's theory about the conquest of power which was until a few years ago viewed as one of the dogmas of the ideology, all we need say is that today it is under critical assault even amongst the highest echelons of the party: 'Lenin's analysis in *State and Revolution*'—so Luigi Longo has written—'no longer suffices for determining our action.'[5] Just so, Togliatti's version in the 'Yalta memorandum' of the theory of so-called national and peaceful ways to socialism contains an implicit criticism of the relegation of the communist parties to a position subordinate to the world stategy

[5] *L'Unità*, 27 April 1962.

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of the USSR and overthrows the myth of revolutionary action understood in terms of subversive action aimed at destroying the State: 'So we are faced with the question of whether it is possible for the working classes to gain power in the context of a State which has not changed its nature, that of a bourgeois State . . . [or in a] struggle for progressive transformation from within.'

THE statement that Marxism, besides permitting of a scientific foundation for political action, is the only theoretical system for defining or explaining all problems of knowledge whatsoever, whether political economy or physics, history or ethics, amounts to something near raving madness, to use Raymond Aron's expression.[6] Nevertheless, to quote Galvano Della Volpe, who on the eve of the Italian party congress in 1962 stated his conviction that he had devoted his life to a movement of Marxist revolutionary thought capable of giving a direction to historical research as much as to political action, and not only in Italy: 'Historical materialism, as a human science by definition, has the lasting obligation to remain on a level with the times, hence of refining the logic of its method (even going much further and distinguishing it, if necessary, from the mathematical method of the natural sciences!), so as to be able to confront, by means of ever more accurate and final historical-dialectical analyses, the new problems of mankind that crowd in on us from all sides.'[7]

We can hardly fail to be surprised at the idea of a system of logic and of a scientific method more subtle and accurate than that of the natural sciences: Professor Galvano Della Volpe is dismissing the whole history of knowledge and even simple common sense, and referring the theoretical and scientific validity of his historical materialism to a methodology and logic that are not in existence and of whose future existence there is no sign whatsoever. The road taken by Galvano Della Volpe is a typical example of the philistinism which Marxism-Leninism has now reached on its way from science to science-fiction.

Renato Guttuso, the ex-fascist painter, who for many years was an ardent follower of Zhdanov, and is now a muddled party theorist recommending an open-door confrontation and dialogue with the non-communist cultural world, laments the absence of a 'centre' in the party's cultural policy—a 'correct line common to all'. 'True', he writes with dismay, 'there are right-wing conservative positions and left-wing extremist positions, but the party exists, Marxism exists, and it is not subject to historicist or structuralist *interpretations;* Marxism is, and can only be, the soul of revolutionary activity; and for that reason neither right-wing nor left-wing nor reformist nor Stalinist nor anything else.'[8]

[6] R. Aron, *L'Impact du marxisme au XXème siècle* (Paris, 1965).
[7] G. Della Volpe, 'Ideologia Sociologia e Scienza dell'Uomo', *Rinascita*, 25 December 1965.
[8] R. Guttuso, 'Un'azione culturale comunista', *Rinascita*, 22 January 1966.

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FOR the generation that had founded the party and for those workers who joined it, communism was a world of accepted and believed ideas on a level with other great systems of ideas. But the intellectuals and the political men who today foment discussion within the Italian communist party have one common characteristic: they do not believe in the ideas they are discussing; indeed their objective relationship to them is one of unbelief. For all that they act as if they believed; that is, they are pragmatists who view ideas as functions of facts. This pragmatist attitude is especially noticeable in the so-called generation of the 'difficult years'—to use Renato Zangrandi's expression—to which men like Alicata, Ingrao, Salinari, Luporini, Trombadori, Lombardo Radice, and others belong.[9] That generation was brought up on Croce's Hegelian and historicist teaching, and when it became 'converted' to communism it underwent no real crisis of thought in the strict sense, but remained addicted to the practice of justifying facts even when the facts were 'historical' Stalinist crimes. Moreover, the deeply historicist stamp of Italian Marxism (Labriola, Gramsci), as kept alive and imposed by Togliatti, could be grafted on to the Italian philosophical tradition without too much difficulty. According to Luciano Gruppi: 'The Italian left-historicist current, with its particular way of understanding Marxism, is of a kind that allows us a critical approach, like other currents of international democratic thinking . . . [and] is a line of interpretation that can produce the maximum yield from Marxism. . . . When we speak of De Sanctis and Labriola we are precisely speaking not of a provincial element in our culture, or of a national element in the limited sense, but of that "national and popular" factor which is also European, of a factor that could be grafted more vigorously than any other on to European thought when it had reached what was a season of splendour.'[10] And the same conviction was expressed by Ranuccio Bianchi Bandinelli: 'By freeing our traditional historicism of its conservative ideological implications, but taking over its technique of work and its system of inquiry, Italian Marxist thought has (in my view) made an invaluable decision for its own development and the development of Marxism in the world.'[11]

And according to Alessandro Natta, who is 'responsible' for the cultural commission of the Italian party, Marxism represents the highest and most unifying element in modern European and world culture; but it would be an error—he adds—to think that the growth of Marxist doctrine can be achieved by parthenogenesis: 'Marxism once set up as a goal can go on developing only through the analysis of the objective processes in the real world . . . [because] to be authentic the development of Marxism should proceed as a process in which the

[9] Renato Zangrandi, *Il Lungo Viaggio* (Milan, 1960); see also articles and declarations by Lucio Radice, M. Alicata, etc., in the second volume of *Rinascita*; the anthology *La generazione degli anni difficili* (Laterza, 1962); and *Trent'anni di lotte dei comunisti italiani* (Rome, 1952).

[10] L. Gruppi, 'P. Togliatti: cultura e metodo', *Rinascita*, 18 September 1965.

[11] R. Bianchi Bandinelli, 'Politica culturale', *Rinascita*, 4 December 1965.

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theoretical movement is in an organic and indissoluble relationship with practical politics and the revolutionary struggle.' [12]

Such rhetoric is becoming unconvincing. In fact it is political reality and practice that have thrown the ideology and the very principles of Marxism-Leninism into a state of crisis.

It was Palmiro Togliatti himself who admitted to the central committee in February 1962: 'We have no experience whatever of how we can and should lead the struggle for socialism in a regime of advanced capitalism. . . . There do not even exist implicit indications in the classics of our doctrine.' [13] And in the 'Yalta memorandum' he wrote that the conflicts within the so-called 'socialist camp' made 'the very principles of socialism open to question'.

The truth is that the party finds itself in an impasse. We can appreciate the dismay of the communist intellectual politicians when, after having done so much to proclaim that their 'strategy' is the offspring of a scientific analysis of reality, they confront the 'ideological void'. Much of the edifice of Marxism-Leninism is creaking. Nevertheless until recently there was a doctrine which, though dogmatic and old, was complete and organic in its way. But what of today?

[12] Alessandro Natta, 'Cultura e ideologia', *Critica Marxista*, No. 2, 1963.
[13] *L'Unità*, 13 February 1962.

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INTELLECTUAL FERMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Anthony Sylvester

THE first thought of any enquiring western visitor to Yugoslavia must be to wonder how such a country can be described as communist. Much that has been happening there since the country broke out of Stalin's fold in 1948 is indeed very different from what one usually associates with communist dictatorship. And the trend away from orthodoxy has been gathering momentum, with ups and downs, right up to the present day. The recent removal from power of the former Vice-President and security police overlord, Mr Alexandar Rankovich, is consistent with this line of development and is bound to give it fresh impetus.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the 'Titoist road to socialism' is the freedom of movement given both to western visitors, who have been pouring into the country in their millions, and to Yugoslav nationals. The Yugoslavs are now by and large free to leave their country, for good or temporarily. Yugoslavia is thus not only open to scrutiny by foreigners; it can be avoided by the natives, or at any rate most of them, who wish to leave the country and settle abroad. Such freedom is unheard of in any other communist country today.

Yugoslav intellectuals and others have been having lively contacts with their non-communist, and sometimes even anti-communist, colleagues in the West, and westerners have been regularly invited to attend seminars and other gatherings in Yugoslavia. Western literature is freely available to the Yugoslavs and much of it has been translated into Yugoslav languages. Foreign newspapers arrive promptly, are sold in large numbers at public stands, and are read widely by the people. Most of the younger intelligentsia have been influenced by western thought, and university teaching is increasingly oriented to western patterns, not only in science, but also in economics, the arts, and even philosophy.

There can be no doubt of the profound disillusionment in Yugoslavia with Stalinism or orthodox communism. While it is not clear how far these feelings are shared by all the leading circles in the Yugoslav League of Communists, the old, conservative notions are gradually being discarded.

This may partly, or perhaps largely, be due to reasons of economic expediency. The old practices of a centrally commanded economy, detailed planning, incentive by threats and slogans, had brought Yugoslavia to the verge of economic collapse and created severe material shortages. Stalinism thus failed precisely in a field where it was meant to compensate for all its other, objectionable aspects, its inhumanity, absence of freedom, and other ingredients of a totalitarian dictatorship.

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It became clear that not only were the means bad, but the end as well, and that at a time when the country's non-communist neighbours were achieving an unprecedented level of prosperity and affluence.

THROWING overboard Stalinism and much that it stood for inevitably resulted in considerable confusion, as no philosophy was readily available to replace what had so far been accepted as the only valid form of communism.[1]

Yet by 1963 the new Yugoslav Constitution not only confirmed the principle of 'workers' self-government' as the basic doctrine of the State, but also proclaimed the 'freedom of press and other aspects of information media, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and public address, freedom of meetings and other public gatherings'. But 'these freedoms', the Constitution adds, 'must not be used to undermine the foundations of the socialist-democratic system'. Moreover, the Constitution lays down that the 'League of Communists . . . remains the basic initiator of political activity for the defence and further development of the achievements of the socialist revolution'; it is guaranteed the guiding role 'in the fields of ideas and politics in conditions of socialist democracy'.

The chief Yugoslav theoretician and architect of nearly all major reforms, Mr Edvard Kardelj, made it clear in an authoritative comment that the reference in the Constitution to what he described as the 'organised activity of the factors of socialist awareness' represented 'an essential element of our constitutional order'. Without such a proviso the door might be wide open to 'blind elemental forces which would sooner or later destroy the foundations of the entire system'.[2]

Nonetheless, the Constitution and subsequent laws and party decisions, notably the new Statute of the League and the programme laid down at the eighth party congress, remained open to a variety of interpretations.

A recent instance of an attempt to organise what might virtually become a political opposition movement, strictly on the basis of legality, has been made by Mihajlo Mihajlov, who planned to launch an independent magazine which would give free expression to the criticism of the existing state of affairs in Yugoslavia, including the political

[1] An illustration of this malaise can be found in an open letter from a young man, published in the Slovene students' paper, *Studentovski list*, 9 March 1966: 'I am writing', the letter says, 'in a moment of profound doubt and despair. I used to be a youth leader with all the faith in the goodness of my actions . . . Now I lack confidence . . . Every day we are changing our judgments. All that we fought for only yesterday we now declare an error . . . And which of us does not know at least five people in responsible positions in whose integrity he doubts? I have ceased to believe in the society we continue to call socialist. I do not seek an answer from you; I demand the right to look for the answers myself.' The letter was addressed: 'To you, our Fathers'.

[2] Report given by Mr Edward Kardelj to the 33rd joint session of the Federal National Assembly, 7 April 1963.

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monopoly of the Communist Party.[3] In a conversation with the present writer, Mr Mihajlov made it clear that at first he had believed his venture would be tolerated by the authorities as being within the law. However, the sentence of nine months passed on him on 23 September 1966 by a court in Zadar, as well as the victimisation and chicaneries to which he and his supporters had been subjected, left little doubt about the prospects of the enterprise.

It is impossible to say how far the philosophy of Mr Mihajlov and his friends is typical of the younger generation in Yugoslavia. The stand taken by the authorities in the matter makes it unlikely that many new recruits will come forward. However, other groups and influential individuals have been challenging the old tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The best known is the Croatian Philosophical Society, which has been publishing its magazine, *Praxis*, continuously since September 1964. Even before that the Society, which was founded in 1957, had been gathering support for its ideas not only in Zagreb, but also in Ljubljana and to a lesser extent in Belgrade. Gradually this group of philosophers assumed a position of pre-eminence in contemporary philosophical thought in Yugoslavia. This became particularly evident when these intellectuals, who like to describe themselves as 'creative Marxists', won a resounding victory over their 'dogmatist' or 'Stalinist positivist' opponents at a conference of Yugoslav philosophers at Bled, in 1960, which can be seen as a watershed in the development of Yugoslav philosophical thinking. The main point on which the new school carried the day was in rejecting the 'orthodox' Marxist theory according to which culture, law, philosophy, and other activities of the human intellect are no more than reflections of, a superstructure on, the underlying productive forces which form the 'base' of any social system. They were hitting at what they call the 'gnoseo-ontological foundation of Stalinist positivism' and asserting instead 'Marx's theory of praxis'.

But more controversial, and also more deeply significant for them, has been the problem of 'human alienation'. This problem now constitutes the cardinal theme of the newly emergent Marxist thought in Yugoslavia.

FOLLOWING to some extent in the footsteps of the French communist intellectuals, notably Roger Garaudy, the Yugoslav philosophers claim that 'Stalinist positivists' have misunderstood Marx's

[3] To be sure, Mr Kardelj denies the existence of such a monopoly, arguing that 'the society which is based on self-government of workers and is increasingly being organised as a community of interest of all working people, as a free community of producers, by its very essence excludes such a monopoly. The bearer of authority in such a system is the working man, directly, or indirectly, through his self-governing organs. The specific leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is in fact a historically determined expression of the interests of the working man to safeguard this social system and develop it further.' Subsequent pronouncements on the subject suggest that Kardelj envisages an eventual 'withering away' of the party, but only in a communist society in which the need for any kind of organised guidance is superfluous. This seems to be the present trend in official Yugoslav philosophy.

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theory of pauperisation under capitalism by trying to explain it merely in terms of the actual material standard of living of industrial workers. In doing so, orthodox communists had to face the reality of contemporary living standards in western countries—and could find no answer. What must be done, the Zagreb philosophers say, is to take into account not only material living conditions, but the alienation and enslavement of the modern industrial worker, to analyse the situation critically, and thus provide the working class in the western world with a new weapon to fight capitalism.[4] In adopting this view they are seeking—not unlike their French and Italian colleagues—to provide communism with an attractive perspective. Moreover the theory of alienation is used not only to combat capitalism but also, and indeed above all, to fight what remains of Stalinism in Yugoslavia. Because, as the *Praxis* philosophers assert, in modern communist countries, too, man has been alienated in conditions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and dogmatism of all sorts. Official Yugoslav theoreticians have not been slow to perceive the potentially explosive nature of such a philosophy.

Yet according to some writers in *Praxis* the contradictions of the modern world, which have made man a slave to forces of his own creation, can be surmounted by affirming and developing the system of workers' self-government. 'The growth of workers' self-government inaugurated in Yugoslavia,' writes a Belgrade contributor to *Praxis*, Miladin Zivotic, 'is of decisive importance to socialism, because the ultimate image of human personality depends on the solution of the problem whether a constructive personality, capable of initiative, will replace the destructive and conformist variety. Only a constructive personality can become both the "base" and the "superstructure" of socialism.'[5]

A human personality which is free in its choices, asserting its rights, keeping an open mind, but nonetheless committed a priori to both humanism and socialism—such is the 'new man' envisaged by these Yugoslav philosophers. It is not difficult to see that their philosophy owes a great deal of its inspiration to Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism and to the modern personalism developed in the West. By insisting on humanism and personalism in Karl Marx—frequently drawing on his earlier works—these Yugoslav intellectuals have clearly departed from the positions hitherto regarded as the fount of wisdom. Friedrich Engels is treated with scant regard and Lenin is largely ignored, although his advice to Soviet Marxists that they should 'turn themselves into a society of materialist friends of Hegel's dialectics' is quoted.

The emphasis on the responsibility of individual and free choice meant, of course, a break with Marxist determinism and the notion that freedom is only the awareness of the inevitable. This latter concept is regarded as sheer sophistry, used by those in power to perpetuate their

[4] Rudi Supek, 'Jos jednom o alternativi: Staljinisticki pozitivisam ili stvaralacki marxizam', *Praxis*, 1965, no. 6.

[5] *Praxis*, 1966, no. 4-6, p. 550. See also Predrag Vranicki, 'Nekoliko misli o humanitetu u teoriji i historijskoj praksi', *Praxis*, 1965, no. 6.

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rule. The *Praxis* philosophers insist that historical progress must be regarded as the fulfilment of human destiny in the lives of individuals and human personalities, rather than in some 'collective existence'.

Taking this philosophy a step further, socialism is no longer seen as the inevitable outcome of the development of material forces, but simply as a moral imperative. Socialism must be regarded as a historical possibility which is being realised in the world. But it is not inevitable. Whether it will triumph depends on the people and their actions. 'Only on the basis of such Marxist doctrine can people be assumed to be morally bound to work for the establishment of socialism.'[6]

In its search for truth and its insistence on the moral integrity of the human personality and on human relations between people, the new philosophy emphasises two basic elements: the need for complete freedom of thought and expression, and the ethical quality of man's endeavour.

What is to be the position of intellectuals in a country building socialism? The philosophers are not unduly modest in their claims: 'Their task is to be the conscience and consciousness of their times.'[7] But they are not to carry out their ideas themselves. To do so would mean taking a leaf out of Stalin's book. While there must be a community of interest between philosophers and politicians, there should also be division of labour. Stalin acted both as politician and philosopher, with fatal consequences for mankind. 'Politicians by their very nature cannot and will not be philosophers, or else they could not be good politicians. And conversely, intellectuals will not and cannot become politicians; to try to do so would spell the end of their spiritual mission.'

In spite of their abstract and metaphysical reasoning, these Yugoslav intellectuals are above all concerned with the actual conditions of life in their country. Their arguments and pleas have an eminently practical and topical significance, reflecting the keen, if often frustrated, desire of the young intelligentsia in a communist country to be socially 'engaged', to be heard and consulted, rather than remain a mere propaganda echo of the ruling elite.[8] The intellectuals of the *Praxis* group have been bitterly critical of the prevailing conservative attitudes in Yugoslav public life, deploring the lack of real democracy and of genuine freedom of thought. Some of them have been more frank than others in their challenge to the ideological and political monopoly of the Communist Party. True freedom, they argue, must necessarily exclude such a monopoly.[9]

[6] Svetozar Stojanovic, 'Etika i interpretacija Marxa', *Praxis*, 1966, no. 4–6, p. 578.
[7] Danilo Pejovic, *Protiv Struje* (Zagreb, 1965), p. 261.
[8] Milan Kangrga, 'Socijalizam i etika', *Praxis*, 1966, no. 4–6, pp. 477–491. He and other members of the group also plead for the creation of a genuine public opinion in Yugoslavia.
[9] Veljko Cvjeticanin: 'Odumiranje drzave kao proces razvoja samoupravljanja u Jugoslaviji', *Praxis*, 1966, no. 4–6, p. 756. See also Danilo Pejovic, op. cit., p. 236, where he insists that socialism should start where the 'highest social and political achievements of parliamentary democracy end'; it should never sink below them, but always try to exceed them.

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The 'creative Marxists' gathered around *Praxis* have gradually established for themselves a position of supremacy in the philosophical field in Yugoslavia. Professor Gajo Petrovic, one of the two co-editors of the magazine, has been leading delegations of Yugoslav philosophers in their meetings and discussions with their opposite numbers abroad. Particularly interesting have been their meetings with Soviet philosophers, led by F. Konstantinov, Director of the Soviet Institute of Philosophy. Soviet philosophers paid a visit to Yugoslavia in November 1965, and in May and June 1966 the Yugoslavs were guests in the USSR. Four members of this Yugoslav delegation are on the editorial board of *Praxis*. Both delegations subsequently published their reports and comments on these meetings.[10]

The discussions at these meetings were apparently quite animated, and although nothing was said to prevent further contacts, it was evident that fundamental disagreement existed on several basic points. These disagreements were indeed a measure of the distance Yugoslav thought has travelled since the break with Moscow in 1948.

'We must first of all determine whether you are Marxists or not', the Russians said, in a somewhat paternalistic manner. In their view the Yugoslavs had gone seriously astray. They had to be approached with understanding and charity. They had been too long exposed to non-Marxist influences. They must be made to realise the error of their ways and brought back to the true Marxist fold. They added (was this a note of warning?) that according to their information the Yugoslavs facing them were not the only school of thought in the country—there were others, standing on positions of true Marxism-Leninism.

To the Yugoslavs this seemed unpleasantly reminiscent of the arguments bandied between Belgrade and Moscow in the years 1948–53. They resented the suggestion that they might not even be Marxists. Who is a better Marxist, according to the Yugoslav report, can be established only on the basis of genuine, free discussion in which only philosophical arguments are used.

One can discern in this report an element of surprise on seeing that the Russians had budged so little from the positions they occupied in Stalin's time. To the Yugoslavs, who have gone through an agonising reappraisal of their former views, it appeared difficult to believe that anyone could still seriously want to adhere to some of the crudest interpretations of Marxism. *Partiinost* in philosophy was something with which the Yugoslavs profoundly disagreed. Both sides parted with a feeling of superiority, and yet in many ways both clearly lack firm ground under their feet. The Russians, basically dogmatist, find it hard to reject orthodox ways and continue to embrace much of the Stalinist philosophical legacy. To the Yugoslav 'revisionist' philosophers the dilemma is no less acute. Are they not really repeating what many non-communists have been saying for decades? Are they not

[10] Gajo Petrovic, 'Jugoslavenski filozofi u SSR-u', *Praxis*, 1966, no. 4-6, pp. 818-25. The Russian report was published in *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1966, no. 5.

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really debunking Marxism by resorting to quotations from Karl Marx? And if so, what validity can be attached to *their* views? Why should one be a Marxist at all, or a socialist for that matter? Why should not Christians, or for that matter anybody else, be allowed to air their views? And then, if this were to happen, what would remain of Yugoslav socialism?

The position of the *Praxis* group would no doubt have been easier in the days when official Yugoslavia was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russian politicians and philosophers. This quarrel is now over and the Yugoslavs are again part of the 'socialist world' in which the USSR is assured a place of pre-eminence. In such circumstances the views expressed by *Praxis* represent not only an internal, but also a kind of international embarrassment to the Yugoslav leaders. The keen Soviet interest in keeping the Yugoslav experiment within the bounds of Marxist-Leninist decency is well known and has frequently been demonstrated in the recent past.

International considerations have, however, not been decisive in persuading the Yugoslav authorities to take an increasingly suspicious and negative view of the *Praxis* group. Basically this suspicion has been due to a feeling on the part of leading personalities in the League of Communists that these philosophers were really trying to establish a new political grouping, yet another attempt to hit at the positions of influence and privilege held by the League and its members.[11]

It must have been a matter of considerable disappointment to the editors of *Praxis* to see that even some of the usually more liberal leaders of the League in Croatia, like Miko Tripalo, took a critical view of the magazine. But such critics have also emphatically stated that no 'administrative' measures were contemplated against the periodical or its contributors, although the views expressed there were said to be by and large hostile to 'society and to the LCY', and to provide a platform to the enemies of the Revolution.

After the matter had been thrashed out in this way in the party organisations and in the Croatian National Assembly, a new issue of *Praxis*—July-December 1966—made its appearance, in which the editorial board made no philosophical concessions to the party diehards. They explained that they had been having unexpected difficulties. The magazine has had its State subsidy reduced and some of the other activities of Croatian philosophers, notably the Korcula Summer School, have been curtailed and their future made uncertain. But the editorial board is determined to go on. The contributors who were asked to give up their fees all agreed to do so.

The present difficulties of *Praxis* must seem encouraging to the orthodox communist intellectual elements which have survived all changes in Yugoslavia with only a very slight adjustment of their

[11] Discussion on the *Praxis* magazine in the Ideological Commission of the Zagreb Town Committee of the League of Communists as reported in *Vijesnik* between 14 May and 23 May 1966.

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theories and views. Rejecting the new interpretation of Marxism as 'anarcho-individualistic', these intellectuals repeat the old familiar formulas of Marxism-Leninism.

Such philosophy must seem more appropriate to some leaders of the League. Yet Yugoslavia, in spite of all its characteristics of a one-party State, is now very different from a conventional communist dictatorship. Pragmatism and humanism have been penetrating the fabric of the system. Above all, the Yugoslavs remain closely in touch with the non-communist West and its currents of thought. A philosophy that has not examined its premises and conclusions for decades is ill-suited to reflect and interpret the real situation in Yugoslavia. Intellectuals, who are not blind to the realities of contemporary life and thought, will seek philosophical answers and explanations which Marxism-Leninism, as we have known it and as the diehards continue to propagate it, cannot provide. Considering the latest developments on the Yugoslav political scene, it seems improbable that the intellectual ferment reflected in the pages of *Praxis* can be suppressed.

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FINLAND'S GOVERNMENT

The Return of the Communists

Katarina Brodin

THE new Finnish government, which came into power on 27 May 1966, and which includes representatives of the Social-Democratic Party, the Centre Party (formerly the Agrarians), the Social-Democratic Opposition, and the People's Democrats (i.e. the communist-front organisation), has aroused considerable interest both at home and abroad. The government coalition, led by the social-democratic leader, Rafael Paasio, commands a total of 152 seats in the 200-member parliament, which in itself is exceptional in Finnish parliamentary history. Moreover, the formation of the new cabinet means that the Finnish social-democrats have at last re-entered the political arena, from which, for reasons of foreign policy, they had been banished since the end of 1958. Finally—and this is the most spectacular aspect of all—after eighteen years in opposition, the communists are now back in the government. Their 'rehabilitation' has understandably aroused a great deal of speculation as to its possible long-term implications. Is there any justification in treating the present solution in Finland as a first step towards a gradual rapprochement between social-democrats and communists in western Europe? France and Italy are obvious cases in point. Or is it more accurate to regard the Finnish popular-front government as an isolated phenomenon and hence as the result of a unique Finnish set-up?

Commenting on the installation of the Paasio cabinet, the leading newspaper of the Centre Party, *Suomenmaa*, noted that the popular-front concept might easily evoke the wrong impression, particularly in those not sufficiently familiar with Finnish political life. It added that the solution did not follow any pre-established international pattern, but had to be considered as a specifically Finnish solution, aiming at the formation of a broadly based government comprising a majority of the parliamentary forces. According to this paper, there seemed in this context no reason to discriminate against the extreme left. Even though there are observers who prefer to view the present Finnish government in a broader perspective than the mere national one, there seems to be among the well informed fairly general agreement that the formation of the Paasio cabinet reflects first and foremost the interplay of a number of factors which have little bearing on developments outside Finland: the split within the social-democratic and the trade union movement, which came to the fore after the general elections in 1958, and which has tragically weakened the Social-Democratic Party (SDP); the relative strength of the Finnish communists, who have the support of approximately one-fifth of the electorate; the key position of the Centre Party, which has benefited most from the dilemma of the social-democrats, and, last but not least, Finland's dependence on the Soviet Union and the various considerations which emanate from this delicate relationship.

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The question of the sort of government to be formed after the general elections of 20–21 March was an important issue in the preceding election campaign and was widely discussed within all parties. In the first place, efforts were made to clarify the exact position of the social-democrats and to determine whether the Soviet leaders' distrust of them had finally been dispelled. Second, the possibility of communist participation in the government had to be reckoned with, particularly if there was a left-wing majority in parliament.

After the elections in the summer of 1958 a majority government was formed under the leadership of the social-democrat, K. A. Fagerholm. A few months later his Cabinet was forced to resign. Although it could count on overwhelming support in parliament, and included members of all parties except the communists and the splinter group of left-wing socialists, the government met with deep suspicion on the part of the Soviet leaders and all efforts to allay these suspicions proved abortive. That the Soviet attitude appeared irrational made no difference. This was the period of the so-called 'night frost' in Russo-Finnish relations, which accounted for the fate of the SDP in the following years, and whose impact on Finnish internal developments is only now beginning to lessen.

It is interesting to note that the Finnish communists and their leading newspaper, *Kansan Uutiset*, were among the first to signal a change in the discussions concerning the 'reliability' of the social-democrats as partners in government. The Centre Party and the splinter Social-Democratic Opposition (SDO) have been much more reluctant to undertake a revaluation of the social-democrats, and have up to date stubbornly insisted that they are not qualified to handle the delicate external relations of the country. In a TV-appearance shortly before the March elections, the leader of the SDO, now Minister of Justice, Aarre Simonen, declared that the elections would not help the social-democrats out of their isolated position, and that the changes brought about within the SDP would not suffice as evidence of a change of heart. A similar attitude was adopted by the Agrarians, who even made futile attempts to bring matters of foreign policy to the forefront in the election campaign. The writings of the Agrarian and the communist press respectively can, in effect, be seen as a thinly-veiled polemic regarding which of the two parties was in a better position to interpret and represent the true intentions of the Soviet Union.

THE revaluation of the social-democrats by the Soviet leaders has taken place gradually and may perhaps to some extent be credited to internal changes within the Finnish Social-Democratic Party. Thus, at the 1963 party congress, Rafael Paasio was elected party Chairman after Mr Vaino Tanner—who together with Mr Vaino Leskinen was considered by the Kremlin at the time as the two arch-enemies of the Soviet Union within the Finnish labour movement—was dropped from

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the executive. But these changes did not in themselves effect any immediate improvement in relations with the Soviet government. On the contrary, Russian commentators insisted that they were not far-reaching enough to dispel existing misgivings. *Pravda*, 25 January 1966, reverted to the familiar theme and stressed that the leaders of the SDP had apparently still not changed their minds regarding communism and the Soviet Union. The writer of this article, S. Smirnov, added that with this 'burden' on their shoulders they could hardly expect to get far ahead in present-day Finland; admittedly, the social-democrats had lately professed that past mistakes were being corrected, but this new orientation had not yet resulted in any *practical* deeds. Seen in the light of the forthcoming elections, the article was not without significance.

The changed Soviet attitude towards the SDP, which Kosygin ostentatiously confirmed when, during his stay in Helsinki in June 1966, he issued an invitation to Paasio to visit Moscow, may also be seen against the background of the party's very tangible successes in recent Finnish elections. In the municipal elections in the autumn of 1964 they received the largest number of votes in the whole country—some 550,000—and in the 1966 general elections they won a decisive victory with a net gain of 17 seats, which made them the largest single party in parliament. For the first time in Finnish history the number of votes received by the socialist parties exceeded those cast for the non-socialists. The social-democrats alone received 645,000 votes, which is more than any single political party in Finland has ever attained. But what was decisive in determining the Soviet attitude was their conscious and persistent effort to prove that the enmity of yesterday no longer shapes party policy, and that their adherence to the official line in Finnish foreign policy is more than lip-service. Nor could Moscow fail to notice the signs indicating increased willingness on the part of the SDP to enter into closer cooperation with the other parties of the left, i.e. the Social-Democratic Opposition and the People's Democrats. Finally, if we accept the fact that the Soviet Union is at present tacitly advocating a rapprochement on a broader scale of the forces of the left in western Europe, it would hardly be wise to discriminate against a social-democratic party.

THE social-democrats have not found it easy to agree among themselves as to the degree and extent of the proposed cooperation. When the former secretary of the party, Mr Leskinen, publicly came out before the elections in favour of a clear-cut rapprochement, whether in government or in opposition, few of his colleagues seemed anxious to follow suit. His plea, considered the more surprising as he had previously been ranked as one of the leading anti-communists within the party, had by many been dismissed as mere expediency, intended to secure his own personal comeback into politics, and outsiders were warned that Mr Leskinen's statement should not be interpreted as in

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any way representative of the official party line. At the same time, the die-hards within the party let it be understood that in no circumstances would they consider any agreement with the communists. Between the two extremes, there were to be found those who, like the present Minister of Finance, Mauno Koivisto, advised the members of the party to consider carefully the prospects of the future and the tactics which carried promise of the highest returns.

When, on 1 May 1965, Mr Koivisto suggested the possibility of government cooperation with the communists, he was opposed by, among others, the leading SDP newspaper, *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, which described the proposal as dangerous and ill-advised. Koivisto was, however, supported by another social-democratic newspaper, *Turun Päivälehti*—edited by Rafael Paasio! Commenting on Koivisto's speech, the paper wrote: 'If the Social-Democratic Party, after the elections, wants to avoid falling into the hands of the Agrarians like a ripe fruit off a tree, it should keep all doors open and retain the possibility of making every conceivable move. Our party has not officially declared that it *strives* for a popular-front government after the elections, but neither has the party officially declared that *it does not strive thereto*.'

This formula aptly illustrates the dilemma of the social-democrats before the general election. What it all boiled down to was not so much to accept, once and for all, cooperation with the communists at the government level, but to avoid, at all costs, a definite rejection of the idea. A premature dismissal of the popular-front alternative would do the party nothing but harm while giving the Centre Party the benefit of a continued check on the social-democratic leadership. Considering the exposed position of the country, which in April 1948 signed a Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Assistance with the Soviet Union, every Finnish political party must, at all times, guard against accusations of 'unreliability' in foreign policy matters. There is every reason to believe that this has played its part in determining the social-democrats' attitude towards the present government coalition.

The discussions within the party before the March elections resulted in a general agreement to avoid a conclusive stand in regard to the Popular Front. At a meeting of the social-democrats in February Mr Paasio, admittedly, declared that the nature of communist activities would, in the last analysis, set the limits to any future cooperation, but this was probably addressed to that part of the electorate which, on grounds of ideology, would prefer to have nothing to do with the crusading revolutionaries of the extreme left. Although no definite commitments were made on the government issue, the social-democrats refused to enter into an electoral alliance with the communists or to consider any form of cooperation on the organisational level.

Only twice before, in 1916 and in 1958, have the Finnish socialists commanded a majority of seats in parliament. Today, the distribution of seats is as follows:

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	1966	1962	
Social Democrats	55	(38)	+17
People's Democrats (Communists)	41	(47)	− 6
Social-Democratic Opposition	7	(2)	+ 5
Centre Party	49	(53)	− 4
National Coalition Party (Conservatives)	26	(32)	− 6
Swedish People's Party	12	(14)	− 2
Liberal People's Party	9	(14)	− 5
Small Farmers' Party	1	(—)	+ 1
	200		

On 16 April, two days after the new parliament convened, Paasio was asked by the President of the Republic to form the new government, and was urged to form a social-democratic minority government if a majority government could not be achieved. Thus it was made clear from the beginning that Paasio was to be the next Premier of the country. Having learned that the National Coalition Party as well as the two small liberal parties, the Swedish People's Party (representing the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland) and the Liberal People's Party, would not participate in a government which included the communists, Paasio was, for all practical purposes, faced with the following three alternatives; (a) a social-democratic minority government; (b) a majority government of the left; (c) a government of the three main parties, i.e. the Social-Democrats, the Centre Party, and the People's Democrats. Apart from the traditional aversion of the Right to so-called 'subversive elements', it is worth remembering that the National Coalition Party managed to break out of its postwar parliamentary isolation—a result of its wartime orientation—largely because of the disrepute into which the Communist Party fell after the abortive coup of 1948.

The three alternatives

Considering that the Centre Party, the backbone of the previous government, as soon as the election results became known, publicly declared that it would now be in opposition, and that there was fairly strong opposition in the SDP to a coalition which included the People's Democrats, it may at first sight seem surprising that the alternative of a minority government was not given more serious consideration by Paasio. At a meeting of his party council on 26 May, when the issue was resolved, Paasio briefly touched upon this question. He noted that at an early stage of the discussions there was a theoretical possibility of forming a minority government, but the opportunity had now passed.

Well informed Finnish circles argue that a SDP minority government would on all accounts, but mainly for reasons of foreign policy, have been a less satisfactory solution. True enough, there had in the past

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year been a distinct change in the Soviet attitude, but the Soviet leaders were well aware of the hostility to the idea of a Popular Front in the SDP rank and file. Asked whether a SDP minority government had actually been possible, a highly placed official source in Helsinki replied: 'Everything is possible.' But it must be remembered that Finnish relations with the Soviet Union can be more or less friendly depending on circumstances. Bearing this in mind, it is hard to believe that Paasio at any time seriously reckoned with the possibility of the social-democrats going it alone. The serious rift within the party, shown at the last stage of the negotiations, when the party board, voting on the proposed platform of the government, refused Paasio a vote of confidence, speaks for itself. This rift also indicates what Paasio had in mind when on the following day he openly declared that 'the opportunity had passed'.

The opponents of the party, not unexpectedly, seized the opportunity to question the intention of the SDP as a whole. In a leading article on 27 May *Päivän Sanomat*—the main newspaper of the Social-Democratic Opposition—wrote: 'A long shadow has been cast on the final stage of the government negotiations, as well as on the SDP, by rightist elements who have strengthened their position in the party and done everything in their power to torpedo the formation of a left-centre coalition. Attempts have been made to explain their attacks solely by reference to divergences on agricultural policy, yet the writings of certain party papers and many other facts show that this was an extensive and carefully planned operation to defeat the Popular Front and to join forces, once again, with the extremists of the Right.'

It has been said that Paasio, in his efforts to bring the dissidents into line, clearly hinted at the possibility of a renewed 'night frost', and urged the need for unity and cohesion within the party if the present goodwill on the Soviet side was not to be once more forfeited. Apart from these considerations, it was clear that a minority government would hardly have been able to push through the fiscal measures needed to stabilise the deteriorating economic situation. Even before the elections, Paasio suggested that a majority government, consisting of only the socialist parties, would in all likelihood rest on too narrow a base in parliament to function satisfactorily. This argument was a respectable alibi for not bringing only the communists into the government, a move which was expected to stir up considerable interest both at home and abroad. Moreover, the more militant groups within the SDP, which strongly disapproved of the new tactics, could not easily be ignored. Studies had shown that, while the People's Democrats as a rule list the SDP as their second choice, the majority of social-democratic voters put the communists as their last choice. This explains why the social-democrats were ready to pay a seemingly high price to secure the participation of the Centre Party in the new cabinet.

There were also social-democrats who, while the negotiations were

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under way, claimed that a majority government would in all circumstances be better than a minority government. The SDP parliamentary leader, Veikko Kokkola, suggested that, if the Centre Party could not be persuaded to join the cabinet, a coalition of the left would still be better than a social-democratic minority government; the fact that the social-democrats, in the given situation, considered working together with the communists in the government did not mean that the party had abandoned the ideals of western democracy. They should remember that the People's Democrats stood no chance of exerting the same kind of influence as they did immediately after the war.

As for the People's Democrats (PDP), it is obvious that they had come to regard a coalition of the left as very much in line with their own interests. What is noteworthy in this context is that they did not exclude a broader base, including the Centre Party, but on the contrary positively endorsed it. The communist MP, Hertta Kuusinen, one of the most colourful members of the Finnish Communist Party, did however remark that, if the Centre Party preferred to remain in opposition, the PDP would be the last to try to make them change their minds. The main thing was that the country should not be forced to accept a caretaker cabinet or a minority government.

Thus in principle the parties of the left agreed that the best solution would be a government including all socialist parties as well as the Centre Party. At first, however, the prospects seemed poor, because of the negative attitude of the Centre Party. Although, in the autumn of 1965, it had changed its name and in the election campaign extended its appeal to the urban areas, it suffered a distinct setback in the March elections. Admittedly the votes cast for the Centre Pary in urban areas increased compared wih 1962, but not enough to secure the additional seats which the party had hoped for, and its attitude immediately after the elections has been described as an emotional outburst rather than a premeditated posture. Its spokesmen argued that it was up to the social-democrats to fulfil the promises given in the campaign, and it is no secret that there was in the Centre Party strong opposition to any form of cooperation with the communists. These elements obviously wanted to wash their hands of any share in the decision to bring the People's Democrats back into government. How sensitive the issue is, was well illustrated by a statement of the Chairman of the Centre Party, Johannes Virolainen—now Speaker of the parliament—when asked about the significance of communist participation: 'Why not ask Paasio—he is the one who brought them in'.

When, finally, the Centre Party was persuaded to change its mind, this was largely due to the personal intervention of President Kekkonen. No details have been made available, but it seems safe to assume that the president, who comes from the ranks of the Centre Party, persuaded the party that it stood to lose rather than gain by joining forces with the opposition. The Centre Party has in recent years occupied a key position in Finnish politics, proclaiming itself the mainstay of the so-called

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Paasikivi-Kekkonen line in foreign policy; this is the official orientation which aims at promoting friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, now that both the SDP and the PDP have re-entered the arena, the position of the Centre Party has to some extent been undermined; it would hardly have been strengthened by remaining, perhaps for a long period, in opposition. Nor could it have been a matter of indifference to them that a strong current of opinion in the country considered a cabinet which included the political centre as well more in line with general expectations, and the sceptics could be reassured by statements that the party had every reason to believe that the SDP would this time go a long way to placate the Centre Party.

The negotiations between the prospective coalition partners proved difficult and time-consuming. In a letter to Paasio on 19 May, President Kekkonen referred to the pending state visits of the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, and urged the negotiators to reach agreement before Whitsun. The discussions were then speeded up, and on 25 May Paasio pressed for a vote on the party board. The vote went against him; he was said to have been too lenient to the Centre Party, above all in matters of agricultural policy. According to his opponents, the concessions offered by Paasio marked a radical departure from the election promises and would be difficult to justify to the supporters of the party platform. Nevertheless, on the afternoon of the same day, the SDP parliamentary group reversed the decision of the board, and the final vote now lay with the party council.

The council met on the following day, and after seven hours of intense discussions Paasio received the necessary endorsement. The debate is said to have been very heated at times, and even if the issue officially turned on the wording of the government programme, well informed sources confirm that what was really at stake was the proposed partnership with the People's Democrats. Paasio threatened to resign if he did not receive the necessary vote of confidence from his colleagues on the council. On 27 May the new members of the Finnish cabinet were sworn in.

IN the present government the SDP has six ministers, the Centre Party five—Mr Ahti Karjalainen retained his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs—the People's Democrats three, and the Social-Democratic Opposition one. The communists originally asked for four posts, including the Ministry of Education, but raised no difficulties when the proposal was rejected. By and large, they showed great restraint in the discussions for a coalition. This was only to be expected considering that their main purpose at the time must have been to secure a foothold in the cabinet. They were invited to take part in the government at a time when they were receiving steadily declining electoral support. In comparison with the general elections in 1958, when they received 23·2 per cent of the vote and emerged as the largest single party in parliament, the elections in 1962 gave them 22 per cent, and in 1966 the corresponding figure

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had gone down to 21.2. That they lost as many as six seats was, however, largely due to technical reasons. The electoral alliance between the People's Democrats and SDO benefited the latter, who increased their share from two to seven seats. The communists are now back in the government for the first time since 1948, and the explanations are as many as they are varied.

An assessment of the influence which might have been brought to bear on the negotiations by the Soviet Union can hardly be avoided. On 9 May the social-democratic evening paper in Stockholm, *Aftonbladet*, carried large headlines to the effect that the Soviet government had presented the Finns with certain demands, which had to be met if the Soviet leaders were to accept a Finnish government dominated by the social-democrats. The conditions were said to have been laid down during a private visit to Moscow by Mr Väinö Leskinen, and were centred on the following issues: (1) the communists should be included in the government; (2) a public repudiation of past errors was to be made at the SDP congress in November 1966; (3) the social-democrats should endorse the candidacy of Urho Kekkonen in the presidential elections due in 1968. The story was officially denied by both Mr Leskinen and Mr Paasio.

While it seems obvious that the Soviet Union had no immediate cause to intervene by making formal demands, it is clear that Moscow cannot remain indifferent to internal developments in Finland. If the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line is to have meaning, those responsible for the formulation of Finnish domestic and foreign policy must enjoy the confidence of the leaders in the Kremlin. In theory, every independent country enjoys the right to decide for itself the nature of its government. In practice, this freedom is limited by the realities of great-power politics, which can be ignored only at the risk of national disaster.

None of the Nordic countries has had more convincing evidence than Finland of the interdependence of domestic and foreign policy. The events of 1958 which led to the resignation of the Fagerholm Cabinet, as well as the crisis in October 1961, when Khrushchev for the first time invoked the stipulations of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, clearly show what can be expected when the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, feels that Finnish developments are getting out of hand. If, as appears to have been the case last spring, the Russians let it be known that a combination of the forces of the left would be taken as proof of the new orientation in the SDP, this was something which Paasio could hardly have ignored. The arrangement finally reached conforms for all practical purposes with the wishes of the Soviet government. It is doubtful whether it would have been reached had Paasio not been forced to take into account possible repercussions in the field of foreign policy.

The picture presented here remains incomplete if developments within the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) are left out of consideration. These developments are to be related to the lessening of tensions on the international scene as well as to the repudiation of old principles which has

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occurred recently in most communist parties in western Europe. The 'revisionist' forces have obviously turned the rivalries in the international communist movement to their own advantage, and, in this respect, Finland is no exception. Compared with the situation in the other Nordic countries, the differences of opinion within the FCP are fairly recent in origin, and the orthodox elements still occupy most of the key posts. The important thing is, however, that an internal debate has been started which is bound to influence the new party programme now being prepared.

Not all the representatives of the PDP in the cabinet belong to the Communist Party. The Minister of Social Affairs, Matti Koivunen, as well as the Minister of Communications, Leo Suonpää, are old FCP members, but the third member of the group, the deputy Minister of Finance, Ele Alenius, now secretary-general of the PDP, is not enrolled as a member of the FCP. The PDP is still, however, wholly dominated by the FCP. Both Mr Suonpää and Mr Koivunen—the former a member of the politbureau—represent an orthodox party position derived from the time of Stalin. The fourteenth congress of the FCP in January 1966 admittedly gave the oppositional elements a welcome opportunity to voice their opinions—the new vice-chairman, Erkki Saloma, is one of them. But the re-election of Ville Pessi as secretary shows the strength of the old-timers. A statement by the former Chairman of the FCP, Aimo Aaltonen, that 'lice have eaten into the party banner and the main thing now is to get rid of these vermin', has not passed unnoticed. Mr Aaltonen and his followers clearly belong to an extremist group, but his statement at least gives the observer an idea of the kind of attitudes still prevailing among a number of the older party members.

HOWEVER, attitudes tend to change as time passes. The Civil War in 1918 and the turmoil of the 1930s, when the communists were forced underground and the fascist-inspired Lapua movement presented a serious challenge to normal parliamentary procedures, now belong to history. The slackening of internal tensions since the war has, in turn, brought about something like a truce between former adversaries. Thus, those who at present favour the speedy integration of the PDP into the Finnish community argue that this, in the long run, will prove the only way to safeguard the status of the country as a free Nordic democracy, and this view is seemingly confirmed by the communists' slow acceptance of the parliamentary road to socialism. Moreover, it is argued, the continued discrimination against the PDP, representing one-fifth of the electorate, will retard the desired evolution within the FCP. It is not enough to improve the economic and social conditions of the less fortunate groups in society; they must also be given an opportunity to partake, by legitimate means, in important policy decisions, if the danger of revolution is to be warded off.

In order to calm those who still hesitate, the supporters of the Popular

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Front point out that, in normal peacetime conditions, the prospects for revolution are in any case extremely slight. On the other hand, it is important to forestall a situation in which Finland, for reasons of foreign policy, might be *forced* to include the communists in the government. Such a situation might arise if the present balance of power in central Europe was in danger of being upset. It should be remembered that Finland's external relations are, for all practical purposes, dependent on developments outside its own borders. As long as the present equilibrium is preserved, the Finns enjoy a certain freedom of movement. Should the situation change for the worse, that freedom would in all likelihood be severely restricted.

The participation of the communists in the new government has provoked various speculations concerning Finland's future. The more pessimistic say that the Finnish way of life is being undermined and may be totally destroyed. Yet it is naive to contend that the situation is the same as in 1948 and that nothing has changed in the past eighteen years. Addressing the members of the new cabinet, President Kekkonen on 31 May said that such apprehensions were unfounded: what had happened in other countries was not relevant to the Finnish situation. Finnish democracy was going to survive.

It is difficult to say whether the President's statement reassured those who view the communists as nothing but obedient puppets of an alien regime. More prudent observers seem to agree that the PDP may be expected to observe a considerable degree of restraint. The relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union has up to now been pictured as a model of peaceful co-existence. Within this framework the Popular Front could be taken to signify the first step towards respectability, with obvious implications for developments in western Europe. Commenting on the new set-up in Finland, the leading communist newspaper, *Kansan Uutiset,* observed: 'In this time of transition, Finland has come to the forefront and the eyes of the leftist forces in western Europe are focused on us. The "Finnish experiment" is of great importance to the labour movement in the whole of western Europe. The success or failure of the Finnish popular-front government will have repercussions on the great powers in this part of the world as well, where the communists enjoy strong support and where favourable conditions for this new kind of cooperation exist. The "key position" of Finland puts us under an obligation'.

On the whole, well-informed observers agree that there is little reason to panic. Still, the long-term perspective gives food for thought. Admittedly, the stabilisation of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union in the postwar period has taken place without the aid of the communists. However, this does not prevent the Soviet leaders from greeting their return to government with great satisfaction. Would it be possible to exclude them if the parliamentary situation changed? True enough, this was done in 1948, when the political climate was much harsher, but the question still remains. Would not a premier who refused to join forces

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with the extreme left run the risk of being termed 'unreliable', with all the implications of the term? The dangers inherent in the situation are not merely imaginary, and no responsible politician in Finland can afford to treat them lightly.

Opinions differ as to the chances of keeping the heterogeneous elements of the new cabinet together. It is no secret that many consider Paasio too diffident to conduct the political game when there are so many deep-seated political and personal cleavages. However, it should be recalled that the parliamentary basis of the present government is exceptionally broad, and its members may find some guidance in the words uttered by the President at the installation of the cabinet: 'It is not worth tiring of compromises, since the remaining alternative will hardly be more comforting'.

* * * * *

Postscript by the editors

Since this article was written Suslov has visited Helsinki and Paasio has been to Moscow. During his stay in Finland Suslov met President Kekkonen and the communist leaders, Pessi and Saarinen. In his speech on this occasion, Pessi emphasised 'the principles of equal autonomy and non-interference in the relations of the CPSU and the FCP', and said pointedly that it was necessary to keep them separate from 'questions concerning state relations of Finland and the Soviet Union' (*Pravda*, 3 November 1966). Suslov was less emphatic about this distinction, but expressed his satisfaction about the state of Soviet-Finnish relations.

Moscow's attitude to the Finnish social-democrats is still reserved. There were difficulties in granting a Soviet visa to Mr Pauli Bourman, Mr. Paasio's secretary, who was to accompany him on his Moscow visit. In a speech on 20 November, the day before their departure for Moscow, Mr Bourman expressed regret for the 'error' he had committed in opposing the communist-organised Youth Festival in Helsinki in 1962. *Pravda* on 25 November made it clear that the congress of the Finnish SDP would be treated as a test of their desire to have 'friendly relations' with the Soviet Union.

Thus, while the Finnish communists in their new governmental role stress their revisionist evolution and their autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet Communist Party, the social-democrats have to eat humble pie as the price for the lifting of Soviet veto against their inclusion in the government. It remains to be seen whether these developments will enhance the country's political stability.

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COMMUNISM IN ISRAEL

Anatomy of a Split

Kevin Devlin

SINCE Israel is a unique country, it seems appropriate that it should contribute a unique chapter to the history of post-stalinist disunity in the international communist movement. This complex process of organisational and ideological erosion, fragmentation, and realignment has been dominated by the Sino-Soviet conflict: from Argentina to Australia factional struggles and splits within individual communist parties have been linked with the larger conflict and, even when based on local issues, have found expression in Sino-Soviet terms. But not in Israel: there the pattern of polarisation breaks down.

The split in the Israeli communist movement became formal and final early in August 1965, when the two main factions held rival congresses — each condemning the other, each claiming to be the only true, legitimate Communist Party of Israel (Maki—Miflaga Kommunistit Israelit). In making this claim, however, both appealed to the Soviet-led majority of the divided world movement, not to the Chinese challengers (who will have nothing to do with either). The cleavage runs instead along uniquely local lines: a predominantly Arab party, militantly anti-Zionist, ranged against an almost exclusively Jewish party, belatedly converted to Zionist patriotism.

This brief formulation must be modified. For convenience we can call one faction the 'Arab' party; but we must note that more than a third of the members of its central committee are Jewish, as is its leading figure, Meir Wilner. Nevertheless, Zionism remains the touchstone. The question which has divided the movement is this: should Israeli communists place their primary hopes on the anti-imperialist (and anti-Zionist) 'Arab socialism' of the surrounding lands; or should they stand against the regional tide by accepting the existence of Israel as an irreversible fact, and work patiently for the socialist transformation of their country?

This was the ground over which the struggle was waged for nearly two years before the final split — a terrain already marked by the trench-lines and shell-holes of intra-party conflicts a generation earlier, in the embattled infancy of Israel.

One faction was led by the secretary-general of Maki, Shmuel Mikunis. His most prominent supporter was Moshe Sneh, editor of the party daily *Kol Haam* (People's Voice), and the ablest of the five deputies which the party then had in the Knesset. Dr. Sneh's political pilgrimage had brought him through the years from the right wing to the left, from the General Zionist Party and the Haganah through the left-wing Mapam to Maki; and in the process (to adapt Johnson's epitaph on Goldsmith) he touched nothing that he did not split.

Given his Zionist background, and the frustration which leadership

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in a politically insignificant party meant for a man of his ability, it seems likely that Sneh was a major force behind the policy shift which provoked the ultimately secessionist reaction of his opponents. This shift, towards revisionist acceptance of Israeli reality, was linked with developments both domestic and international. At home, the replacement of Ben-Gurion by Premier Eshkol, and the later rift between the two, seemed to give Maki more room for opportunistic manoeuvre *à l'italienne*. Abroad, the loosening of international discipline due to the Sino-Soviet conflict, the growth of polycentrism, and the emphasis on the autonomy of each communist party, offered new possibilities to a party which had long suffered electorally from its subservience to Moscow.

The opposition was led by the Jewish communist veteran, Meir Wilner, flanked by two Arabs, Toufik Toubi and Emile Habibi. With them stood the overwhelming majority of the Arab membership of Maki and a politically important minority of Jewish communists (perhaps about 15 per cent). This minority was composed of party veterans like Wilner himself, schooled from the days of the Palestine CP to fight Zionism in the name of proletarian internationalism. Also represented in this group of intransigents were Jewish communist immigrants, notably from Iraq and Bulgaria, who had never been ideologically at ease in Zion.

By January 1964, when Wilner attacked Mikunis's political report at the party's national convention in Haifa, the battle had been joined. From then on the tide of polemic flowed and ebbed at successive meetings of the politburo and central committee, with intermittent compromises and attempts to maintain a facade of unity. The conflict was kept behind closed doors and on the level of leadership, but shrewd observers could chart something of its course by comparing the contents of *Kol Haam* and the party's Arabic organ, *El-Ittihad*.

In July 1964 the fifteenth plenum of the evenly-divided central committee produced a temporary truce, with the unanimous adoption of a compromise policy resolution which managed to incorporate the main points of both views without admitting the implicit conflict between them — and which therefore settled nothing.

Within weeks the facade collapsed. In September, while Mikunis and Sneh were in Moscow, Wilner's faction, then in the majority, pushed through a politburo statement condemning the position taken by the delegates of the party's youth organisation (Banki) at the international Youth Forum in Moscow — a position that had certainly been approved on the spot by the secretary-general. The Banki delegates' crime was that they had resisted a hostile Arab resolution denouncing Israel as an 'artificial creation' and had tabled an amendment calling for an Arab-Israeli settlement, but failing to demand the repatriation of Arab refugees, 'contrary to party policy', as Wilner argued later.

Mikunis reacted sharply to this challenge. From the Moscow hospital where he was under treatment he sent to *Kol Haam* a vigorous article in which he seized upon some conventionally anti-Israeli remarks

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made by Ben Bella a month earlier, to reassert in stronger terms his faction's shift towards modified Zionism.[1] If the Algerian President, newly honoured with the Lenin Prize, regarded the existence of Israel as a permanent threat to peace, wrote Mikunis, then the Israeli CP 'has no language in common with Ben Bella'. The article was duly published in *Kol Haam*—but not in *El-Ittihad*. The battle was out in the open, briefly.

When Sneh and Mikunis returned from Moscow the two factions evidently clashed at politburo and central committee meetings. But again self-interest, caution, and the habits of discipline dictated a compromise; and again the result was a juxtaposition of divergent formulas that left the gap unbridged. One factor made any bridge-building very difficult, perhaps impossible: the divided leadership had to prepare for the party's fifteenth congress, which should have been held in 1961. Fixed for January 1965, it was postponed again, but the polarisation of pre-congress positions could not be postponed. In February *Kol Haam* published congressional theses which predominantly reflected the Mikunis-Sneh viewpoint. Criticising Arab policies towards Israel, and condemning in particular the encouragement of terrorism, the statement said that 'such policies contradict the democratic principle of self-determination for the people of Israel . . . and undermine the brotherhood of the peoples of the area, the anti-imperialist campaign, and the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute'.

In mid-April, at a stormy central committee meeting ('The shouts could be heard in the street', reported one local paper), the Wilner-Toubi faction narrowly failed to have the Mikunis line censured for 'nationalist-Jewish deviation'. Wilner then demanded that the opposing positions be made public in detail, and he had his way. A three-day plenum early in May decided to 'assist the discussion of the fifteenth-congress theses and correct the misconceptions of the press by setting forth the two characteristic viewpoints within the central committee in regard to certain problems'. Two weeks later *Kol Haam* published at length the manifestos of the two factions — later to be described, in cautious periphrasis, as 'Opinion A' (Wilner-Toubi) and 'Opinion B' (Mikunis-Sneh).

THIS was a document, and an event, without precedent in the history of communism. Factionalism was a familiar phenomenon, but the publication of conflicting programmes in party organs was something new, and ominous in its implications. Unable to resolve the evenly-balanced struggle, the Israeli communists had struck a blow at the very roots of Leninism — 'democratic centralism' and the mystique of the party. Mikunis's comment later, after the split, was a memorable understatement: this 'was a serious mistake in terms of internal party discipline'.

[1] A commentary in the left-wing Ahdut Havoda party's organ *Lamerhav* (9 October 1964) remarked that Mikunis's article 'could in part have been signed by a representative of the Israeli foreign service'.

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Meanwhile, the opposing positions were expressed more clearly than ever before. The points which they still held in common were stressed (notably solidarity with the Russians and criticism of the Chinese line), but the differences in emphasis and substance stood out. In 'Opinion A' Toubi argued that 'the real threat to peace in this region can be found in the policies of the imperialist nations, aided and abetted by the ruling circles in Israel', and that the main task for Israeli communists was 'to achieve cooperation with the Arabs in their anti-imperialist struggle'. He admitted that 'many of the Arab states are guilty of anti-Israeli or chauvinistic tendencies', but insisted that 'such negative signs . . . are merely temporary in nature', and minimised the chances of Arab aggression. In domestic politics, he rebuked his opponents for drawing a line of demarcation between the Ben-Gurion and the Eshkol governments, and for nourishing hopes of left-wing alliances at the expense of ideological integrity.

'Opinion B', presented by Sneh, insisted that Arab-Israeli peace could be based only on 'mutual recognition of rights',[2] although conceding that Israel must make the first move. Furthermore, a territorial settlement should not be based on the UN partition plan of 1947 (as Toubi suggested), because this would 'arouse concern for the Jews of such localities as Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, etc.'—in effect, the 'not an inch' stand of the Israeli government. Any attempt to play down the hostility of the Arab states was 'an indirect method of protecting the interests of Arab chauvinism'. Moreover, 'any attempt at appeasement will . . . not serve the interests of progress in the Arab national movement. . . . The enthusiastic support on our part of the anti-imperialist Arab leaders, in spite of their declared intention of abolishing the state of Israel, will arouse distrust towards Israel in the anti-imperialist and progressive movements of the Arab countries, and will estrange the Israeli masses from our cause and prevent our cooperation with wide segments of the Israeli public'.

With the battle-lines thus drawn, an organisational struggle now developed over the delegates to the congress, scheduled for 23 June. Having gained a precarious majority in the central committee through the conversion of one waverer, the Wilner-Toubi faction forced a change in method, from election by branches (which would give Mikunis a slight advantage) to election by cells (which would add several dozen delegates to the 'Arab' strength).

The Jewish faction replied by disobeying this directive and electing delegates by branches. There was now no hope of holding a united congress, since there could be no agreement on its composition. Then came word that rival congresses would be held simultaneously, the 'Jewish' one in Tel-Aviv and the 'Arab' one in Haifa.

[2] 'Opinion A' rejected this formula as 'the fallacy of drawing an artificial parallel between a fulfilled right [of Israel to exist] and a denial of rights [to Arab refugees].'

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At this point, as bewildered, congress-bound delegates from fraternal parties were being met and courted by rival groups, Big Brother intervened. During prolonged eleventh-hour talks in a Tel Aviv hotel the two Soviet delegates, flanked by representatives of several other parties, worked to avert a split, warning leaders of the two factions that they would boycott both congresses. On 23 June, only a few hours before the congresses were to convene, resentful discipline prevailed. It was announced that, 'to restore unity and integrity to the party', the separate congresses had been cancelled; instead, two rallies would be held. A united congress would take place later, and delegates would be elected (as Mikunis wished) by branches. Meanwhile, three Mikunis-Sneh adherents were transferred from candidacy to full membership of the central committee, restoring the balance of power.

On the whole, the Soviet intervention had favoured the Jewish faction. But, once more, it left the basic conflict unresolved; and the approach of Histadrut, Knesset, and local elections helped to ensure that the truce would be short-lived.

It lasted, in fact, little more than a month. On 2 August the central committee made communist history by announcing a formal and agreed split in the party. Attempts to arrange a united congress had failed, so there would be two congresses — the Jewish faction meeting in Tel Aviv on 4 August, and the 'Arabs' in Jaffa three days later.

FORMAL schism widened the policy gap between what were now rival parties. In particular, the Jewish party was led to emphasise still further its new-found Zionism and its opportunistic revisionism. The 43-point programme presented by Mikunis consisted largely of proposals for what Togliatti called structural reforms; and the call for an alliance with other left-wing forces (Mapam in the first place, but later also the right-wing social-democrats) was clearly influenced by Italian communist ideas. The shift to Zionism was summed up in Mikunis's formula: 'The patriotic spirit of our party is reflected in our identification with the people and the motherland'. Presenting an impressive list of demands for better treatment of the Arab community in Israel, the secretary-general also promised support for 'any attempt to recognise the legal rights of the Arab countries, *provided such action would not encroach upon the legal rights and interests of Israel*'.[3]

The new line emerged even more clearly in one phrase of a final resolution: 'If Arab nationalism succeeds in infecting with its anti-Israeli attitude a socialist regime of any kind, then the Communist Party of Israel will work against this tendency'. There was here, perhaps,

[3] Mikunis's report to the fifteenth congress (emphasis added). The unrealistic and largely propagandist nature of some of the Jewish party's proposals for Arab-Israeli peace was expressed in Sneh's statement at the congress that 'the proper course is the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state with UN membership, which is not opposed by the State of Israel [and which could] make demands and enter into negotiations with Israel which would eventually lead to a peace treaty.'

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a rebuke for Comrade Ulbricht, who had recently been criticised by the Jewish faction and defended by the Wilnerites for issuing with his host, President Nasser, a communiqué containing anti-Israeli statements. There was probably also a nod of warning to Moscow: having decided at the congress to base its policies henceforth on the three principles of 'Marxism-Leninism, Israeli patriotism, and proletarian internationalism', the party was no longer ready to sacrifice the second to the third, as it had so often done in the past.

Despite this hint, solidarity with Moscow, and recognition by Moscow, was centrally important for the Jewish party — and for its rival. The Russians, for their part, tried to avoid commitment, although the balance swung towards the Jewish party. In a quiet reversal of the Leninist tenet that each country can support only one communist party, a Tass dispatch from Tel Aviv on 11 August reported the split into two parties at rival congresses. Noting that both supported Soviet positions, it added with a touch of cynicism: 'Both, however, accused the other of "departures from the principles of internationalism", "factionalist activities", "backsliding to positions of nationalism", and so on'.

In line with this magistral impartiality, the Russians sent greetings to both congresses. In addition, the Mikunis congress received greetings from 33 other fraternal parties, whereas the Arab congress apparently got only the Soviet cable, plus an unhelpful message from a group of pro-Chinese exiles in Brussels. [4]

Neither party heard from the Chinese, who had sent formal greetings to every previous Israeli CP Congress. While Soviet state and party policy paid some attention to Israel (and considerably more to its Arab opponents), the Chinese had already decided to put all their regional bets on the Arabs — or some Arabs. A secessionist 'Party of the Socialist Revolution' in the Lebanon, founded in September 1964, provided a bridgehead for pro-Chinese factionalism in the area. More significant was Peking's alliance with the extremist, Cairo-based Palestine Liberation Organisation. The alliance was sealed in March 1965, when the president of the PLO, Ahmed Shukheiri, led a delegation to Peking. A permanent PLO liaison office was set up in the Chinese capital; and in a joint communiqué the Chinese pledged full support for the 'just struggle against Israel', promising to aid the Arab irredentists 'by all means, political and otherwise'. The 'otherwise' might be linked with Mao Tse-tung's blunt advice to the Arab leader: 'There are not only two million Palestinians engaged in the fight against Israel, but 100 million Arabs. You must therefore act and think in accordance with this consideration'.

Given this strategic commitment, one can see why China wants no

[4] This blast from Brussels was delivered by mistake to the headquarters of the Jewish party, which gleefully passed it on to the rival congress—and published the contents in *Kol Haam*. It congratulated the Wilner-Toubi faction on 'your crucial decision to cleanse yourselves of the Zionist leprosy [and] your tardy return to the revolutionary source.'

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truck with Israeli communism, of either brand. This has not prevented the Jewish party from trying to pin the Chinese label on its rival. 'I do not wish to imply that the faction which seceded . . . supports the Chinese communists', Sneh told the congress with righteous restraint. 'But it is essential to alert the dissenters to the fact that they are influenced to a large degree by Chinese ideologies which may lead them to the brink of disaster'.

However, when the split took place both parties were more immediately concerned with their domestic positions than with Sino-Soviet alignments. The impending elections to the Histadrut labour federation and to the Knesset assembly offered a trial of strength that could not be avoided. Oddly enough, conditions favoured the Arab party. First, it could count upon the Arab vote — especially after the Arab nationalist organisation *El Ard* (The Land), itself excluded from the elections, had instructed its followers to vote for Wilner's faction (the same advice came from Cairo Radio). It could count, too, upon an intransigent minority of Jewish communists. Moreover, since this faction's strength had always been in certain areas (Nazareth, the 'Triangle', and Galilee), its power-base, small but secure, was the less affected by the split.[5] On the other side, the Zionist shift of Mikunis's party was too recent to help it much electorally.

However, the Jewish faction was relatively stronger in the labour movement, and this enabled it to gain a deceptive first-round lead on points in the Histadrut elections — 1·58 per cent of the total vote, against 1·21 per cent for the Arab communists. But Mikunis's electoral hopes withered in the Knesset elections of 2 November. His rivals, with 27,413 votes (2·3 per cent of the total), won three of the 120 seats, while the Jewish faction, with 13,617 votes and a single seat, joined the one-man party of the magazine editor, Uri Averni, at the bottom of the parliamentary list.[6] This was humiliation: in the old assembly the Jewish faction had three deputies against two for the rival group.

But one should not make too much of these results. Electorally, both communist parties are political featherweights; and these unimpressive percentages can hardly affect the role each will play, in Israel and in the international movement.

As for inter-party relations, it seems possible that the anti-Zionist, pro-Nasser stand of the Arab party may actually hinder rather than help it in its efforts to win friends and influence parties. When the

[5] This territorial strength made possible a fairly clean-cut division of the original party's membership, newspapers and offices between the two factions. However, in the 'mixed' town of Jaffa the Arab faction went to court to press its claim to the party premises. It withdrew the suit in Marxist-Leninist indignation when the judge insisted on his right to decide what group was legally entitled to wear the mantle of Maki.

[6] See Maurice Friedberg, 'The Split in Israel's Communist Party', *Midstream*, February 1966. Professor Friedberg concludes: 'It is assumed that some 16,500 Jewish voters voted communist, 13,000 for the "Jewish" Mikunis-Sneh group and 3,500 for the "Arab" communist list. Of the estimated 24,500 Arabs who voted communist, all but 600 are thought to have voted for the "Arab" list.'

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Israeli split occurred, the fall of Ben Bella and the latest shifts in Cairo's policies had already prompted Middle Eastern communist leaderships to second thoughts about the Egyptian architect of 'Arab Socialism'. The Syrian and Iraqi communists were firmly anti-Nasser; in Egypt itself a clandestine faction had defied the leadership's decision to dissolve the party in favour of Nasser's Arab Socialist Union; the Jordanian communists were wavering; only in the Lebanon had the communist leaders held to the pro-Nasser course — and they were being challenged by a dissident group with its own weekly organ.[7]

WHAT mattered most, of course, was the reaction of the Soviet party to this unusual and embarrassing split. At first it seemed likely that the Russians would support Mikunis, at the risk of driving Wilner into the arms of the Chinese.[8] Thus, the 15 November 1965 issue of the Soviet weekly *New Times* brought some evidence of a shift towards neutralism in Arab-Israeli affairs, and of support for the Jewish CP. The Moscow correspondent of *Kol Haam,* Mordechai Kaspi, was allowed to reply to an earlier anti-Israeli article by one Siful-Mulyukov. 'We publish these comments of an Israeli communist journalist in the belief that they will give our readers a more rounded and objective picture of Arab-Israeli relations', *New Times* noted coolly. But this bow to the Jewish CP was balanced in the following issue of the weekly by a report that in the Israeli elections 'the communist party' had won four seats. The split was ignored.

In fact, it quickly became apparent that the Russians, who had tried to avert the split, were now bent upon minimising its consequences, if they could not bring the rival factions together again. The first fruit of their efforts came in mid-November, when two leaders from each faction — Mikunis, Sneh, Wilner and Toubi — arrived in Moscow for several days of secret talks with a Soviet team led by Suslov and Ponomarev. The brief announcements made by *Pravda* and Moscow Radio on 21 November reported that 'questions of mutual interest' were discussed in a comradely atmosphere, but had nothing to say of any agreement or of the usual 'identity of views'. The significant point, however, was that these Soviet statements lumped all four Israeli delegates together as representatives of 'the Communist Party of Israel', making no mention of the split. Even if mediation failed, it seemed, the Russians would hold to this line as long as possible.

[7] An unconfirmed report in *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (15 October 1965) claimed that a three-day meeting of Arab communist leaders, held in Salzburg early in October, took a strong stand against 'the reactionary Nasser dictatorship', and also 'supported . . . the Israeli section of the party led by Shmuel Mikunis [while condemning] Toufik Toubi and Meir Wilner for having split the party'. This report, although impressively circumstantial, remains unconfirmed, and there are grounds for treating it with scepticism.

[8] This risk was emphasised when a New China News Agency dispatch (3 October 1965) listed Wilner (together with Belgian, Australian, and Ceylonese secessionist leaders) among foreign comrades who had sent greetings to Peking for the 16th anniversary of the Republic. Despite this warning gesture, however, Wilner soon proclaimed his complete solidarity with the CPSU (see below).

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On his return home Wilner gave Israel Radio an interview which revealed more about his own mental and verbal agility than about what happened during the Moscow talks.[9] Asked in this 29 November broadcast whether the CPSU recognised the existence of two communist parties in Israel, he replied evasively — and incorrectly — that 'the announcement in *Pravda* mentions two delegations of the Israeli Communist Party. The meaning is obvious'. The interviewer was no more successful in subsequent attempts to pin him down:

> *Question:* Does that mean that there is only one party which sent two delegations?
> *Wilner:* It means that there is a party which has split, as is known to everyone.
> *Question:* As I understand it, when a party has split, this means that there are two parties.
> *Wilner:* This may be so, and it can also be a temporary state of affairs . . .
> *Question:* What do people in Moscow think?
> *Wilner:* That depends upon who [it is].
> *Question:* If the CPSU should recognise — even if only as a temporary state of affairs — the existence of two Israeli communist parties, would not this constitute a precedent?
> *Wilner:* In the long run, only one communist party can exist in our country. Everyone agrees on that.

This exercise in obfuscation was followed by another attempt to settle the differences and end the split. The initiative came this time from Wilner's group—now generally known as 'Rakach,' from the Hebrew electoral title, 'New Communist List'—which put forward a four-point programme for working towards reunification. The proposals included the formation of a joint conciliation committee, the abandonment of polemics, and joint editorial direction for the party press. However, this approach (whatever the motives behind it) was rejected by Mikunis, who later declared: 'It is a proven fact that no common denominator for unity exists at present. All [the 'Rakach' faction's] talk about unity can therefore be described as mere baseless demagoguery with no prospect of realisation. So far, all their plots and intrigues have merely resulted in further deviations from the creative communist policy and tactics best suited to the realities of the Israeli situation' (*Kol Haam*, 22 March 1966). As the phrasing suggests, he apparently feared that the concessions required for reunification would mean giving up his faction's emphasis on reformist 'Zionism'—and the long-term political hopes that went with it.[10]

[9] In his article 'Les communistes israéliens à Moscou' (*Est et Ouest*, 1–15 February 1966), Joseph Kahn notes that the content of these Moscow discussions has remained secret, but proceeds to give an account of them, including direct quotations. The Russians, he asserts, told the two Israeli delegations that they would have to settle their differences and reunite within one year. If it was delivered, this ultimatum proved ineffective.

[10] *Zu Haderekh* (Tel Aviv) 30 December 1965. This exchange of letters was also published in the East German organ, *Aus der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung*, 29 March 1966.

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As a result of the continuing split, Israeli communism was represented at the twenty-third CPSU congress in March 1966 by two delegations (treated by the Russians as one)—Mikunis and Sneh for the Jewish faction, Wilner and Habibi for 'Rakach'. Before leaving for Moscow by separate planes they had met again, and again failed to reach anything approaching agreement; but they did manage to produce a joint address of greetings so blandly anodyne that it ignored all controversial issues.

But behind this temporary facade the struggle continued. Before, during, and after the twenty-third congress both Israeli factions conferred with representatives of other communist parties, in Moscow and elsewhere, each trying to gain support for its positions, if it could not win recognition as the sole legitimate Israeli party. As a result, the position of the 'Arab' faction in the international movement was certainly strengthened; but, since Mikunis's party was still recognised by the other communist parties, the effect was to deepen the split and make it more enduring. Wilner was going a good deal too far when he reported to his central committee:

> After holding extensive discussions with a number of communist parties in Moscow, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, and Rome, we can now report . . . that the so-called 'historical objective' of the Mikunis-Sneh group, aimed at a change in the Leninist ideology of the international communist movement, has suffered a serious setback. . . . In the course of the discussions we were frequently praised for saving the honour of Israel and defending the cause of Jewish-Arab class brotherhood. . . . We have won the trust of the fraternal communist parties mainly because of the realisation that our party has pursued, even after the split, the correct Marxist-Leninist as well as patriotic and international policy. . . .We have won the solidarity of the fraternal communist parties because of their awareness that the apprehensions about the activities of the Mikunis-Sneh faction have proved well-founded.[11]

The dilemma which the Israeli split posed for the CPSU and other fraternal parties was plain enough. Mikunis's appeal to Leninist legitimacy was offset by the fact that his rump party was now overwhelmingly Jewish in membership, whereas the rival organisation could make a much more convincing claim to represent both ethnic communities: thus, having won more than 97 per cent of the Arab communist votes, it was now publishing a Hebrew organ, *Zu Haderekh* (This is the Path), in addition to the Arabic *El-Ittihad*. Ideologically, both factions could marshal arguments acceptable to other communist parties in a period of 'unity in diversity and autonomy'. Politically, each could promote in its own way the diverse regional interests of the ruling communist parties, particularly the CPSU.

Here again, the 'Arab' party enjoyed a marginal tactical advantage.

[11] *Zu Haderekh*, 19 May 1966. According to Wilner, he and Habibi conferred with representatives of twenty other parties on the occasion of the congress. The rival faction had been carrying out similar lobbying activities, beginning with Mikunis's visits to Prague, Bucharest, and Rome in November 1965.

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While both factions proclaimed their solidarity with the CPSU, recognising what Wilner called its 'vanguard position . . . of leadership in the revolutionary workers' movement' (*Zu Haderekh,* 19 May 1966), the Jewish party was obliged by the logic of its domestic position to adopt on occasion a cautiously critical attitude towards some Soviet statements on Israel and her Arab neighbours.[12] It was the same political logic which led the party to approach the World Jewish Congress in the spring of 1966, following talks between Mikunis and the Mapai leader Golda Meir. This development led to further polemics, during which the 'Rakach' group attacked 'the contagion of nationalism and Jewish bourgeois chauvinism', and denounced the World Jewish Congress's alleged efforts 'to blur and vitiate the class struggle between the Jewish proletarial and the Jewish bourgeoisie . . . to isolate the Jews from the revolutionary proletariat' (*Zu Haderekh,* 5 May 1966). The Mikunis group's unimpressive efforts to promote a 'socialist-communist dialogue' in Israel also fitted into this pattern of divergence.[13]

As the split deepens and widens, it seems likely that the CPSU and other fraternal parties will make further intermittent (and probably ineffectual) attempts to promote a reconciliation of the Israeli factions, while avoiding full commitment to one side or the other. As far as the Russians are concerned, this has a significance beyond the national or even regional issues involved: the post-Khrushchev leadership, in the course of meeting the Chinese challenge, has apparently accepted and is exploiting a looser, more permissive set-up in the world movement, one in which influence replaces authority and counsel replaces control. As a result, the Russians, while attempting to bring about a reconciliation, have refused to intervene on behalf of either side in the Israeli struggle.

This, however, sets a fateful precedent, the effects of which cannot be undone by their insistence that, as a point of principle, there can be only one Communist Party of Israel — the question of which faction rightfully represents it being left in abeyance. What matters is that the principle has been violated in practice. This strikes another blow at the crumbling ideological foundations of the Marxist-Leninist monolith.

Meanwhile, Israel's rival communist parties go their divided ways. One is the voice of Arab protest and Jewish anti-revisionism, with a small but sure corner in the country's political life. The other, hampered by the ideological burdens of the past, faces a long uphill road. 'What is good for Israel is good for Ishmael, and vice versa', Mikunis told his congress, echoing and adapting a famous American slogan. One wonders, though, if either Israel or Ishmael will pay much heed to the blandishments of revisionist reason.

[12] See, for example, the *Kol Haam* editorial of 17 May 1966, replying to a *Pravda* report of the previous day, which had described Israel as a 'strategic base of imperialism'.

[13] See the article by Eliezer Feiler of the Maki secretariat, *Kol Haam,* 29 April 1966.

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FEUER ON MARX AND THE INTELLECTUALS

Three Comments

Some time ago we published in Survey *(No. 49, October 1963) an article by Professor Feuer on 'Marx and the Intellectuals'. In the current issue Professor Feuer discusses the 'un-Marxist' phenomenon of the American 'New Left' students. The subject has not only historical, but contemporary significance, and we publish below (with considerable delay) three comments on Professor Feuer's original article. We hope to be able to continue the discussion in a subsequent issue of* Survey.

1. Shlomo Avineri

IT LOOKS AS IF PROFESSOR FEUER, in his otherwise admirable essay on 'Marx and the Intellectuals', seems to have underestimated the strong feelings Marx held about the degree of involvement of intellectuals in the socialist movement. Though he was, as Professor Feuer rightly points out, rather suspicious of intellectuals of the sort of Lassalle and the Fabians, this probably was so not because he suspected them *qua* intellectuals, but because he suspected that their social connections, as well as their social aspirations, might be dangerous. This is quite clear in Lassalle's case, and the same attitude was adopted by Engels to the Fabians (Marx was, of course, dead by then). This transpires clearly from Engels's letter quoted by Professor Feuer himself.

As for the role of the intellectual *qua* intellectual, it has been rather overlooked that Marx could not envisage the success of the proletarian revolution without the guiding hand of the egghead.

It may perhaps not be very helpful to rely on Marx's early comments in his *Preface to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* written in 1843–44, where he says about the coming emancipation of mankind that 'philosophy is its head, and the proletariat its heart'. One would have liked to know what Marx's ideas on this subject were after he had already been in continuous touch with a working-class movement, and for this purpose 1844 is too early a date.

Marx's attitude on this is made most explicit in the Communist League debates which were going on throughout 1850 and which eventually led to the split between the Marx-Engels group, which advocated gradualism, since the next revolution was not going to be a proletarian one anyway, and the Willich-Schapper group, which, influenced by its own Jacobin-Blanquist tradition, was for an immediate *émeute.* In the crucial debate held in London on 15 September 1850, Schapper accused Marx and his followers of intellectualism, which handicapped their practical political activities, adding, 'Let us then have two Leagues, one for those who fight with their pen, another for those who act in another fashion'. Marx countered this with the significant rejoinder:

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> I have always been opposed to the ephemeral opinions of the proletariat. If the proletariat were to achieve power now, then it would put into force not proletarian, but petty-bourgeois legislation. Our party can achieve power only when circumstances allow it to put into effect its *own* ideas. Louis Blanc may serve as an example of what may happen when one achieves power too early.[1]

This seems to give an insight into what Marx conceives to be an epistemological difference between the way proletarians on the one hand, and socialist intellectuals on the other, may assess the chances of revolution. The difference seems to lie in the different faculties of the two groups in being able to judge a given situation correctly. The proletarian element, once revolutionised, is ready to go straight to the barricades, without any critical insight into how things really are and without regard to the hard facts of the social environment. It is for the intellectuals in the proletarian movement to supply this insight and enquire whether the socio-economic situation is ripe for the final coup de grace; if it is not, the ground has to be prepared, so as not to strike prematurely and rush headlong into catastrophe. This, certainly, was for Marx the lesson of 1848.

Marx restates this position in a now much-neglected article published in April 1850 in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Reviewing two books on the French revolutionary movement (by A. Chenu and Lucien de la Hodde), Marx gives a devastating characteristic of the Jacobin-Blanquist who becomes a professional conspirator, for whom being revolutionary becomes a habit and way of life, and who loses sight of the final social aims of the revolutionary movement. Marx no doubt has the Willich-Schapper group in mind as well as the French Blanquists when he dwelt upon the anti-intellectual bias of the professional revolutionaries:

> Always extremely busy with projects and plans they have no other aim except the immediate overthrow of the powers that be, and they view with deepest contempt anyone who tries to give greater theoretical enlightenment to the workers in regard to their class interest. Hence their not proletarian, but rather plebeian outrage against the men in the dark suits (*habits noirs*), those more or less educated people who represent this side of the movement.[2]

The theoretical implications of these statements for Marx's views on the place of theory in social action cannot be elaborated here in detail. Suffice it to say that Marx held the same opinion during his work in the International. Less than six months after its foundation, the London Central Council was under strong pressure from the Proudhonist Paris

[1] Marx-Engels, *Werke* (Berlin, 1960), VIII, pp. 599, 600.

[2] *Neue Rheinische Zeitung: Politisch-ökonomische Revue* (reprint, Berlin, 1955), p. 200. Engels seems to have shared this view about the role of the proletariat vis-à-vis the intellectual leadership in the coming revolution. In a letter to Weydemeyer, dated 12 April 1853, he remarks that in case of a revolution, they, as leaders, will certainly come under strong pressure from 'the proletarian *populus*' which, because of its rather ignorant and half-baked enthusiasm, will make them 'try out all sorts of communist experiments and jumps, which we ourselves know to be untimely'. Cf. Marx-Engels, *Ausgewählte Briefe* (Berlin, 1953), p. 93.

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section to bar non-workers from holding office. It was on Marx's initiative that the Council adopted, on 7 March 1865, a resolution directly aimed against the Paris Proudhonists:

> The Central Council further protests that it does not sanction the principle that none but an *ouvrier* is admissible as an official in our Society.[3]

The issue was raised again by the Proudhonist Tolain at the first congress of the International in Geneva in 1866, but the majority endorsed the decision of the General Council.[4]

It has often been pointed out that Marx and Engels were rather sceptical about the intellectual powers of workers as leaders of a proletarian movement, and they usually refer to such persons in their correspondence by the very unflattering title of '*Knoten*'. In 1870 Engels notes with regret and some apprehension that the supply of non-proletarian intellectuals for the socialist movement is declining, adding that now 'the workers will have to do it by themselves'.[5]

The only case where either Marx or Engels reflected upon a possible danger to the proletarian movement from intellectuals was in connection with Russia. When Bakunin reported that there were 40,000 revolutionary students in Russia, Engels, after questioning the veracity of the statement, added:

> How awful for the world . . . that there are 40,000 revolutionary students in Russia, without a proletariat or even a revolutionary peasantry behind them and with no career before them except the dilemma: Siberia or abroad—to western Europe. If there is anything which might ruin the western European movement, then it would have been this import of 40,000 more or less educated, ambitious, hungry Russian nihilists; all of them officer candidates without an army.[6]

Allowing for Engels's strong anti-Russian bias, there still is some sociological value in this remark. It seems to make clear that it is not suspicion of the intellectual as such which Marx or Engels had in mind. Nor would this have been in accord with Marx's method of judging socio-economic phenomena in their context: the intellectual in an industrialised bourgeois society is by necessity different from the *intelligentsia* of an under-developed country.

It seems that Marx and Engels had one set of ideas about the intellectuals in western, industrialised societies, where some of them may play a

[3] *The General Council of the First International 1864-1866* (Moscow, 1963), p. 77. That this was on Marx's own initiative is made clear from his letter to Engels, dated 13 March 1865. *Briefwechsel* (Berlin, 1950), III, p. 304.

[4] *La première Internationale*, ed. J. Freymond (Geneva, 1962), I, p. 55. That Tolain had Marx in mind is clear from the answer of Cremer, the secretary-general, who defended the clause about the non-proletarians by arguing that the International owed them much of its success, adding: 'Parmi ces membres je vous citerai un seul, le citoyen Marx, qui a consacré toute sa vie au triomphe de la classe ouvrière' (p. 56). Marx himself was not present at the Geneva congress.

[5] Engels to Marx, 11 February 1870, *Briefwechsel*, IV, p. 333.

[6] Engels to Marx, 20 April 1870, ibid., p. 375.

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leading role in the proletarian movement and where this role is indispensable for the socialist movement itself—and another set of opinions about the role of intellectuals in an under-developed country, where they become 'generals without armies' and hence tend to force their ideas on a reluctant reality.

This may perhaps also be the occasion to point out that it seems that Professor Feuer is creating unnecessary difficulties for himself by saying that Marx conceded that as far as intellectuals are concerned his theory 'affirms that existence does not determine consciousness, but rather that a purely theoretical consciousness determines existence'. It seems that this rests on a rather too mechanistic understanding of Marx, who never really said that a man's *economic* position determines his socio-political consciousness. In the *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx says that 'it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.'.[7] This in no way implies that a bourgeois intellectual cannot join a proletarian party. His social being, as determined by bourgeois society, made him an intellectual, that is, a person whose mode of thinking infers from ideas to facts. It is by virtue of this socially determined position that the intellectual is, according to Marx, in a most extraordinary position: his social being is so determined as to make his choice free, and this is not at all in conflict with Marx's idea of class determination, as the intellectual is not an intellectual *before* he enters into social relations. It is his given society which makes him an intellectual and it is in this respect that his consciousness is determined by his social being, as is that of any member of society—only the content of his consciousness enables him to think differently.

It is here that one may find a connection between Marx's condemnation of the working-class *conspirateur* in the West and Engels's strictures against the déclassé intelligentsia of Russia. Neither has the ability to gain an insight into the reality of social life. The first because they lack the necessary theoretical faculties, and hence get involved in hopeless risings; the second because the absence of a proletarian movement makes them powerless to carry out their ideas, and hence they degenerate into terrorism. As against both groups Marx and Engels seemed to have envisaged the role of the western intellectuals as leaders of working-class movements in developed countries, combining theoretical insight with the practical power of the workers. The authoritarian revolutionary intellectual of Professor Feuer's picture matches rather well with Engels's picture of the uprooted *lumpen-intelligentsia* of Russia, and both seem to agree in condemning it.

2. *Max Nomad*

RIGHT AT THE OUTSET of his article Professor Feuer points out correctly that 'confronted with the dilemma which the intellectual class posed

[7] *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1962), I, p. 363.

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for Marx's sociology . . . Marx and Engels met this dilemma by choosing not to discuss it'.

Marx's reluctance to discuss it may be explained by the fact that the question of the intellectual's class status was inextricably and uncomfortably tied up with the basic Marxist assumption that it was not the *income* but the *source of income* which determined the class character of an individual or a group.

Now, according to the terminology of the *Communist Manifesto*, modern society is divided into 'Bourgeois and Proletarians' (the title of its first chapter); in other words, into owners and non-owners of the means of production, that is, employers and employees, the latter being the 'proletarians' and including both manual and intellectual workers. ('The bourgeoisie'—so the text runs in the *Manifesto*—'has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science into its paid wage workers.')

In keeping with this concept, the reactionary General Jellachich who, in 1848, in the service of the Habsburgs, crushed the Austrian revolution, once called himself a 'proletarian who lived only on his wages'. It did not occur to Karl Kautsky, the outstanding disciple of Marx, who mentions this episode in his *Krieg und Demokratie*, that this quip was the strongest possible refutation of this basic Marxist thesis.

One wonders why it never occurred to Marx (and later to Lenin) to go beyond the 'wage-earner' concept in defining the class character of the intellectual workers. For the whole idea of the class struggle becomes ridiculous once it is assumed that a well paid expert or manager, because he is the recipient of a salary and not of a dividend cheque, belongs to the same class as the lowly labourer employed by the same enterprise. The answer to this enigma may be found in the following lines from Schopenhauer: 'The will forbids the intellect [to hit upon] certain ideas; it prevents the rise of certain lines of thought . . . in order to prevent painful and shameful shocks.' The idea which neither Marx nor Lenin wanted to face was the realisation that the source of income of the intellectual worker was not simply *labour*, as in the case of the manual worker, but *higher education*, a sort of invisible capital which, generally speaking, has been acquired due to the expenditure of comparatively large amounts of money (maintenance during the years of study, tuition fees, etc.; a 'capital', in short, which earns its dividends in the form of a higher income either under the capitalist system (this refers to the well-heeled 'ins') or under a collectivist system, after the déclassé 'outs' have taken possession of the privileged jobs.

The realisation of the potentially exploitative character of a propertyless but educated class of neo-bourgeois would have given a 'painful and shameful shock' to the self-righteousness with which Marx and Lenin identified the seizure of power by their would-be office-holding followers with the 'emancipation of the working class'. That is why Marx refused to face the possibility of a new class rule under a non-capitalist system, a possibility which was pointed out to him by his disenchanted disciple and rival Bakunin. (It may not be amiss to mention here that this possibility was clearly envisaged by the youthful cynic Nechaev, whose philosophy was a composite of Marxism, Blanquism, and Bakuninism, and who apparently had no illusion as

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to what he wanted. For he once blurted out that the men of education will always be astride of the ignorant masses.)

However, the Marxists sensed that to many manual workers the inclusion of intellectual workers among the proletariat might appear rather unconvincing—not to say spurious. So they adopted the device of relegating the intellectuals to the undefined limbo of the petty bourgeoisie, which was slated to be ground out of existence by the progress of capitalism, and thus offered no serious problem.

The contradictions, evasions, and outright disingenuousness of the Marxist theorists on this question are to be explained by the fact that they were and are not only scholars in search of sociological truth, but also radical politicians intent upon attaining power and confounding their competitors within the radical camp. It is from this angle that one has to consider Marx's ambivalent attitude to the intellectuals, as pointed out by Professor Feuer.

In contrast to the conspiratorial giants, Blanqui and Bakunin, who openly hailed the educated déclassés as the great leaven of the revolution, Marx and Engels more often than not treated them with the utmost contempt as 'lawyers without clients, physicians without patients', and so on. This attitude may have been prompted both by the desire to emphasise the truly working-class character of Marx's own school, and by fear of competition (within the First International) from the Bakuninists and later the Blanquists, who were much quicker on the revolutionary trigger than the London sages. Marx and Engels did not believe in the efficacy of revolutionary uprisings engineered by conspirators. They expected a revolution to break out as the result of major conflicts, domestic or international. That is why they hoped for a war between Germany and Russia.

Yet Marx could also depart from this attitude whenever revolutionary déclassés acted in accordance with his own hopes or expectations. Thus during the revolution of 1848 Marx hailed Blanqui as the leader of the 'proletarian party', although he could not have been ignorant of the fact that Blanqui's 'proletarians' were almost exclusively jobless students, and the like—in short the very same elements whom, during his conflict with Bakunin several years later, he described as 'dregs of the bourgeoisie'. And towards the end of his life he manifested the greatest admiration for the terrorists of the 'People's Will' (practically all of whom were déclassé intellectuals), because he expected them to bring about a revolution in Russia which would also precipitate a revolution in the West (Russian absolutism was in his opinion the main pillar of Prussian Junkerdom), because they were *not* Bakuninists, and because, though not Marxists, they were admirers of Marx.

At variance with Marx, Lenin, in his famous statement about the workers getting their socialist consciousness from outside, as it were, and not from their own selves, attached great importance to the revolutionary role of the intelligentsia. Professor Feuer is wrong when, in contesting this statement, he claims that 'socialist consciousness itself does not require any elaborate theoretical analysis but springs spontaneously from the ethical aspirations of all exploited people'. He forgets that those 'ethical aspirations' of the manual workers never go beyond 'a fair day's pay for a fair day's work'; that this very natural aspiration has nothing to do with socialist consciousness, which is the

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desire for a *different social system*; that the masses at large are even more traditionalist in their views than their masters; and that they never see beyond the system under which they live—unless and until they are told to do so by educated malcontents. All this is quite elementary, as Sherlock Holmes would say. (The case of the Working Men's party founded in New York as far back as 1829 by the mechanic Thomas Skidmore was no exception. Skidmore was inspired by the ideas of Robert Owen and other radical thinkers. After his expulsion from the organisation its members were absorbed by Tammany Hall and that was the end of their 'socialist consciousness'.)

Professor Feuer is also wrong when he links the alleged 'anti-Jewish feeling' of the terrorist People's Will of the 1880s with the alleged 'authoritarianism' of the Russian revolutionary intellectuals. The endorsement of pogroms by some survivors of the People's Will (after the execution of its most prominent leaders) came in the wake of anti-semitic riots (either spontaneous or instigated by the police) because in their desperate mood some of the revolutionists hoped that the masses, once aroused and on the rampage, would go further and turn their fury against their Tsarist masters as well. It was revolutionary Machiavellism at its worst, but neither specifically authoritarian or ideologically anti-semitic.

At the end of his article Professor Feuer refers to the 'problem of the future, the strife between the authoritarian and liberal elements' of the intelligentsia. That strife is in my opinion not so much a clash of philosophies as a contest for jobs and security. Where, as in the economically advanced countries (except in times of a great depression), there is enough room both at the top and below it for all the educated, they will adopt a liberal or tolerant attitude of live and let live. In those countries, however, in which, because of their economic backwardness, there is a large number of unemployed or underpaid intellectual workers, there is and will be a violent struggle between the 'ins' and the 'outs', and also between various groups of 'outs'. Such strife, like any other form of conflict, engenders authoritarian feelings. In the course of this conflict the educated 'outs' of today are in most countries wont to invoke either the vague Afro-Asian dictatorial and nationalistic statism of the Nasserites or the Baathists, or a pseudo-proletarian 'communism', Moscow or Peking style, advocating the 'emancipation of the working class by the working class itself' (Marx)—but handing all the power and all the good jobs to the most deserving neo-bourgeois disciples of Marx and Lenin. However, a distinction should be made between the *objectively* neo-bourgeois character of the various anti-capitalist theories and movements, and the *subjectively* disinterested devotion to the underdog on the part of such men as Liebknecht or Djilas.

3. Malcolm Warner

IN HIS ARTICLE PROFESSOR FEUER discusses the ambiguity of Marx's explanation of why intellectuals join the labour movement. He queries whether existence determines consciousness in this case, giving as examples, amongst others, the early Fabian socialists, particularly the Webbs. He sees their final 'authoritarian' position as yet another illustration of the widespread opinion that it is due to 'frustrations

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peculiar to intellectuals in modern times', and continues: 'The most eminent Fabian intellectuals thus became increasingly authoritarian as in the course of their long lives they saw the transition of their ideas into action disrupted'. Was this the case? It must, of course, be pointed out that these Fabians did not move in this direction until democracy (of which they had rarely been enamoured, given their ideological elitist bias and especially Mrs Webb's social origins), and the stability of the capitalist system, were undermined first by the inflation and mass unemployment of the early twenties, and later by the slump.

Could existence have determined Fabian consciousness? It is possible to see the Fabian idea of the intellectual as expert as one clue why such people joined the socialist movement. At least for England, and considering that so many Fabians were of a common occupational-social class (as Dr Hobsbawm has pointed out),[1] it can be suggested that potential qualification for a technical role in a future society can attract people to work for social changes which will bring about such a society. The Webbs started the London School of Economics to train such experts and argued that the study of economics, *per se*, would produce socialists. Two possibilities were apparent: if an intellectual could perform a new task, the socialist of today becomes the planner of tomorrow. If he already had a professional role, this could be made more important in a new society, and this would give him power and influence to be used in an altruistic way, making professional skill available to more people.

The first of the two possibilities is the less obvious. Here the case of the Webbs is most illustrative. Webb (and Olivier) had been civil servants, but bureaucratic trends had progressed in such a way as to produce neutrality and a departmental responsibility which reduced the individual reformer's scope in this profession, so that they were forced to use the Fabian Society as a platform for advocating administrative reforms and finally to work out a comprehensive rationale for a society run by the bureaucratic expert.

As Dr Hobsbawm notes, 'The Webbs' entire structure of socialism rests on such professionals. They are trained, impartial and scientific administrators and expert advisers who have created an alternative Court of Appeal to profit. By origin they sprang chiefly from the capitalist class, but the growth of democracy and education opened up alternative supplies of brainworkers, and they would therefore increasingly be recruited from below.' Hobsbawm, at the one end, cuts the Fabian role down to size, a little excessively in the light of the general trend. Feuer, at the other, exaggerates their discontent, alienation, and authoritarianism. For example, he implies that it is the surplus of intellectuals which even advanced economies cannot employ which produces the frustrations leading to adherence to the dogmatic socialist creed. Yet today there is a growing demand for them, in all advanced countries, and even in less advanced countries this tends to be more and more the case. It is where the training they receive is inappropriate to the demands of the labour market, such as the vast production of Arts graduates in India, that there is trouble.

[1] E. J. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour* (London, 1964). See also William Clarke's contribution to the first *Fabian Essays* quoted by Professor Feuer.

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In many cases, particularly in advanced societies, there is a further problem which concerns the less than market price paid for services in their *potential* employment (caused by such factors as the employer being a financially hard pressed public service). In other words, where such a stratum is publicly employed, there is a strong likelihood, *on economic grounds at least*, that they will be a built-in factor generating discontent, particularly where similar 'experts' can be employed by private employers at higher salaries. Today, and whenever there is full employment for the ordinary as well as the intellectual proletariat, there will be less trouble. Where there is *less than full employment*, as was the case in the 1880s in the example quoted by Feuer (and also in the inter-war years), the malaise will be accentuated, for the demand of the private sector will contract, thus swelling the demand for employment in the public sector, that is, the teaching profession, civil service, etc.

Thus it is possible to have an economic explanation of the problem which fits the Marxist model, but which does not necessarily rely on all its assumptions.

As for non-economic explanations, there are two important and interesting cases. These involve problems of status. The first concerns a society where the intellectual has a high *social status* but a low economic return for his services. This may not necessarily produce discontent, but probably will. In France this results in a significant proportion of this class voting communist and supporting militant action to improve their conditions of work. The second case involves a discrepancy between a relatively high economic return and a lower social status. This was the case in the United States at least until recently.

Whether the hypothetical third case, where there is a harmony between the social and economic status levels, leads to identification with society is a moot question. This will depend on the level of incomes and employment as well as on political factors. The situation is never static. By a change in the political environment, the intellectuals as a group may be able to improve their social *and* economic status even further. This dynamic aspect must be kept in mind, and it is the Marxist notion of the historical dimension that makes it plausible. How far this is objective is also to be considered. As Ossowski notes, 'Different beliefs about reality will thus find expression in differing conceptions of social class or of the class system'.[2] Which is to say that the intellectuals may perceive that they ought to have a greater say in how a society is run, irrespective of the social and economic considerations at stake, although these may take the form of rationalisations involving class, even at what may be seen by others as a high level of status and income.

The intellectual may not identify with the socialist tradition out of a desire to join a ruling class or to participate in a society of equals, as Feuer suggests. The intellectual class may choose a socialist form of society, irrespective of its purely ideological trimmings, in which they can best pursue their technical and professional bent with the minimum of frustration in a context of administrative complexity. This may possibly be elitist in some of its implications, but it is not necessarily authoritarian.

[2] S. Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (Eng. trans. London, 1963), p. 177.

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DOCUMENT:

In his article in a recent issue of Survey *(no. 60, July 1966), on 'Socialism, Alienation, and Political Power' Dr Z. A. Jordan referred to the 'hardly veiled racist attack' on Professor Adam Schaff in a review of his book* Marxism and the Individual, *published in* Tygodnik Kulturalny *(19 December 1965), by Professor J. Chalasinski, and to a reply to it in the same weekly (30 January 1966) by Professor T. Kotarbinski, the doyen of Polish philosophers. We reproduce below the full text of this esoteric exchange.*

THE HOMELESSNESS OF 'UNIVERSAL MAN'

Jozef Chalasinski

PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT life and man, the meaning of life itself, the relationship between the individual and the outside world and society, and problems of the human personality in its social and cultural context, have recently been given increasing public attention. What is the reason for this intensified interest? Posing this question in the introduction to his book *Marksizm a jednostka ludzka* (Marxism and the Individual), published in Warsaw in 1965, Adam Schaff in his answer refers to Martin Buber, who links this growth of interest to the feeling of homelessness experienced by contemporary man. In Buber's opinion, the source of this feeling is to be found first of all in the disintegration of the old forms of society such as the family unit or a neighbourhood community, and secondly in man's loss of control over the world he has created. Schaff writes that 'Marx, following Hegel, described this phenomenon as alienation', and he quotes from Buber:

> This point concerns the connection between man and the new things and relationships which his actions and participation have produced. I would describe the peculiar feature of the present crisis as that of man allowing his own actions to overtake him. Man is no longer in a position to comprehend the world he has made; a world which is becoming stronger than man and independent of him—it opposes man in its elementary independence and man no longer knows the magic word by means of which he can exorcise and render harmless the Golem he has created.

This quotation is followed by Schaff's own comment:

> Buber, using different words, is speaking here about the same phenomena that attracted the attention of the young Marx and his contemporaries when they analysed the crisis of the individual against the background of contemporary convulsions. Buber speaks of the same phenomena when he says that technology, economics, and politics are the main spheres in which man is dominated by things and relationships he has himself created.

And, again quoting Buber, Schaff writes: 'man was therefore faced with a terrible situation—he had given life to demons which afterwards he was unable to tame'.

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Recalling the problem of alienation posed by Marx, Schaff asserts that, despite the general opinion that he was an economist, Marx was not interested in economics but rather in the philosophy of man. Continuing this theme, he quotes from Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology:* 'In truth, Marx was never interested in economics . . . for him economics was the practical side of philosophy.' Bell is not the only American Marxologist to whom Schaff refers. Before the publication of Schaff's book, American Marxologists had discovered the earlier writings of Marx on the question of alienation. This is the subject of publications by Hannah Arendt (*The Human Condition*, 1959), Robert Tucker (*Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, 1961), and others. Tucker is quoted by Schaff on the first page of his book: 'It seems fair to say that a change in the generally accepted view of Marx has been taking place in the twentieth century'. When citing Buber, Schaff draws attention to the fact that Buber's thought coincides with that of the French communist Roger Garaudy, who represents a diametrically opposed school of philosophy.

Since Schaff fails to give any detailed information about Buber, who is virtually unknown in Poland, it is necessary for the reader to turn to the Polish Encyclopedia to learn that 'Buber Martin, born 8 October 1878 in Vienna; Jewish philosopher and student of religion; professor at the University of Frankfurt; since 1938 in Jerusalem; in philosophical opinions representative of mysticism; Zionist writer and historian of Chassidism'.

Both the Zionist and mystic Martin Buber and the materialist Roger Garaudy are thus in agreement with the view expressed by the young Marx over a century ago, that the question of alienation is the foremost problem of our age and one which is not only philosophical but also practical.

The general problem of alienation is the subject of Schaff's introductory chapter entitled 'The Rediscovery of Marx's Early Writings'. In the following chapters, he deals with specific types of alienation and analyses the possibilities of counteracting them in a socialist society. According to Schaff, although Marx was in agreement with idealists and mystics in condemning the evil of alienation, he based his condemnation on a materialist concept of the individual. Schaff maintains that Marx 'had nothing more to do with this term which had formerly been so dear to his heart' because of its frequent misuse by many people, including those whose views bordered on mysticism. Marx is presented as 'an apologist of the role of the individual in history'. 'History', Schaff quotes from Marx, 'is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims' (*The Holy Family*). The Marxist concept of the individual contains elements of the theory of human personality which, however, is 'undeveloped and not fully formed'. The fact that Marx in his later works abandoned the concept of alienation, even in his own materialist formulation, is regarded by Schaff as reflecting the essence of the problem of personality in our time.

In discussing various kinds of alienation, Schaff first brings up the question of religious alienation. This is man's creation of deities which, being human products, free themselves from, and gain control over, their creators. The creation of gods is an example of ideological alienation;

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in addition, there are also socio-political and economic forms of alienation. Schaff maintains that socio-political alienation takes place when administrative and state organisations created by man become independent of him and obtain control over him. Similarly, economic alienation consists in control over man by the products of his labour; the process of work itself is also subject to alienation.

No social institution or human activity is secure against alienation. 'Among other things, Marxism lays bare, in terms of alienation, the social character of the family. In a similar way, man's social creation—namely, institutionalised human relationships—not only becomes autonomous and begins to live its own life but also subjugates man.'

National feelings are also affected by alienation.

> I shall point out, in addition, the alienation occurring between the nation and national feelings which leads to nationalism and even to racialism. At one time this would have been thought absurd. Naive talk about the complete solution of these problems by a socialist revolution, in the face of clear evidence to the contrary, does not in the long run serve its aim. This is a dangerous phenomenon, not only because it maims the human personality, which is in striking contradiction to the principles of socialism, but, in the most direct way, it obstructs the construction of a new society.

It is not by accident that Schaff discusses the presence of alienation in a socialist system. In the light of this book, the young Marx's faith in the disappearance of all alienation with the liquidation of private property proved to be unrealistic. 'Alienation can also be found in a socialist society, whether it be one of the still existing relics of the past or whether it be connected with a new society in a more organic and durable form.'

Among the various forms of alienation existing under socialist conditions, such as the alienation of family or of bureaucratically deformed state organs, special importance is attached by Professor Schaff to nationalism, as a form of the alienation of national feelings; he sees a glaring example of this in anti-semitism.

> In the socialist countries of Europe, the war against anti-semitism and the parallel campaign of enlightenment have a special importance in this context. Why concentrate on anti-semitism while there exist so many varieties of nationalism and national hatred? Simply because in these countries this is a typical form of racialism (i.e. nationalism is here linked with contempt for other nationalities as belonging to an 'inferior' race). This is a gross violation of the principle that man is *summum bonum.*

It is clear that Schaff considers the notion of alienation to contain a wide, perhaps too wide, range of phenomena. Religion and its position in cultural history is, for example, seen simply in terms of alienation. Ludwik Krzywicki, another materialist and sociologist, approached this question in a clearer and more exhaustive manner seventy years ago, when he studied a pilgrimage to Jasna Gora (Czestochowa). In Schaff's terminology, this should be defined as a pilgrimage of victims of religious alienation. It is doubtful, however, if any progress in sociological thought has been made by this approach. However foreign religious experience may be to a philosopher, there seems to be no scientific basis for labelling

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as alienation that which other people identify themselves with. It is a question of cultural differences which Krzywicki understood perfectly when comparing the religious experience of the uneducated with that of the intelligentsia.

In order to remedy the evil of alienation, Schaff suggests that man should be educated in the spirit of Marxist humanism and universalism. 'The ideal man in a communist era is a universalist liberated from the grip of alienation.' 'Universal man' is moulded in the spirit of internationalism.

> According to Marx, the new man of communism was to be universal and a complete entity. These characteristics are the opposite of those that are injured by alienation. Alienation has deprived man of a part of his personality and has resulted in the transformation of man's creations into independent forces, thus reducing the status of man to that of a 'thing'.

It would be difficult to produce any ethical objections to such a generally outlined ideal of man. It is, however, difficult to agree with Schaff for whom the problem of the nation and national culture is lost in his treatment of nationalism considered as the alienation of national feelings.

Schaff's book reflects in an interesting manner the intellectual evolution of one of Poland's leading philosophers. This is mainly because, in defending the individual, he refutes sociological patterns which tend to diminish man's importance. Given this approach, it is all the more striking to find him using the abstract method of treating the individual in terms of the ideal universal man—a concept isolated from historical reality.

The problem of contemporary man's personality does not manifest itself on the abstract plane of individual and society. It appears, on the one hand, within the context of different national societies and cultures, and, on the other, in the sphere of supra-national and international relationships. In contrasting universal man and universalism with the alienation of national feelings and nationalism, Schaff uses a device which neither explains, nor facilitates the understanding of, contemporary world conflicts. That this should be the dominating theme of the whole book is a great defect.

It is a pity that Schaff does not tell his Polish readers more about such contemporary writers as Buber and Bell, who are quoted in connection with alienation. Had he done so, it would have been clear that the problems of alienation are closely linked in their minds with the quest for the self-determination of their national identity. It is not by accident that the theme of alienation has attracted American intellectuals whose families had recently emigrated from Europe. Such men have not yet solved the conflict between former and present national affiliations. This is the origin of their homelessness.

In an article entitled 'Reflections on Jewish Identity' (*Commentary*—organ of the American Jewish Committee—June 1961), Daniel Bell writes about homeless universal man, a category in which he includes himself. 'He is homeless. The present is his only reality. Bereft of the past, he has neither continuity nor future'. Professor at one of the leading American universities, Daniel Bell does not hide the fact that the

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article reflects his own painful experience. 'I have been unable to find a final place for myself, because I have no final answers.'

The search is not Professor Bell's alone. Professor Buber, having emigrated from Frankfurt in order to find his own nation in Jerusalem, reveals another tragic aspect of alienation—that of nationless existence. This theme has unfortunately been ignored by Professor Schaff.

The subject of alienation does not exhaust the anxieties experienced by American intellectuals living without a nation. Lost in the abyss between universalism and local religious community, they are trying to find their own national identity. Because of this, the problem of alienation is combined with a philosophy of existentialism which is represented not only by Buber but also by Joseph Soloveitchik, an Orthodox rabbi, Professor of Talmudic Studies at the Yeshiva in New York (cf. *Commentary*, November 1959).

Educating people in accordance with the ideal of universal man is designed to be a panacea for all the vicissitudes connected with alienation as described by Schaff. Daniel Bell provides the answer to this in his article (*Commentary*, June 1961): 'There is no such thing as a completely cosmopolitan culture.'

THE TYPICAL AND THE NON-CONFORMIST

Tadeusz Kotarbinski

HOW PLEASANT IT IS to be an ordinary member of the community—typical in racial origin, religious affiliation, native language, nationality, and also in descent from men typical in all these respects. A man then simply belongs and is at home, and nobody has the right to single out his strangeness or to interfere, because of it, with his participation in communal affairs.

With dissenters, however, the situation is different. In Poland this is an endemic and tragic problem, which is self-perpetuating in various forms, whether the emphasis is on religious issues or on national descent. Perhaps one could venture to state that the general attitude towards dissent has been a measure of progressiveness and of maturity in the affairs of an independent state. Both the progressives, and those defending a threatened sovereignty, have always been inclined towards the integration of minority groups and to tolerate their partial differences, reducing in importance that which divides while stressing that which is common. Ardent advocates of non-assimilation, suspicious of anything that appears unfamiliar, have formed an opposite group, often with fatal results for the Polish Republic. Similar in its limitations and equally disruptive of the public good was the exclusiveness of the gentry in the question of civil rights for the peasants.

Problems of dissent are still present in Poland today. I have no intention of attempting an exhaustive analysis, but I should like to emphasise one point—that no purpose is to be served either by acting in such a way as to dishearten those who are willing to cooperate

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constructively, or to show to the door those who have already found a home in our midst and wish to stay there working for the common good. The following is an example of a conversation which should never have taken place: 'Who are you really, Mr Baum? What language is Baum? German. If you are German, then go to the *Vaterland*.' Old Baum was forced to swallow this and similar bitter pills. He did not leave for the *Vaterland* and his son demonstrated his identity with his smashed bones in the Warsaw Uprising.

A few words now about a special type of dissenter: he can be called a universalist. The ordinary man everywhere considers himself to be first and foremost a Pole, Hungarian, Greek, or Israeli, and only then to be a member of the human race. A universalist primarily feels that he belongs to the universal human community and only in the second instance that he is of a specific nationality. There is not enough room in any home for such a person. There is Poland—a home for Poles, Hellas—a home for Greeks, and Israel for the Israelis, but nowhere is there a home for man, the whole world already being occupied by national homes. Is homelessness in a human being a vice or a virtue? Can such a person be useful in those different homes or will he be shown to the door in each of them and told to find shelter elsewhere? Where? Nowhere? Does this mean everywhere but not with us? On the contrary, we should rear such people in Poland. We should regard it as an honour if our country, while remaining a Polish home, were to be friendly to universalists and prove to be for them as good as a universal home. Universalists are increasing and should increase in number, and are becoming progressively more important in their community. Their prime desire is to remain good citizens of their respective countries and yet to live in their own homes as in the universal home of man.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

ON READING RECENT SOVIET JUDAICA

Maurice Friedberg

WHAT is the picture of Jews, past and present, that emerges from recent Soviet sources? Given the existence in the USSR of popular anti-semitism (a fact never, to my knowledge, denied even by official Soviet spokesmen, though they prefer to speak of individual anti-semites only), and, as has often been asserted in the West, of officially abetted anti-semitism as well, the question is of some significance. Do the controlled Soviet media—for there are no other—strengthen the negative stereotype of the Jew that has persisted in Russia for centuries, or is the portrayal of recognisable Jews a fair one? The subject was touched upon briefly by George L. Kline in *Survey* of October 1965 in connection with his discussion of economic crime in the USSR. While I agree with Mr. Kline that the Soviet 'decrees concerning punishment for economic offences are *not* specifically anti-semitic'—even though Jews account for more than a third of those sentenced to death under these decrees—I find his other arguments singularly unconvincing. To begin with, the question of the laws *per se* is of secondary importance. It is their—to use a favourite Soviet term—'objective' repercussions that matter. And there can be no doubt that these have had a strongly anti-semitic flavour. Even a casual perusal of a source such as *Jews and the Jewish People*, a unique compilation of extracts from some 120 Soviet newspapers and magazines published periodically by the Contemporary Jewish Library in London, reveals that the publicity given to persons accused of economic crimes is such as to underline the fact that a disproportionate number of them are Jews. If the culprit's name is not readily identifiable as 'Jewish', then his 'Jewish' first name is given in full, instead of the customary initials; if this is not enough to reveal the individual's Jewish origins, then his patronymic is disclosed as well, and, failing that, 'incriminatingly' Jewish names of relatives and friends, often without any relevance to the story. No such devices are ordinarily employed where non-Jewish culprits are involved. Also, on many occasions, the 'humorous' quality of feuilletons in which such criminals are exposed is enhanced by the use of Yiddishisms or transparently 'Jewish' Russian expressions familiar to millions of Soviet citizens who know them from 'Jewish' jokes which have traditionally enjoyed a popularity in Russia rivalled only by that of 'Armenian' anecdotes. Lastly, Mr Kline fails to explain the curious fact that while Russia's Jews are, admittedly, disproportionately prominent in those areas of Soviet economic life in which embezzlement and other forms of illicit activity are rampant (e.g., state-owned commerce, light industry, etc.)

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these branches of the Soviet economy are not merely hotbeds of corruption. They are often lauded in the press for such achievements as increased and improved production and distribution, the introduction of time and money saving devices, and so forth. It stands to reason that the hundreds of thousands of Jews employed in these enterprises also have a part in this meritorious activity. Yet when 'positive' economic work is being publicised, no similar effort is made to emphasise the fact that an upright engineer with a Slavic-sounding last name also has a Jewish patronymic. A blatant instance of this procedure could be observed some two years ago when Khrushchev's declaration abroad that Jewish scientists had played a prominent part in the launching of the Soviet space satellites was deleted from the version of his remarks that was printed for home consumption. To pursue the parallel with Italian-American building contractors that was offered by Mr Kline: if Italian-American contractors (or owners of pizza parlours or espresso bars) were to figure consistently and prominently only in revelations of graft and negligence, but not in a large number of articles and series of articles on the progress in the American building industry or the virtues of pizza and espresso in combating alcoholism and juvenile delinquency, then I would not hesitate to point to this as serious evidence of an anti-Italian bias in American journalism. Given the fact that the Soviet press is government controlled, one has no alternative to assuming that its anti-semitic innuendos are officially encouraged or at least condoned.

ASIDE from this journalistic fare, what can an interested Soviet citizen learn about the Jewish past and present, about Jewish culture and religion, about the State of Israel, about Jews abroad, or, for that matter, within the Soviet boundaries? Nearly twenty years after Stalin's massacre of all the country's Jewish cultural institutions and more than a decade after the dictator's death, there are still no Jewish schools of any kind, religious or secular. The fewer than ten theology students at the Moscow *yeshiva* are the only persons in the USSR currently receiving any formal Jewish education. There are even no extension or correspondence courses in the Hebrew or the Yiddish language and literature or in Jewish history—not even in the officially-designated Jewish Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan. Nor are there, understandably, any textbooks or teaching aids, although, for reasons that remain a mystery, a Hebrew-Russian dictionary was printed in 1963. No permanent Yiddish theatre exists. Russia's Jewish press consists of *Der Birobidzhaner Shtern*, a local newspaper which appears twice a week and which accepts no outside subscriptions, and of *Sovietish Heimland*, a literary monthly published in Moscow. These, and very rarely a Yiddish novel or an anthology of verse, constitute what is euphemistically known as the 'national' Yiddish culture of the Soviet Union's two and a half million Jews, including over half a million native speakers of Yiddish.

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It comes as no surprise that in these conditions of premeditated cultural starvation of the country's Jewish community most Soviet citizens have scant factual knowledge of Jewish problems. To most, a Jew is merely one who is vulnerable to anti-semitic attacks and discrimination. Occasionally, however, foreign travellers returning from the USSR report encountering Soviet men and women, among them persons whose age would preclude their having received any formal Jewish schooling in the past, who, considering the circumstances, demonstrated an impressive degree of familiarity with Jewish subjects. These people were quite well versed in Jewish history and literature, knew the significance of Jewish holidays, and sometimes astounded their foreign acquaintances by citing in detail recent statistics on the number of rabbis and synagogues in the United States or the exact volume of Israel's citrus fruit exports.

How could they have gained access to this sort of information? Some of the facts, to be sure, could have been learned at home from parents and grandparents. An isolated few might have had previous contact with foreigners. A few others might have succeeded in obtaining western or Israeli books and periodicals dealing with Jewish religious or cultural subjects — or even Yiddish ones from some of the other communist countries, such as Poland or Rumania — all of them, technically, ' illegal ', since with few exceptions no foreign books, magazines, or newspapers (not even those from communist countries) are sold in the Soviet bookstores. (Thus, e.g., the lively Warsaw Yiddish publishing house has representatives and distributors in several western countries, but none in the USSR, the nearest and largest potential market.) We must presume, therefore, that the vast majority of these persons have received most of their information from officially sanctioned printed Soviet sources. True, no Soviet book dealing specifically with Jewish history has been published in decades, while G. A. Remenik's slim biography of Sholom Aleichem is the only recent entry in the field of Yiddish literary criticism. Outside of a few scholarly volumes dealing with the archaeology, linguistics, and history of the ancient Middle East, and a few volumes of fiction which will be discussed below, the only other Soviet ' Judaica ' are the generally crude attacks on Judaism as a religion (the few serious ones, brought out by the USSR Academy of Sciences, are normally anthologies of eighteenth and nineteenth-century rationalist critiques of Judaism by Western authors), as well as on Zionism and the State of Israel. Some of these have blatantly anti-semitic overtones, such as Trofim Kichko's notorious *Judaism Without Embellishment* brought out in 1963, or F. S. Mayatsky's *Contemporary Judaism and Zionism*, which appeared the following year. Others, like M. I. Shakhnovich's *The Decline of Judaic Religion* (1965), are more subdued in tone. With effort, however, the curious Soviet reader may succeed in gathering some purely factual information on subjects relating to the Jews, scattered through hundreds of Soviet

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scholarly and reference works. Naturally, even here the data are accompanied by commentaries that range from the strongly tendentious to the aggressively propagandist, and more often than not the sought after facts are inconspicuously buried under extraneous material. The sort of research this requires — hunting for isolated bits and pieces of information, collating them, and then ridding them of the editorial invective in which they are usually enveloped — is a rather arduous undertaking, but at present the interested Soviet citizen has no alternative. Perhaps the one major pitfall against which even highly sophisticated readers are quite defenceless are the deliberate distortions of fact, as distinct from a mere bias in their selection and interpretation, since the facts themselves cannot, as a rule, be checked against other sources.

We shall concentrate here on some of the basic reference works published since Stalin's death, on the assumption that these are the easiest to obtain, being available in most of the larger Soviet libraries, and unlikely to be replaced for some years.

THE Encyclopedic Dictionary (*Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, in progress, printed in 400,000 copies per volume) gives the figure of 12·7 million as the 1959 world Jewish population. All Soviet reference works give the population of Israel, but only two, the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia (*Ukrainska radianska entsiklopediia*, 100,000 copies per volume), and the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia (*Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia*, in progress, 65,000 copies per volume), provide a breakdown by countries of residence. The Ukrainian enumerates the figures for the Soviet Union, United States, Israel, Great Britain, Argentine, and France, while the Historical also offers data for Canada, Morocco, Algeria, Brazil, and Rumania, and is also the sole Soviet source mentioning the division of Jews into Ashkenazim (Western) and Sephardim (Oriental), and the existence in the USSR of non-western Jewish communities in the Caucasus, Georgia, and Central Asia. Most Soviet reference works mention the Nazi slaughter of six million Jews.

Difficulties set in with the definition of Jews, and the Soviet understanding of the term is contradictory and inconsistent in the extreme. The article on the Jews in the Little Soviet Encyclopedia (*Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 310,000 copies per volume) states that 'The Jews [is the] general name for the different ethnic groups [*narodnosti*] linked by a common religion and descent from an ancient Jewish ethnic group which lived in Palestine until the first centuries of the Common Era' — and then goes on to contradict itself by adding that 'the religious believers among the Jews are for the most part adherents of Judaism', thus suggesting that one may be a Jew and a Moslem or a Christian at the same time. (The same formulation, incidentally, is used in a number of recent Soviet books touching on the subject.) The Historical Encyclopedia takes a different view. It emphasises that all

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Jewish believers profess Judaism, but places somewhat more stress on the ethnic heterogeneity of the Jews who are, in its definition, not merely a conglomeration of various 'ethnic groups' but of various 'peoples' (*narody*). Several Soviet sources suggest that some adherents of Judaism are not Jews, but offer no specific examples. All Soviet reference works stress that the Jews are quite assimilated with their non-Jewish neighbours in all the countries of their dispersion. Thus, the Small Soviet Encyclopedia writes that 'the tremendous majority of the Jews speak the languages of the peoples among whom they dwell', and stresses the artificial character of modern Hebrew (*ivrit*): 'Spoken by approximately 1,346,000 persons, [Hebrew is] a language that was resurrected and is being fostered' (Yiddish, on the other hand, is 'the language of the Jewish population of eastern Europe'). It is interesting to note that in 1952, shortly before Stalin's death, the Large Soviet Encyclopedia (*Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 300,000 copies per volume), the fifty-odd volume set which is still to be found in every Soviet library and which is commonly recognised as the most authoritative of Soviet reference works, had already declared Yiddish dead: 'In the past, the Jews of Russia spoke Yiddish'. In general, the article continues, as a result of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policies, 'in the USSR and the people's democracies the Jews are rapidly assimilating with the peoples among whom they live'. In capitalist countries, according to the same source, the situation is more complex. The Jewish proletariat assimilates with the Gentile proletarians and the Jewish exploiting classes merge with their Gentile counterparts. It appears that for reasons that the Soviet writer chose not to explain only the Jewish petty-bourgeoisie refuses to assimilate and clings to its separate ways. The 'natural' and 'desirable' process of assimilation of the Jews is hindered, according to the Large Encyclopedia, by the insidious machinations of the Zionists — 'those agents of the Anglo-American imperialists and most vicious enemies of the Jewish toilers'.

Most Soviet sources claim that class distinctions divide the Jews even during anti-semitic persecutions. According to the post-Stalin Ukrainian Encyclopedia, only 'toiling Jews' suffer from anti-semitism, thus implying that anti-semitism does not affect the Jewish bourgeoisie. (This class approach to the problem of anti-semitism was made notorious by Khrushchev, who pointed out on one occasion that not only were Jews to be found in the past among the active supporters of tsarism, but that some of them had even assisted Nazi armies.) All recent Soviet encyclopedias and dictionaries have entries on anti-semitism and denounce it as an 'extreme form of racial chauvinism' rampant in the West and non-existent in the countries of the Soviet bloc; so did a volume of the Large Encyclopedia published in 1950, i.e., at the height of Stalin's anti-semitic persecutions.

Aside from a few abusive epithets, Zionism as such receives comparatively little attention in Soviet reference books. Much more

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abundant is the material on Judaism as a religion, and it is in the discussion of this subject that Soviet sources often assume an anti-semitic tone. According to a volume of the Ukrainian Encyclopedia printed in 1961, 'Judaism preaches disdain for members of other faiths, national separatism, "exceptionalism" and "chosenness" of the Jewish people, and rejects the idea of equality and friendship of peoples. Judaism was the basis for the appearance and growth of Zionism, one of the most reactionary forms of bourgeois nationalism'. Even the seemingly 'positive' aspects of Judaism — e.g., the Old Testament Prophets' appeals for social justice — are interpreted as having been prompted by evil motives. In the opinion of the Large Encyclopedia, the prophets of ancient Israel — obviously, sophisticated propagandists familiar with all the devices of the art of political warfare — denounced social evils in order to 'minimise the class contradictions' of the period and thus, presumably, to avert the eruption of a revolution.

Hostility and distortion are equally marked in the articles on the State of Israel, which is consistently presented as a militaristic spearhead of American imperialism in the Middle East (and recently also as its base for incursions into the newly independent African states), and a threat to the neighbouring Arab countries. All the recently published encyclopedias have separate entries on the 1956 'Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt'. The 1948–49 Israeli War of Independence is described by the Historical Encyclopedia as having been 'provoked by imperialist states, in the first place by England, which took advantage of the chauvinist tendencies of Israel's bourgeois-nationalist circles desirous of seizing all of Palestine and expelling the Arabs from it'. The article proceeds to deplore the defeat of the Arab states which it blames on disunity and corruption in their ranks. The prize, however, surely goes to the Ukrainian Encyclopedia, according to which it was Israel which attacked the Arab states in 1948, and it goes on to inform its readers that in present-day Israel 'as a result of racial discrimination almost no Arab children attend schools'.

NOTWITHSTANDING all these falsifications, careful perusal of these sources may yield a good deal of information otherwise unavailable in the USSR. The Little Encyclopedia has entries on and maps of the Israelite and Judean kingdoms, as well as brief articles on Moses, Solomon, Maimonides, and a number of other figures from Jewish history and literature, as does the Ukrainian Encyclopedia, which notes that 'a great literature was created in Yiddish'. The supplementary fifty-first volume of the Large Encyclopedia, brought out in 1958, lists scores of Jewish victims of Stalin's purges not mentioned in the earlier volumes, men who were posthumously rehabilitated, including several of the Soviet Yiddish writers executed in 1952. The Philosophical Encyclopedia, inaugurated in 1960 and still in progress (*Filosofskaia entsiklopediia*, 70,000 copies per volume), has several informative

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articles on Hellenistic and medieval Jewish thinkers, and relatively restrained, factual entries on the Bible, the Cabbala, and the Apocrypha. Its entry on Judaism explains to the Soviet reader some of the differences between Orthodox and Reform Judaism, mentions the three American centres for the training of rabbis, and then proceeds to decry the existence of the Synagogue Council of America with its four thousand houses of worship and three thousand Sunday schools which serve to poison the minds of countless children with religious superstitions. Many of these entries may also be found in abridged form in the one-volume Philosophical Dictionary (*Filosofskii slovar*) published in 1963 in 400,000 copies. Much data on Jewish history may be found in the Historical Encyclopedia. The six volumes of the projected twelve-volume set that have appeared so far have entries on the city of Jerusalem, on Bar Kochba, and on several of the Prophets.

There is no questioning the fact that the best Soviet source for the study of Judaism is, ironically, the Concise Scientific-Atheist Dictionary (*Kratkii nauchno-ateisticheskii slovar*), printed in 1964 in 60,000 copies. It has nearly a hundred entries relating to Judaism, including most of the major religious holidays, the books of the Bible, customs, and so forth. Readers interested in the State of Israel will find the yearbooks of the Large Encyclopedia rewarding. These give up-to-date facts and figures on such diverse subjects as Israel's industrial and agricultural output with breakdowns by specific branches, the number of schools and students at every level, libraries and their holdings, physicians and hospital beds, political parties and the number of seats each has in the Knesset, manpower and arms strength of Israel's armed forces, and the exact amount of money Israel has been receiving in American 'aid' (invariably put in quotation marks).

A considerable amount of material dealing with Jewish culture is found in the articles in the Theatrical Encyclopedia (*Teatralnaia entsiklopediia*) and the Concise Literary Encyclopedia (*Kratkaia literaturnaia entsiklopediia*), both still in progress: so far, three volumes of the first (41,000 copies each) and two of the second (113,000) have appeared. The Theatrical Encyclopedia had a long entry on the Yiddish theatre (a separate one on Mikhoels' disbanded Moscow State Yiddish Theatre is to appear in a subsequent volume), and shorter ones on the Israeli theatre (with a separate one on the Habimah), and on several major figures in the history of the Yiddish stage, including Abraham Goldfaden, Jacob Gordin, and Peretz Hirschbein. The Literary Encyclopedia contains brief but useful general accounts of Biblical, medieval Hebrew, and modern Yiddish literature, as well as separate articles on Yiddish literature in Poland and in the United States, the latter documented with a list of contemporary 'progressive' and 'reactionary' authors (Bashevis Singer and Auerbach, for instance, are accused of waging an embittered 'cold war' against the Soviet Union and the forces of progress in general). The article mentions the IKUF,

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a left-wing American Yiddish cultural organisation, the journal *Yiddishe Kultur*, several almanacs and anthologies, etc. The overall impression is one of the vitality of Jewish cultural life in the United States; unintentionally, the article suggests an unfavourable parallel with the state of Jewish culture in the USSR. If one is to judge by the first two volumes which cover approximately one-fourth of the Cyrillic alphabet, the Literary Encyclopedia promises to become the best Soviet source for the study of Jewish culture. It has, not unexpectedly, numerous entries on Soviet Yiddish writers, past and present (so far, on Zelik Akselrod, Moishe Altman, Rokhl Baumvol, Dovid Bergelson, Shira Gorshman, Dovid Hofshtein, Motl Grubian, Shike Driz, Shmul Halkin, Tevye Gen, Avrom Gontar, Eli Gordon, and, of course, Aron Vergelis, the present editor of *Sovietish Heimland* and post-Stalin Russia's semi-official spokesman on Jewish affairs). The biographies of those murdered during Stalin's mass slaughter of Jewish writers and artists are all supplied with the formula now customarily used by Soviet reference works in biographies of the victims of Stalin's terror — 'unlawfully repressed; rehabilitated posthumously'. For the first time, however, Soviet readers were informed that these were not individual victims but members of a group singled out for annihilation:

> A heavy blow was dealt Yiddish literature during Stalin's personality cult. Many noted writers and critics were, though innocent, repressed and perished. Among these were P. Markish, D. Hofshtein, D. Bergelson, I. Fefer, L. Kvitko and others. After the 20th Party Congress, principles of Leninist nationality policy were restored and conditions were created for the continued development of Yiddish literature.

There are several entries on pre-Soviet Yiddish writers and a few on non-Soviet Yiddish writers living abroad, the latter mostly left-wing, though there are exceptions. Sholem Asch, for example, is recognised as a talented novelist whose concern with social injustice is, unfortunately, marred by strong religious and nationalist tendencies. There are also several articles on western authors who wrote on Jewish subjects in languages other than Yiddish (e.g., Jakob Wasserman, Franz Werfel, Max Brod; the latter, better known as the biographer of Kafka, a writer to be dealt with in a subsequent volume of the Encyclopedia, is called 'the chronicler of the mores of Austria's Jewish bourgeoisie' and a 'champion of the idea of religious proselytizing'). In addition to an article on Judah Halevy (described as a gifted lyrical poet and also the author of religious poems which 'reflect the hard lot of the people during the Crusades'. In *Sefer ha-Kuzari* Halevy expounds the principles of Judaism in the form of a dialogue between representatives of different religions and condemns the teachings of Aristotle from reactionary positions), one also finds an item on the nineteenth-century Hebrew poet Yehuda Leib Gordon (lauded here for his anti-clericalism), and a brief entry on the foremost modern Israeli writer Shmuel Yosef

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Agnon. Most remarkable, however, is the article on Chaim Nachman Bialik, hitherto treated as a symbol of reactionary Jewish nationalism and unmentioned in the standard Soviet sources:

> Even though a certain part of his work is linked with the bourgeois Zionist movement and is permeated with a nationalist romantic pathos . . . in his best works he rises to the stature of a national people's poet. . . . His fiery verses about the pogroms organised by the tsarist government written in the idiom of the Bible and the Prophets, his impassioned appeals to struggle against social and ethnic injustice, his brilliant, profoundly emotional, cycles of lyrical poems dealing with themes of love and nature, unique in their originality, have earned Bialik the love of his readers. . . . Bialik's works were frequently published in Russian in Moscow and St Peterburg (1910–12, 1918). Maxim Gorky called Bialik 'a great poet, a rare and perfect embodiment of the spirit of his people'.

The quotation from Gorky was supplied with an exact reference and was, no doubt, aimed at silencing neo-stalinist critics who might otherwise have protested against such an enthusiastic appraisal of the 'nationalist' Hebrew poet. As for the bibliography, it was probably meant as an indirect invitation to Soviet readers to try to find his works in the libraries. The same stratagem seems to have been employed in the February 1965 issue of *Sovietish Heimland*, in which the editors referred their readers to a Hebrew and Yiddish alphabet chart with Latin and Cyrillic transliterations which had recently appeared in the Literary Encyclopedia (similar, though less satisfactory charts may be found in other reference works as well). In this fashion the Soviet Yiddish journal seems to suggest to its readers how best to bypass the virtual Soviet ban on the teaching of the language by using the chart as a sort of Yiddish primer.

IN spite of the official rehabilitation of the Yiddish writers executed by Stalin's police, most of their writing is still not available; the best anthology of their works is the 800-page Yiddish volume published in 1964 in Tel Aviv (*A shpigl oif a shtein*, Khone Shmeruk, ed.). The total number of Yiddish books printed in the USSR in recent years is fewer than ten, and most of these are classics (Sholom Aleichem, Peretz, Mendele). The most interesting recent Yiddish publication is *Horizontn* (Horizons), an anthology of contemporary verse which includes some poetry of real merit. The exceptionally beautiful Yiddish in which most of the poems are written, is, incidentally, remarkably free of Russicisms, as is the Yiddish of *Sovietish Heimland*, which is otherwise — by present day Soviet standards — a militantly political periodical of great ideological rigidity, its Jewish content by and large limited to the settings of stories, occasionally nostalgic memoirs, and infrequent brief news items about Yiddish variety shows and Jewish cultural activities abroad held under the auspices of pro-Soviet groups. To *Sovietish Heimland*

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belongs the dubious distinction of being probably the world's only Jewish periodical to completely ignore Yevgenii Yevtushenko's *Babii Yar* — an indictment of anti-semitism by a Soviet poet, from Soviet positions, and originally printed in a Soviet periodical. (In 1965, however, *Sovietish Heimland* did print a Yiddish translation of the episode in Yevtushenko's poem *The Bratsk Power Station* describing a Jewish survivor of Nazism, now an engineer in Siberia.) There are other signs that the periodical may be undergoing some change: the June 1965 issue featured translations of medieval Hebrew poets and a review article on Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* The much-advertised anthology *Azoi lebn mir* (That's how we live), brought out in 1964 in 15,000 copies and readily available abroad but difficult to obtain in the Soviet Union, was in any case transparently intended for foreign consumption. It is a propagandist compilation of essays, travelogues, and short stories aimed at refuting western charges of Soviet anti-semitism. It depicts Soviet Jews as active in different occupations —which is true—and as completely assimilated with the non-Jewish population around them—which is not true. Conspicuously absent from the book are any references to Jewish cultural interests, to religious practices, to attempts to impart to the younger generation any Jewish knowledge, to any contacts with or interest in the Jews abroad, and to the existence of anti-semitism. The book's Soviet Jews, then, are 'typical' in the sense in which the term was used by theoreticians of socialist-realism during the Zhdanov era: that is how the party *wants* them to live, and that is how they *will* live—some time in the future, if the party's plans materialise.

In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of translations from the Yiddish: a six-volume set of Sholom Aleichem (225,000 copies per volume) was completed in 1961, and translations of some of the other classics and of several Soviet Yiddish writers. One should also mention the recent anthology of translations of contemporary Soviet Yiddish verse (*Stikhi evreiskikh poetov*) and a volume of Israeli poetry, the latter consisting largely of political verse by Jewish and Arab communist authors, while some of the other texts have been mutilated by Soviet censors.

Occasionally, some western material of Jewish interest is brought in from abroad. Thus, several years ago a visiting Italian troupe, after much haggling, was allowed to give two performances of *The Diary of Anne Frank*; subsequently there was a small Soviet edition of the book. The monthly *Inostrannaia literatura* occasionally prints translations of similar material, such as Arthur Miller's *Incident at Vichy.*

Finally, interesting vignettes of Jewish cultural life in the USSR during the first decades of the Soviet regime may be found in commemorative volumes of different kinds (e.g., *Mikhoels: stati, besedy, rechi. Vospominaniia o Mikhoelse*, 1965), and in a number of memoirs by Soviet men of letters. Of these, by far the most important are those

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of Ilya Ehrenburg, now easily the most famous Jew in the USSR. Ehrenburg's memoirs contain many pages devoted to Jews (in fact, in scores of cases Ehrenburg is the only Soviet source to indicate that many 'positive' political and cultural figures of this century, both in Russia and elsewhere, were Jews, a fact usually concealed in other Soviet books). The memoirs are also the most outspoken attack on anti-semitism to appear in the USSR for many years: Ehrenburg never misses an opportunity to emphasise that in our times anti-semitism cannot be separated from Nazism.

> I am linked with the Jews by the trenches in which the Nazis buried old women and infants. Weeds that sprung up from the seeds of racism were followed in the past by rivers of blood. I am linked with the Jews by the persistence of prejudice and bias. When I spoke on the radio on my seventieth birthday, I told my readers that I will continue saying that I am a Jew as long as one anti-semite remains alive. It was not nationalism that prompted these words, but my notion of what constitutes human dignity and self-respect. I continue to believe that anti-semitism is an evil survival of the past and that it will disappear when all racial prejudices disappear; except that now I am aware that cleansing human consciousness of centuries-old prejudices will require a long time.

Given sufficient determination, perseverance in research, and the ability to separate objective facts from biased interpretations, a resident of the Soviet Union with access to a good library may succeed in obtaining a hazy image of the Jewish heritage and of contemporary Jewish life. That this requires such effort and skill in itself illustrates the virtual blackout imposed in the USSR on cultural and religious Judaica. Other than some works of fiction printed in recent years, a single solid book on Jewish history could impart more factual knowledge of the subject than all that could possibly be gathered from the Soviet sources currently available. In the meantime, the only Judaica readily within reach of the average Soviet citizen are the countless newspaper and magazine articles about Judaism, which somehow appears to be even more reactionary than are the other religions; about Israel, which turns out to be more 'imperialist' than its 'imperialist masters' themselves; and about homegrown Soviet embezzlers and black marketeers who suspiciously often happen to bear clearly Jewish names.

MARXISM IN FRANCE TODAY

Pierre Naville

MARXISM IN MODERN FRANCE* is an interesting attempt to interpret the crisis of Marxism in France or, better, the new system of social problems

* George Lichtheim, **Marxism in Modern France,** Columbia University Press, 1966, 198 pp.

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deriving from the revision of Marxism since 1950. (Unfortunately the author never uses the word ' problem ', commonly employed by French writers and more characteristic than words such as ' crisis ' or ' revision '.) According to Mr Lichtheim the main cause of this crisis is the recent industrial metamorphosis in France: state intervention in all sectors of social life, state planning, the diminished hostility between theoretical classes (wage-earning proletariat and private capitalists) in favour of the ill-balanced hierarchies of functions over which technocracy now dominates. It is in this context that he places the philosophical and even literary arguments, political debate, the attempt to work out theory and to re-examine history. On the whole Mr Lichtheim is well informed and his book is a useful introduction to the evolution of social thought in France. But there are some mistakes that make us uneasy. On p. 158 he says: ' When Lenin in 1920 defined communism as " electrification plus soviets " he was unconsciously reverting to Saint-Simon. . . . The Stalinist dictatorship, with its exaltation of the engineer, was Saint-Simonian to the hilt, and quite properly gained the applause of numerous *polytechniciens*, some of whom in their enthusiasm even joined the communist party.' Lenin put it in reverse order: the soviets, plus electrification . . . the soviets coming first! And could Mr Lichtheim name a single *polytechnicien* who praised the Stalinist dictatorship and joined the French Communist Party? On p. 197 he writes that Marx did not share Engels's ' illusions ' on the dialectics of nature and that he ' would [not] have wasted his time on an attempt to construct an all-embracing system to take the place of Hegel's '. *Of course* he had no ambition to build a philosophical system on Hegel's model. But neither had Engels. Moreover, their correspondence bears witness to the fact that Marx and Engels (in 1858, 1860, 1870, 1873 . . .) often discussed the elaboration of a natural, experimental, and synthetic dialectics of nature. I clearly brought out these discussions in my preface to *Dialectique de la Nature* (Paris, 1950).

These remarks, to which I could add many others of the same sort, show the difficulties of the method chosen by Mr Lichtheim for expounding his ideas. In the first part of his book he defines the tendencies of French socialism and syndicalism in terms of their principal theoreticians, before going on to define the big rift between communists (Soviet style) and socialists (bourgeois-democratic style) in the years 1918 to 1939. In the second part he presents a picture of the transformation of Marxist theory (philosophical debates), and of the relations between the state and society (industrial and political mutation) on the basis of books and articles that interpret these in a conservative or innovating sense. This method has a number of disadvantages. First, it leads to overestimating literary publications that have left hardly any trace, and this gives rise to a certain lack of balance in the importance attached to the subjects under review. Secondly, events and the real labour and socialist movement take second place and it is no longer easy to understand why certain problems arose at the moment they did. By taking a series of publications as his guiding thread the author gives the impression of not always understanding the exact sort of determinism that lies beneath the reclassification of the political and social (and even philosophical) ideas he is studying. The French reader will supplement them by instinct, but the foreign reader runs the risk

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of being misled. It would have been preferable to describe the wide historical framework of the new system of French social problems since 1940–1945, then to examine how the socialist, Marxist, and syndicalist traditions created an obstacle to it and how it has brought with it new tendencies which in fact today allow us to single out the early symptoms of a neo-Marxism or of a renovated socialism.

In this way many of the ideas here outlined with a discriminating and perspicacious eye could have been given deeper development. In particular the author would have noted that *outside* influences have played an essential and possibly central part in today's crisis in French Marxism. Mr Lichtheim writes that France is still Europe's political laboratory. This judgment is very flattering for the French but it is rather too traditional. It would be better to say that the French of today are very clever at assimilating and recasting the social and political ideas that have come from abroad. This is all the more true now that, despite all Gaullism's grandiloquence, France (both bourgeois and working-class) no longer has the place she once held in the world. Mr Lichtheim notes the revival of French interest in the Hegelian tradition, including the Hegelianism of Marx's young days—not to mention the persistent interest in Nietzsche and the more recent influence of Husserl and Heidegger. But emphasis should have been put on many other influences, possibly less literary and aesthetic, but bound up with the most important social and political upheavals in Europe and the world. From this point of view Mr Lichtheim's thesis, or at least the impression he has formed of the kernel of Marxism's new preoccupations in France, seems rather narrow. He sees in the French evolution since 1950 an originality which to me seems debatable, at least up to the present time. Possibly it is the freedom of political arguments in France and the conjunction between literature and politics which is deep-rooted in this country's tradition that urge the author on to underline this originality. But if we put the crisis and evolution of French Marxism back into the framework of international transformations, we shall soon see that the latter have at least as much definitive influence as the domestic metamorphoses in the political and economic system of metropolitan France.

So it seems to me that the import and significance of Mr Lichtheim's conclusions, which in themselves are interesting, would be widened if we added—to the subjects he has dealt with in the second part of his book—a study of events which he merely touches on, if he takes them into account at all. These events can be viewed in terms of the French crisis itself. The following points should be examined—I merely provide a list: the end of French traditional colonialist and imperialist power, both overseas and in eastern Europe, after the loss of a number of wars and the success of a number of revolutions; the attempt at integration into a united Europe, at least western Europe; the new relations embarked on with the United States and the formidable impact of that power on French industrial, scientific, economic, and even literary life; the crisis in the Soviet system since Stalin's death and the return of post-stalinism to a kind of bureaucratic empiricism; the emancipation of Asia and the forms assumed by the Chinese revolution, including the growing antagonism between China and the Soviet Union. Here I am only mentioning the principal changes. The positive side of the crisis in French Marxism, above all since 1960, lies in the sort of enthusiasm

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and youthful spirit in which it has welcomed these events and used them as elements for its own renewal. From this point of view Mr Lichtheim does not seem to be quite accurate when he ascribes to the evolution of the French Communist Party a sterility, impotence, and conformism which merely reflect the present state of the 'Soviet model'. Similarly the 'leftist' tendencies, which go so far as to deny the role of parties if not trade unions, can hardly be put in direct relationship with the 'Chinese' tendencies in the workers' movement. And yet again one cannot help wondering whether the 'revisionists' (notably those of the *Parti Socialiste Unifié*) with whom Mr Lichtheim seems to sympathise, do not derive as large a part of their ideas from the Americanisation (industrialisation) of economic life as from purely French attempts at planning. In this sense it could be said that the crisis of Marxism in France expresses to a large extent the sudden awareness on the part of the labour and socialist movement of its backwardness in relation to world evolution. It is from an awareness of this time-lag that the various sorts of contemporary 'revisionists' draw their main strength. In the last few years the subject of '*autogestion*' has come up and needs to be added to those Mr Lichtheim examines—it has taken the place of the old philosophical discussion on 'alienation'. But as is all too plain, this subject received a powerful impetus in France from the crises of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, and subsequently from the Yugoslav and Algerian experiences in the same field.

Thanks to his careful documentation on the polemics of recent years, Mr Lichtheim's book has the merit of allowing us to reflect usefully on these different points. One of the conclusions I draw from it, while bearing in mind the observations above, is that the renewed Marxism whose form is now beginning to appear in France will gain its full strength when it spreads over the French frontiers and joins up with efforts at further political and social discoveries that are being made throughout Europe, not to mention new, world-scale movements. The crisis in Marxism can be called an international phenomenon. It will not be resolved in France by French efforts alone, even though it may take special forms there; and the same can be said of every single other European country.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

Peter Nettl

GEORGES HAUPT IS WHAT Stalin contemptuously called an 'archive rat'—and I use this term without any pejorative connotations. For, as regards the archives of the Second International, *il y a de quoi* to be a rat—as Haupt's collections amply demonstrate.* He has mined the splendid and

* Georges Haupt (ed.), **Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans 1905–1914,** Editions Mouton, Paris/The Hague 1963.
Georges Haupt, **La deuxième Internationale 1889–1914: Etude critique des sources. Essai bibliographique,** Paris 1964, Institut Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milan, and Mouton & Co., The Hague.
Georges Haupt (ed.), **Le Congrès Manqué: l'internationale à la veille de la première guerre mondiale. Etude et documents,** Paris 1965.

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hitherto unexplored seams of Camille Huysmans' archive. Huysmans was secretary of the Bureau of the Second International from 1905 until the war, and later carried his archives from Antwerp to Brussels and back again between the two wars, from one important position in the Belgian state to another. The fact that some of the content was damaged only serves to enhance the determined extractive activity of the good archive rat, for it calls for precisely those qualities of documentary analysis in which Haupt excels. Then there is the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam, about which one could well write an archival history (and no doubt somebody will). Now housed in stately if inadequate premises by the side of one of Amsterdam's *Grachten*, its collections are a goldmine of archival material on both the Second and the Third International, little of it published (its publications assuredly seem to take longer than anyone else's), most of it ordered, and some of it as yet completely unexplored. The real twin heroes of Haupt's bibliography, then, are the Huysmans collections and the Institute in Amsterdam.

Haupt has collated all these and other sources in the three works under review. The first concerns the correspondence between Lenin and Huysmans between 1905 and 1914. Like all complete editions of correspondence it is variable in interest; even Lenin really writes no differently from anyone else when it comes to sending small subscriptions and acknowledging receipt of circulars. But also in this collection are some of the summaries he wrote for the benefit of the Executive Council of the International to explain his position, and that of the Bolsheviks, in their fight against the party opponents whom Lenin generically condemned as liquidators. The reader who is not interested in following this verbose dispute through the Russian sources can obtain a very concise and clear idea from this collection of the issues as viewed by Lenin.

The second book is more ambitious—even though the title is a misnomer; it is not so much a bibliography of the Second International as a bibliography of its institutions, particularly the publications of its nine congresses (plus the tenth destined for Vienna in August 1914 which never took place), the Bureau of the Socialist International, and of various meetings and conferences of subsidiary international organisations. It is a valuable source book as to what documents exist, and where, in relation to these institutions. Again, the value varies considerably. The conferences and meetings are of little interest when compared with the activities of the Bureau and of the congresses themselves. Haupt, in his introduction, quite rightly points up one very much neglected aspect of these sources, which could be of great value to the social historian of the period: the reports which member parties of the International presented to each congress about their activities during the preceding period.

Finally there is Haupt's documentation of the detailed plans for the Vienna congress of August 1914, which was swept away by the war: the *congrès manqué*. This includes the reports of the various commissions which sat earlier and would have reported to the congress, as well as the very important and hitherto unpublished reports of the final meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in Brussels on 29 and 30 July 1914, when the delegates faced the danger of the impending war and discussed their possible courses of action. Both the protocols themselves,

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in the abbreviated form of Huysman's notes, as well as Haupt's comments on the meeting, do add substantially to our knowledge of this sad, hopeless, and—as history showed—valedictory event.

In presenting these three studies, Haupt has rendered a very valuable bibliographical service. There can be no one as familiar with the documentation of the Second International, particularly in its institutional aspect. Nor, of course, is his knowledge confined to the actual documents which he has catalogued or printed; he is familiar with, and has been able to make use of, most of the detailed studies, analyses, and evaluations of the period in Russian, French, German, Italian, and English. Reading his prefaces and notes is therefore a very useful introduction to the literature on and of the Second International. Unfortunately, Haupt's own analyses do not go very much further. The reader's sense of dissatisfaction is particularly strong with *La deuxième Internationale*. This is a French university *thèse* at its best and worst. Haupt is well aware that beyond the little methodological questions there lurk big historical and epistemological ones; frequently his rhetorical questions point them up. But hardly ever are we given even a glimpse of a satisfactory answer. Particularly disappointing is the chapter entitled ' History of the Socialist International or International History of Socialism? '. Intellectual fashion demands a genuflection in the direction of social history, concerned with the mass periphery rather than the elite institutions, concerned also with the process of socialist action rather than its ideological window-dressing. Haupt accordingly bends his knee, but he contributes little in the way of any attack on the problem. He is equally well aware that any study of the Second International in its institutional aspect must raise the problem of whether we are dealing with an organisation whose task it was to arrange congresses and circularise correspondence, or an effective machinery for co-ordinating international action. It was clearly the former, and Haupt confirms this; but his hesitant discussion hardly does justice to the problem. After all, much of the emphatic Bolshevik insistence on discipline in the Third International sprang from their jaundiced view of the excessive freedom of national parties to go their own way before the First World War. The documents weigh heavy, and Haupt never really succeeds in lightening their load.

These drawbacks are somewhat less marked in the other two books, where the focus is somewhat more precise. The introduction to the Lenin/Huysmans correspondence does greater justice to the material and is written with much more verve. It effectively answers the official communist view that Lenin was already thinking of a breakaway from the International during the first decade of the twentieth century, and shows clearly how much importance Lenin attached to the institutions of the Second International. Haupt rightly stresses that the emphatic attachment to the International as the supreme policy-making body was a specifically left-wing attitude, which Lenin shared with Rosa Luxemburg and others. Huysmans' remark, reproduced in the introduction to this volume, that ' it seems certain to me that if the allies had not sent their armies into Russia to try to restore the Tsar, the split in the social-democratic movement would not have taken place ' goes much further than either Haupt or his evidence. What also emerges from this volume of Lenin's correspondence is a characterisation of Huysmans and his function as secretary of the International Socialist Bureau. It was a

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thankless task, in the execution of which he was forever being blamed either for doing too much or not enough. Huysmans clearly carried out his task with impartiality, efficiency, and only an occasional sarcastic sortie in order to round up the more laggard or cantankerous of his subscribers and correspondents.

Haupt's introduction to the *Congrès manqué* provides a circumstantial setting for the documents. Historians will find particularly useful the discussion of the last meeting of the International Bureau at the end of July, since this has been little known hitherto. Also illuminating is the way in which Haupt has traced the basic divergence in attitude and conflict over policy between the French and the Germans; the former accustomed to participation in politics and accordingly determined to make their influence felt on their government, particularly over questions of war and peace, the latter abstentionist, self-regarding, and overwhelmed by a feeling of impotence. Haupt does not, however, point up the strange paradox of subsequent events; in the end there was more effective opposition against the war among socialists in Germany than in France. It therefore seems historically unjust that the German social-democrats should carry a much larger share of the blame in communist eyes than the French—though it does reflect Lenin's own misguided over-valuation of German social-democracy and his subsequent disappointment.

RUSSIA AND ASIA

Geoffrey Wheeler

CONSIDERED SIMPLY AS HISTORIOGRAPHY this is an interesting and useful book.* Three preliminary chapters are concerned with Marxism and Asia and with Soviet policy towards Asia during the first ten years since the 1917 Revolution. The remainder of the book consists of two chapters each on the Soviet Union and Turkey and Iran, and one on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The section on each country is followed by a separate conclusion, and four pages of general 'Conclusions' sum up the author's findings on the unfolding of Soviet policy during the period under review. The whole work is abundantly documented from Soviet and Western sources. The author's wide reading and his use of some hitherto untapped source-material deserved much greater attention to such details as the spelling of names. For example, he has Nachchivan, Kakkichevan and Nakhitchevan for the same place, which is more properly and usually spelt Nakhichevan. Similarly, he has Haflin for Khalfin, Swearington for Swearingen, and Nicholson for Nicolson.

Himself an Asian, Mr Kapur's study provides an interesting insight into what is perhaps the general impression created in the Asian intellectual mind by the phenomenon of communist and Soviet policy. Neither communist ideology nor its principal exponent the Soviet Union has ever

* **Soviet Russia and Asia: 1917-27. A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.** By Harish Kapur. Michael Joseph for the Geneva Institute of International Studies. 1966. p. 266. Map. Bibliography. 45s.

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seemed so potentially dangerous to Asians as they have to Europeans. Indeed, in Asian eyes the merit acquired by communism as an enemy of the imperialist West has in the past to a large extent obscured the fact that the communist powers may be no less addicted to imperialism than those of the West.

But besides being an Asian intellectual, Mr Kapur is a scholar who is temperamentally inclined to approach his subject with objectivity and integrity. While, therefore, he seems to have started out with the aim of vindicating Soviet policy towards Asia, and implies in his general Conclusions that he has done so, the material on the unfolding of Soviet Asian policy up to 1927 which he has so painstakingly assembled does not create anything like such a favourable impression of that policy as is generally imparted by Asian writers and expressed by or attributed to Asian statesmen.

Mr Kapur states in his introduction that 'the Bolsheviks saw in their policy in Asia an essential unity of the two basic objectives—the objective of safeguarding the security of the Soviet State and the objective of world revolution, of which the nationalist revolutions in Asia constituted an integral part'. This proposition, which with the substitution of the words 'important and indispensable' for 'integral' is repeated in the Conclusions, constitutes his main thesis. He sets out 'to determine how this remarkable and unique unity' was attained and 'whether it really contributed to the enhancement of Soviet prestige and policy' in Asia. But it is by no means clear from the evidence adduced by Mr Kapur that the Soviet Government consciously regarded these two objectives as interdependent. The 'basic objective' of the Soviet Government and the Soviet Communist Party was certainly to 'eliminate British influence' from the areas adjacent to Soviet territory and they believed, not only during the period under review but at various times since, that they could manipulate nationalist movements towards this end. It is quite another thing to make out that 'Soviet assistance to the nationalist forces played a decisive role in the decline of imperialism' (p. 86). This has not been the considered opinion of nationalist leaders in Turkey and Persia, where the ultimate objective of the Soviet government—and of the Tsarist government before it—has always been held to be the overthrow of these countries' independence.

Even in Afghanistan, where Soviet moral support during the Third Afghan War is from time to time judiciously recognised, few if any Afghans would regard it as having been *decisive*. As can easily be established from Soviet writing up to the time of the twentieth party congress of 1956, the strong nationalist governments established in Turkey and Persia between 1917 and 1927, and in Afghanistan a few years later following the downfall of the Soviet protégé Amanullah, were not at all to the Soviet liking. Indeed, by 1927 Russian political, cultural, and economic influence in Turkey and Persia had not only, as Mr Kapur admits, not significantly increased, but it was already on the decline, and by 1934 stood lower in all three countries than at any time before or after the Revolution.

In common with many other writers on Soviet policy towards Asia, Mr Kapur seems to overlook the fact that over one-third of the territory of Asia is under Soviet rule. He roundly condemns those who ignore the fact that 'the Soviet leadership, at least during the first few years after

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the revolution, seriously believed in renouncing all that had been forcibly acquired by Russia and which rightfully belonged to other nations'. Earlier however (p. 38), he states that by 1920 'it became possible for Soviet Russia to bring under her control the eastern borderlands which had declared their independence from Moscow immediately after the October Revolution'. It is difficult to see how these two statements can be made to tally, or what justification there was for Soviet support of the 'nationalist revolutions' in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan at the very time that the subject peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus were once more being bulldozed into submission. The complete contrast between the Soviet attitudes towards nationalism inside and outside the Soviet Union is typical of all imperialist regimes; but this is no reason why it should be almost entirely ignored in the present study, especially when there are strong cultural affinities between the Muslim peoples of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan and those of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Mr Kapur's references to nationalist trends in Soviet Asia are meagre and not remarkable for their accuracy, particularly in his brief description of Sultangaliyev's movement. Ryskulov, incidentally, was a Kazakh, not a delegate from Kazan.

As a narrative of events in the early development of Soviet policy in the Muslim borderlands of the USSR Mr Kapur's study is workmanlike and objective. As a piece of political commentary and interpretation it is inconclusive and open to considerable argument.

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